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Kurzzusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation setzt sich aus fünf Forschungspapieren zusammen. Jedes Kapitel enthält 
ein Papier. Das erste Kapitel untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen der Größe des 
Kundenstamms einer Firma und ihrem Gewinn in einem Markt mit Wechselkosten. Entgegen 
unserer Intuition wird gezeigt, dass Firmen nicht immer von einer Vergrößerung ihres 
Kundenstamms profitieren, weil diese die Intensität des Wettbewerbs beeinflusst. Kapitel 2 
führt eine ähnliche Untersuchung durch, aber für einen Markt, in dem die Konsumenten 
unvollständig über die Standorte der Anbieter informiert sind. Es zeigt sich auch hier, dass 
eine Firma nicht immer von einem großen Kundenstamm profitiert. Die zugrunde liegenden 
Mechanismen unterscheiden sich jedoch deutlich von denen in Kapitel 1. Kapitel 3 ist eine 
Erweiterung des Modells mit unvollständiger Konsumenteninformation hin zu einer 
vollständig dynamischen Version. Im Zentrum der Analyse stehen nun die dynamischen 
Eigenschaften des Modells. Unter den Annahmen über die graduelle Verbreitung von 
Information auf der Konsumentenseite entsteht Trägheit in den Marktanteilen der Firmen. 
Dynamik entsteht im Modell ausschließlich aufgrund der Verwendung von gemischten 
Preisstrategien. Kapitel 4 analysiert Wettbewerb in einem vertikal differenzierten Markt. Hier 
gibt es keine Trägheit auf der Nachfrageseite. Das Hauptergebnis der Analyse ist, dass 
Wohlfahrtsverluste, die im Duopol aus ineffizienter Qualitätswahl resultieren, in Märkten mit 
drei oder mehr Wettbewerbern fast vollständig verschwinden. Dieses überraschende Ergebnis 
resultiert aus einem Regimewechsel in der Art des Wettbewerbs, der beim Übergang vom 
Duopol zum Markt mit drei Wettbewerbern auftritt. Kapitel 5 ist eine Erweiterung von 
Kapitel 4. Während in Kapitel 4 ein quadratischer Zusammenhang zwischen Kosten bzw. 
Zahlungsbereitschaft und Qualität angenommen wurde, wird die Analyse nun für eine 
allgemeinere nicht-lineare Abhängigkeit durchgeführt. Es werden grundlegende Einsichten 
über das Funktionieren von vertikal differenzierten Märkten vermittelt. So zeigt sich, dass der 
allgemein postulierte Vorteil der Firma mit der höheren Produktqualität nicht allgemeingültig 
ist. Ob dieser besteht, hängt von der Art der strategischen Interaktion ab. 
 
Schlagwörter:  Kundenstamm, Wechselkosten, unvollständige Information, Marktanteile, 
vertikale Differenzierung
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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of five independent research papers. Each chapter represents one 
paper. The first chapter analyzes the shape of the relation between the size of a firm’s 
customer base and profit in a market with consumer switching costs. Contrary to common 
wisdom, it is shown that a firm is not automatically better off with a larger customer base, as 
the size of its customer base affects the intensity of price competition. Chapter 2 performs a 
similar exercise, but for a market where consumers are not fully informed about the locations 
of the different suppliers. Once more, it is shown that firms do not always benefit from an 
increase in the size of their customer base. However, the underlying mechanisms are rather 
different than in the model with switching costs. Chapter 3 is an extension of the model 
introduced in chapter 2 to a fully dynamic game. The focus of chapter 3 is on the dynamics in 
a market with incomplete consumer information. Under the assumptions about the gradual 
diffusion of information among consumers, there is inertia in the market shares. Dynamics are 
generated solely by the firms’ usage of mixed pricing strategies. Chapter 4 analyzes 
competition in a vertically differentiated market. There is no inertia on the demand side. The 
main result of the analysis is, that welfare losses that stem from an inefficient choice of 
qualities in the duopoly case, disappear almost completely as soon as three or more 
competitors are in the market. This surprising result is related to a regime change in the nature 
of competition that occurs at the transition from duopoly to triopoly. Chapter 5 is an extension 
of chapter 4. Whereas the model introduced in chapter 4 was based on a quadratic relation 
between costs or willingness-to-pay and quality, the analysis is now extended to a more 
general non-linear dependency. The analysis provides fundamental insights into the 
functioning of vertically differentiated markets. Interestingly, the well-known high-quality 
advantage is not a robust feature of these markets. Whether it is obtained, depends on the 
nature of strategic interaction between the firms. 
 
Keywords:  customer base, switching costs, incomplete information, market share, vertical 
differentiation
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Allgemeine Einführung 
In der ökonomischen Literatur wurde lange Zeit angenommen, dass Konsumenten über alle in 
einem Markt verfügbaren Produkte vollständig informiert sind, und dass sich die 
Nachfragemengen zu jedem Zeitpunkt vollständig an die gegebenen Preise anpassen. Wenn 
sich ein Preis oder eine Qualität ändert, oder ein neues Produkt eingeführt wird, dann müssten 
sich demnach die Marktanteile der Firmen sofort an die neuen Bedingungen anpassen. Es 
dürfte für das Marktergebnis also keine Rolle spielen, ob eine Firma gegenwärtig über einen 
großen oder einen kleinen Kundenstamm1 verfügt. Beggs und Klemperer (1992) schreiben 
jedoch: „Managers often seem more concerned with market shares than with short-run 
profits.“ Es hat demnach den Anschein, als würde der Aufbau eines großen Kundenstamms 
für die langfristige Positionierung von Firmen wichtig sein. Belege dafür gibt es viele.2 So 
lautet z.B. eine aktuelle Schlagzeile aus der Internetpresse: „Apple faces iPhone profit or 
market share dilemma“.3 Im Beitrag wird u.a. auf Sacconaghi (ein bekannter Analyst) Bezug 
genommen: „The analyst, however, said that Apple would be unlikely to sustain the same 
level of profitability if it expects to sell 10 million phones in 2008, as its CEO Steve Jobs had 
hoped. Sacconaghi noted that carrier payments to the company could allow it ’to pull some 
strategic strings’ to drive up unit sales, but only at the expense of profitability.“ 
Ein großer Kundenstamm kann für die zukünftige Profitabilität einer Firma nur dann 
bedeutsam sein, wenn die Konsumenten nach einer Preisänderung nicht sofort bzw. nicht alle 
zum billigeren Anbieter wechseln.4 Dieses Verhalten der Nachfrage wird im Folgenden als 
Nachfragerigidität bezeichnet. Eine mögliche Begründung für Nachfragerigidität ist, dass den 
Konsumenten beim Wechsel des Anbieters Kosten entstehen. Demnach wird ein Konsument 
nur dann den Anbieter wechseln, wenn der Preisunterschied die Wechselkosten aufwiegt.5 Es 
kann zwischen zwei Arten von Wechselkosten unterschieden werden. Erstens: „natürliche“ 
Wechselkosten, die z.B. durch das Erlernen der Bedienung eines neuen Produktes entstehen 
(Beispiel: Wechsel von Microsoft- zu Apple-Software), oder aufgrund von 
Transaktionskosten (Beispiel: Eröffnung eines neuen Bankkontos). Und zweitens: 
 
1 hier: „Kundenstamm“ = Verkaufsmenge in der Vergangenheit 
2 Siehe z.B. Allenby und Lenk (1995), Antunano und Kuo (2002), Dorward (1977), Kirman und Vriend (2001), 
Odin, Odin und Valette-Florence (2001), Shum, (2004), Stern und Hammond (2004), Yim und Kannan (1999). 
3 http://www.macnn.com/articles/07/10/10/aapl.target.up.by.30/
4 Hier wird der Einfachheit halber von homogenen Gütern ausgegangen. Netzwerkeffekte werden nicht 
betrachtet. 
5 Für einen Überblick über die Wechselkostenliteratur, siehe z.B. Klemperer (1995). 
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„künstliche“ Wechselkosten, die z.B. durch Rabatte bei Wiederholungskäufen entstehen 
(Beispiel: Vielfliegerprogramme).  
Ein Aspekt, der in der Literatur bisher wenig beachtet wurde, ist, dass auch unvollständige 
Konsumenteninformation zu rigider Nachfrage führen kann. Diesem Aspekt soll in dieser 
Arbeit besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden. Der Effekt entsteht, wenn 
Konsumenten im Markt als Wiederholungskäufer auftreten, und über Produkte, die sie in der 
Vergangenheit gekauft haben, besser informiert sind als über die übrigen Produkte.6 Demnach 
haben Firmen mit einem großen Kundenstamm einen potenziellen Vorteil gegenüber ihren 
Konkurrenten, da viele Konsumenten über ihr Angebot informiert sind.  
Die Analyse von Märkten mit rigider Nachfrage bildet das Hauptthema dieser Arbeit. Eine 
der Fragen, die beantwortet werden sollen, ist, wann Firmen von einer Vergrößerung ihres 
Kundenstamms profitieren können. Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist nicht trivial, denn die 
Marktaufteilung beeinflusst die Intensität des Preiswettbewerbs. Demnach kann eine 
Vergrößerung des Kundenstamms einer Firma deren Gewinn schmälern, wenn dadurch der 
Preiswettbewerb intensiver wird.  
Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich darüber hinaus mit Marktanteilsdynamiken bei unvollständiger 
Konsumenteninformation. Aufgrund der daraus resultierenden Nachfragerigidität sind die 
Marktaufteilungen durch ein gewisses Maß an zeitlicher Stabilität charakterisiert. Für ein 
solches Verhalten gibt es auch Belege aus der Praxis.7 Nachfragerigiditäten sind eine 
mögliche Erklärung dafür, warum einzelne Firmen Märkte z.T. über längere Zeit dominieren, 
während kleinere Konkurrenten ihren Marktanteil nur langsam erhöhen können.8
Ein weiteres Themengebiet dieser Arbeit sind Märkte mit vertikal differenzierten Gütern (das 
sind Güter mit unterschiedlicher Qualität). Doch bevor der Inhalt der Arbeit im Detail 
vorgestellt wird, folgt ein kurzer Rückblick zur Entwicklung der Idee von 
Nachfragerigiditäten. 
So erwähnt z.B. Bain in seiner empirischen Analyse von 1956, dass Markteindringlinge ohne 
Kundenstamm im Wettbewerb mit etablierten Anbietern benachteiligt sein können. Dafür 
nennt er verschiedene Gründe: „(a) customer inertia, habit, and loyalty…; (b) preferences for 
 
6 Dazu zählt z.B. Kenntnis über die Existenz eines Produktes bzw. des entsprechenden Anbieters, sowie Wissen 
über den Standort des Anbieters und die Eigenschaften des Produktes. 
7 Siehe z.B. Pakes (1987). 
8 Ein anschauliches Beispiel dafür ist im deutschen Getränkemarkt zu finden. Die „Bionade“ – ein Getränk aus 
biologischer Produktion, konnte ihren Marktanteil über die letzten Jahre graduell ausweiten. Das Produkt war 
den Konsumenten zunächst unbekannt, und wurde lange Zeit vorwiegend durch Mundpropaganda verbreitet. 
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products of established firms based on advertising or on established product “reputations“; (c) 
allegiances to established firms based on services supplied to customers; and (d) established 
dealer systems, owned or more or less controlled by established firms.“ Bain schreibt weiter: 
„The inability of potential entrants to match the physical product designs of established firms 
does not stand out as generally important in industries within this sample, but the allegiance 
of consumers to established products in areas in which they are ignorant or uncertain 
concerning the actual properties of products is quite important.“  
Kaldor (1935) führt den Begriff der „buyers’ inertia“ ein, zu der er u.a. folgendes schreibt: 
„No doubt, in most cases, the products of various producers selling the same sort of goods are 
not ‚perfect substitutes’… The reasons for such ‚market imperfection’ may be classed under 
one of three headings. There may be slight differences in the products themselves…; or 
differences in the geographical location of producers…; or finally, there may exist a certain 
‚inertia’ on behalf of the buyers themselves who will require either some time, or a certain 
magnitude in the price-difference, before they make up their minds to buy from another seller 
– even if they are quite indifferent as between the products of different sellers.“ 
In eine ähnliche Richtung zielt auch Selten’s berühmte Arbeit von 1965, in der er einen 
Oligopolmarkt mit „Nachfrageträgheit“ anhand eines theoretischen Modells analysiert. Unter 
Nachfrageträgheit versteht der Autor, dass Nachfrager nicht sofort auf Preisänderungen 
reagieren. Dafür führt er u.a. folgende Gründe an: Preisänderungen werden nicht sofort 
bemerkt, Einkaufsgewohnheiten werden nur langsam geändert, mangelnde Markttransparenz, 
Starrheit der Absatzwege, Kundentreue. Bei Selten spielt die zeitliche Dimension bei der 
Änderung von momentan vorhandenen Marktanteilen eine besondere Rolle, während (anders 
als bei Bain) Marktzutritt nicht berücksichtigt wird. Selten schreibt: „Auch die 
Produktdifferenzierung kann zur Nachfrageträgheit beitragen, indem sie die Umstellung von 
dem Produkt eines Anbieters auf das Produkt eines anderen Anbieters erschwert.“ Dabei 
denkt der Autor vornehmlich an Märkte, die er als „quasihomogen“ bezeichnet: „Die 
Quasihomogenität besagt, daß in einer Situation, in der die Gesamtnachfrage konstant ist, die 
Marktaufteilung nur dann unverändert bestehen bleiben kann, wenn alle Anbieter den 
gleichen Preis haben, weil Preisunterschiede immer eine Verschiebung der Marktanteile 
zugunsten der billigeren Anbieter zur Folge haben. … Die Produkte der einzelnen Anbieter 
müssen trotz ihrer Differenzierung noch ungefähr gleichwertig sein und die Unterschiede 
zwischen den Produkten dürfen lediglich eine Verstärkung der Nachfrageträgheit zur Folge 
haben.“ Es ist bemerkenswert, dass Selten mit seinem Konzept der Nachfrageträgheit u.a. der 
Wechselkostenliteratur knapp zwei Jahrzehnte voraus war. Auch wenn er Wechselkosten 
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nicht als solche definiert hat, beinhaltet sein Konzept letztlich die Idee davon: Konsumenten 
wechseln langsam bzw. nur teilweise zu einem günstigeren Anbieter, weil die Produkte aus 
ihrer Sicht differenziert sind. Allerdings sind die Produkte nicht im Hinblick auf ihre 
Funktionalität verschieden; die Differenzierung erschwert lediglich den Wechsel von einem 
Anbieter zu einem anderen. Selten motiviert sein Konzept der Nachfrageträgheit aber auch 
mit unvollständiger Konsumenteninformation, ein Aspekt, der in der hier vorliegenden Arbeit 
von zentraler Bedeutung ist.  
Es sollte jedoch nicht unerwähnt bleiben, dass Selten’s Arbeit weniger aufgrund des 
eigentlichen Themas der Arbeit, also der Analyse von Märkten mit Nachfrageträgheit, 
sondern viel mehr durch die Einführung des Konzepts vom teilspielperfekten Gleichgewicht 
berühmt wurde. Dass die Nachfrageträgheit als solche weitgehend in Vergessenheit geraten 
ist, und nur gelegentlich von anderen Autoren erwähnt wurde, hat verschiedene Ursachen. 
Einerseits war der Autor mit seinem Beitrag möglicher Weise zu weit seiner Zeit voraus, um 
damit einen neuen Forschungsstrang zu begründen, und seine Analyse war so umfassend, dass 
sie wenig Platz für Modifikationen oder Erweiterungen ließ. Andererseits ist die 
Formalisierung seines Konzepts der Nachfrageträgheit weitestgehend ad hoc, d.h., es fehlt 
eine schlüssige mikroökonomische Begründung für seine Modellannahmen. So lässt der 
Autor z.B. offen, ob sich die Nachfrage einer Firma ableitet von unterschiedlichen 
Vorbehaltspreisen der Konsumenten für ein unteilbares Gut, oder ob möglicher Weise alle 
Konsumenten die gleichen Präferenzen haben und die nachgefragte Menge pro Konsument 
sinkt im Preis. Auch die Möglichkeit der Koexistenz von trägen und nicht-trägen 
Konsumenten im Markt bleibt unerwähnt. Bei funktional identischen Gütern würde die 
Anwesenheit von nicht-trägen Konsumenten (also vollständig informierter Konsumenten 
ohne Wechselkosten) die Existenz eines dynamischen Preisgleichgewichts in reinen 
Strategien, wie Selten es berechnet hat, ausschließen.  
Ähnlich wie bei Selten’s Modell ist auch der Ausgangspunkt dieser Arbeit die Annahme, dass 
Nachfragemengen von vergangenen Marktergebnissen abhängen. Die Größe des 
Kundenstamms einer Firma beeinflusst demnach deren Profitabilität. Die Arbeit gliedert sich 
in drei Haupt-Themenbereiche. Der erste Themenbereich sind Märkte mit vollständig 
informierten Konsumenten und Wechselkosten. In solchen Märkten wechseln Konsumenten 
mit unendlicher Geschwindigkeit den Anbieter (falls sie wechseln), aber ein gegebener 
Preisunterschied führt i.A. nicht dazu, dass alle Konsumenten wechseln. Der zweite 
Themenbereich sind Märkte mit unvollständig informierten Konsumenten (ohne 
Wechselkosten). Die Rigidität der Nachfrage hat hier eine zeitliche Dimension: bei gegebenen 
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Preisunterschieden verschieben sich die Marktanteile der Firmen mit endlicher 
Geschwindigkeit. Der dritte Themenbereich konzentriert sich auf vertikal differenzierte 
Märkte. Rigiditäten der Nachfrage spielen hier nur indirekt eine Rolle. So kann gezeigt 
werden, dass das gängige Standard-Modell mit vollständig informierten Konsumenten nicht in 
der Lage ist, bestimmte empirische Beobachtungen zu erklären (s.u.). Demnach müssen in der 
Praxis Marktunvollkommenheiten eine Rolle spielen, die vom Modell nicht erfasst werden. 
Die plausibelste Erklärung ist unvollständige Konsumenteninformation, die zu Rigiditäten 
führen kann, wie jene, die im Rahmen des zweiten Themenbereiches betrachtet werden. Diese 
werden für vertikal differenzierte Märkte jedoch nicht explizit untersucht. 
Diese drei Haupt-Themenbereiche werden in fünf Kapiteln behandelt, von denen sich jedes 
auf eine bestimmte Fragestellung konzentriert. Jedes Kapitel kann als eine separate Arbeit 
betrachtet werden. Das führt an einigen Stellen zu Redundanzen bei der Einführung der 
Modellannahmen, hat jedoch den Vorteil, dass die Kapitel unabhängig von einander gelesen 
werden können. Die Inhalte der fünf Kapitel werden im Folgenden zusammengefasst. 
Kapitel 1 und 2 beschäftigen sich mit der Frage, wann Firmen von einer Vergrößerung ihres 
Kundenstamms profitieren können. Kapitel 1 behandelt diese Frage im Rahmen eines 
Wechselkostenmodells. Für Märkte mit Wechselkosten wird i.A. angenommen, dass Firmen 
von einem großen Kundenstamm profitieren. Klemperer (1995) weist jedoch darauf hin, dass 
diese Aussage nicht allgemeingültig ist, denn eine Vergrößerung des Kundenstammes einer 
Firma kann ein aggressiveres Preissetzungsverhalten der Konkurrenten zur Folge haben, was 
zumindest theoretisch dazu führen kann, dass die Firma dann schlechter gestellt ist als zuvor. 
Anhand eines Duopolmodells wird im Kapitel 1 gezeigt, dass ein solches Resultat keine rein 
theoretische Möglichkeit darstellt, sondern ein empirisch relevantes Ergebnis sein kann. Diese 
Schlussfolgerung ergibt sich daraus, dass das Ergebnis unter plausiblen Modellannahmen 
erzeugt wird. Dazu zählen insbesondere homogene Güter und gleichmäßig verteilte 
Wechselkosten. In der funktionalen Abhängigkeit zwischen der Größe des Kundenstamms 
und dem Gewinn einer Firma ergibt sich ein Maximum bei einer ex-ante gleichförmigen 
Marktaufteilung. Das hängt damit zusammen, dass der Preiswettbewerb am intensivsten ist, 
wenn der Markt ex-ante asymmetrisch aufgeteilt ist. Darüber hinaus wird gezeigt, dass die 
Vorhersage, dass Wechselkosten i.A. zu einer Abschwächung des Wettbewerbs führen, im 
verwendeten Modellrahmen verlässlicher ist als in bisher bekannten Wechselkostenmodellen. 
Kapitel 2 beschäftigt sich ebenfalls mit der Frage, wann Firmen von einer Vergrößerung ihres 
Kundenstamms profitieren können, jedoch im Rahmen eines Modells mit unvollständig 
informierten Konsumenten, die als Wiederholungskäufer auftreten. Auch hier ist zu beachten, 
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dass ein großer Kundenstamm nicht automatisch vorteilhaft für eine Firma sein muss, wenn 
dieser zu aggressiverem Preissetzungsverhalten der Konkurrenten führt. Anhand eines 
Duopolmodells, in dem Konsumenten aktiv suchen oder Mundpropaganda betreiben können, 
wird gezeigt, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen der Größe des Kundenstamms und dem 
(erwarteten) Gewinn einer Firma nicht immer monoton steigend ist, sondern vielfältiger 
Gestalt sein kann. Bei nahezu vollständiger Information ergibt sich eine V-förmige Relation. 
Demnach ist kein Kundenstamm, bzw. ein sehr großer Kundenstamm für eine Firma günstiger 
als ein mittelgroßer Kundenstamm. Das liegt daran, dass der Preiswettbewerb am intensivsten 
ist, wenn der Markt ex-ante symmetrisch aufgeteilt ist. Rigidität, die aus unvollständiger 
Konsumenteninformation entsteht, führt demnach zu einem Ergebnis, das dem unter der 
Annahme von Wechselkosten erhaltenen Ergebnis entgegengesetzt ist: dort ist der 
Preiswettbewerb am wenigsten intensiv bei einer ex-ante symmetrischen Aufteilung des 
Marktes! In Kapitel 2 wird darüber hinaus eine Endogenisierung der Mundpropaganda-
Entscheidung eingeführt, und das Modell wird für größere Firmenzahlen verallgemeinert.  
Kapitel 3 basiert auf dem selben Grundmodell wie Kapitel 2, erweitert dieses jedoch zu einem 
unendlich-periodigen Preisspiel mit rigider Nachfrage. Allerdings werden nun die 
dynamischen Eigenschaften des Modells näher untersucht. Eine zentrale Eigenschaft des 
Modells besteht nämlich darin, dass die Marktaufteilung zwischen den Firmen keinem 
stabilem Zustand zustrebt, sondern dass die Marktanteile unentwegt fluktuieren. Die zentrale 
Triebfeder hinter diesen Fluktuationen ist das Nicht-Vorhandensein eines Gleichgewichts in 
reinen Strategien. Stattdessen würfeln die Firmen ihre Preise gemäß einer im Modell zu 
bestimmenden Verteilungsfunktion, die von der gegenwärtigen Marktaufteilung abhängig ist. 
Die resultierende Preisdispersion ist eine wohlbekannte Eigenschaft von Standard-Modellen 
aus der Suchliteratur.9 Allerdings haben Autoren von entsprechenden Arbeiten aus diesem 
Bereich der Marktanteilsdynamik, die sich bei Preisdispersion zwangsläufig ergibt, bisher 
wenig Beachtung geschenkt. Nach meinem Wissen ist die Analyse in Kapitel 3 in dieser 
Hinsicht neuartig. Es sollte ebenfalls erwähnt werden, dass die Möglichkeit von 
Wiederholungskäufen in der bisherigen Suchliteratur so gut wie keine Rolle gespielt hat. 
Ohne Wiederholungskäufe gibt es trotz unvollständiger Konsumenteninformation natürlich 
 
9 Das Vorhandensein von Preisdispersion wird in einigen empirischen Arbeiten belegt. Lach (2002) schreibt 
z.B.: „I find that price dispersion prevails even after controlling for observed and unobserved product 
heterogeneity. Moreover, intra-distribution mobility is significant: stores move up and down the cross-sectional 
price distribution. Thus, consumers cannot learn about stores that consistently post low prices… price dispersion 
persists over time as predicted by Varian’s (1980) model of sales.“ 
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keine Rigidität in der Nachfrage. Deshalb entspricht die „Dynamik“ eines Standard-
Suchmodells der simplen Wiederholung eines Einperiodenspieles. Im Gegensatz dazu gibt es 
im hier betrachteten Modell einen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen der Vergangenheit des 
Marktes und dem gegenwärtigen Marktergebnis. Es sollte betont werden, dass – anders als bei 
vielen Modellen aus dem makroökonomischen Bereich – die Dynamik des Modells nicht von 
exogenen Schocks abhängig ist, sondern allein aus dem Streben der Firmen nach 
Gewinnmaximierung resultiert. Ziel der Analyse ist es, diese Dynamik zu charakterisieren, 
und die Triebkräfte dahinter aufzudecken. 
Kapitel 4 und 5 beschäftigen sich mit vertikal differenzierten Märkten. Hier spielen 
Rigiditäten der Nachfrage nur indirekt eine Rolle. Es ist allgemein bekannt, dass es in vertikal 
differenzierten Märkten mit vollständig informierten Konsumenten zu übermäßiger 
Qualitätsspreizung kommt, weil die Firmen dadurch die Intensität des Preiswettbewerbs 
abschwächen können. Diese aus der theoretischen Literatur stammende Vorhersage hat 
Autoren dazu veranlasst, sich mit wohlfahrtssteigernden Maßnahmen zu befassen, 
insbesondere Mindest-Qualitätsstandards. In Kapitel 4 wird die Allgemeingültigkeit dieser 
Ergebnisse in Frage gestellt, indem überprüft wird, ob die Maßnahmen auch in Märkten mit 
mehr als zwei Wettbewerbern wohlfahrtssteigernd wirken können. So wird insbesondere 
gezeigt, dass die Überdifferenzierung fast vollständig verschwindet, sobald mindestens drei 
Firmen im Markt aktiv sind. Demnach muss nahezu jede Form von Regulierung 
wohlfahrtsmindernd wirken, denn freier Wettbewerb führt zu einem annähernd optimalen 
Ergebnis. Es sollte also eine laissez-faire Politik betrieben werden. Diese Aussage steht im 
Widerspruch zu dem, was in der Realität beobachtet wird. Mindest-Qualitätsstandards sind in 
der Praxis nämlich weit verbreitet, und ihre Verwendung beschränkt sich keineswegs auf 
Duopolmärkte. Unter der Annahme, dass Mindest-Qualitätsstandards nicht generell als 
Zeichen von Überregulierung gedeutet werden können, folgt daraus, dass es weitere Ursachen 
für Marktversagen geben muss, die von dem Standard-Modell nicht erfasst werden. Die 
plausibelste Erklärung ist, dass Konsumenten die Qualität der Güter nicht genau einschätzen 
können. Demnach liefert die Analyse in Kapitel 4 ein starkes Argument für das 
Vorhandensein von unvollständiger Konsumenteninformation. 
In Kapitel 5 wird lediglich der Duopolfall eines vertikal differenzierten Marktes mit 
vollständig informierten Konsumenten betrachtet. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine allgemein 
anerkannte Vorhersage für solche Märkte, nämlich die, dass der Anbieter des Produktes mit 
der höheren Qualität den höheren Gewinn erzielt, falsch ist. Statt dessen kann der Anbieter 
mit der geringeren Qualität den höheren Gewinn im Markt erzielen, wenn die Beziehung 
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zwischen Nutzen und Qualität konkav, oder die Beziehung zwischen Stückkosten und 
Qualität konvex ist (oder beides). Beides sind plausible Annahmen. Welche Firma letztlich 
den höheren Gewinn erzielt, hängt davon ab, wie die Firmen unter den jeweiligen 
Modellannahmen strategisch interagieren. 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit legen nahe, dass ein „profit or market share dilemma“, wie 
jenes, in dem Apple sich z.Zt. möglicher Weise befindet, auch aus theoretischer Sicht 
plausibel ist. Wenn die Nachfrage rigide ist, kann es für eine Firma sinnvoll sein, den Preis zu 
senken oder in Werbung zu investieren und damit auf kurzfristige Gewinne zu verzichten, um 
einen größeren Kundenstamm aufzubauen. Abhängig davon, wie die Konkurrenten auf solche 
Maßnahmen reagieren, kann der größere Kundenstamm für die zukünftige Profitabilität der 
Firma wichtig sein. 
 
General Introduction (English) 
In the economics literature, it has long been assumed that consumers are fully informed about 
all products available in a market, and that firms’ demands fully adjust to the prices at each 
instant. Hence, if a price or a quality level changes, or if a new product is introduced, then 
market shares should immediately adapt to the new conditions. It should not play a role for 
the market outcome whether a firm currently has a large or a small customer base10. Beggs 
and Klemperer (1992), however, write: “Managers often seem more concerned with market 
shares than with short-run profits.“ It, thus, seems as if a large customer base can be important 
for the future profitability of a firm. There is a lot of evidence for this.11 A headline from the 
current internet press reads: „Apple faces iPhone profit or market share dilemma“.12 The 
article refers to Sacconaghi (a well-known analyst): „The analyst, however, said that Apple 
would be unlikely to sustain the same level of profitability if it expects to sell 10 million 
phones in 2008, as its CEO Steve Jobs had hoped. Sacconaghi noted that carrier payments to 
the company could allow it ’to pull some strategic strings’ to drive up unit sales, but only at 
the expense of profitability.“ 
 
10 here: “customer base” = past sales volume 
11 See e.g. Allenby and Lenk (1995), Antunano and Kuo (2002), Dorward (1977), Kirman and Vriend (2001), 
Odin, Odin and Valette-Florence (2001), Shum, (2004), Stern and Hammond (2004), Yim and Kannan (1999). 
12 http://www.macnn.com/articles/07/10/10/aapl.target.up.by.30/
 14
                                                
A large customer base can only be important for the future profitability of a firm if consumers 
do not immediately or not completely switch to the cheaper supplier after a price change.13 
This demand behavior is in the following referred to as demand rigidity. A possible 
explanation for demand rigidity is that consumers incur costs when switching the supplier. 
Therefore, a consumer will only switch if the price differential outweighs the switching 
costs.14 There are two types of switching costs. Firstly, “natural” switching costs, that may 
e.g. be due to the effort of learning how to use a new product (for example when switching 
from Microsoft to Apple software), or due to transaction costs (for example when opening a 
new bank account). And secondly, “artificial” switching costs, that may e.g. be due to 
discounts for repeat purchasers (example: frequent-flyer programs). 
An aspect that has received rather little attention in the literature is that incomplete consumer 
information can also induce demand rigidity. This aspect will be a major focus of this work. 
The effect arises when consumers are repeat purchasers who possess more information about 
products they have previously purchased15 than about the other products in a market. 
Therefore, firms with a large customer base have a potential advantage over their competitors, 
as many consumers are informed about their offer. 
The analysis of markets with rigid demand is the main topic of this work. Among the 
questions that shall be analyzed is, under what conditions firms can benefit from an increase 
in the size of their customer base. The answer to this question is not trivial because the market 
split affects the intensity of price competition. Therefore, an increase in the size of a firm’s 
customer base can reduce the firm’s profit if it induces fiercer price competition.  
Furthermore, this work analyzes market share dynamics under incomplete consumer 
information. Due to the resulting demand rigidity, market splits are characterized by a certain 
degree of temporal stability. There is empirical evidence for such behavior.16 Demand 
rigidities are a possible explanation for why certain firms can dominate markets for extended 
periods of time, while their smaller competitors can only gradually achieve a higher market 
share.17
 
13 Here, I assume homogeneous goods for simplicity. Network effects are not considered. 
14 For an overview over the switching cost literature, see e.g. Klemperer (1995). 
15 This information may be knowledge about the existence of a product or the respective supplier, about the 
supplier’s location or the product’s characteristics. 
16 See e.g. Pakes (1987). 
17 A nice example for this can be found in the German market for soft drinks. “Bionade” – an organic soft drink 
– could gradually increase its market share over the past few years. The product was originally unknown to the 
consumers and gradually became more famous via word-of-mouth. 
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Another topic of this work are markets with vertically differentiated goods (these are goods 
that differ in quality). But before the contents of this work is described in more detail, let us 
briefly look back on the development of the idea of demand rigidity.  
In his empirical analysis from 1956, Bain points out that entrants with no customer base may 
be at a disadvantage relative to established firms. He mentions several reasons for this: “(a) 
customer inertia, habit, and loyalty…; (b) preferences for products of established firms based 
on advertising or on established product “reputations“; (c) allegiances to established firms 
based on services supplied to customers; and (d) established dealer systems, owned or more or 
less controlled by established firms.“ He further writes: “The inability of potential entrants to 
match the physical product designs of established firms does not stand out as generally 
important in industries within this sample, but the allegiance of consumers to established 
products in areas in which they are ignorant or uncertain concerning the actual properties of 
products is quite important.“  
Kaldor (1935) introduces the term “buyers’ inertia”. He writes: “No doubt, in most cases, the 
products of various producers selling the same sort of goods are not ‘perfect substitutes’… 
The reasons for such ‘market imperfection’ may be classed under one of three headings. 
There may be slight differences in the products themselves…; or differences in the 
geographical location of producers…; or finally, there may exist a certain ‘inertia’ on behalf 
of the buyers themselves who will require either some time, or a certain magnitude in the 
price-difference, before they make up their minds to buy from another seller – even if they are 
quite indifferent as between the products of different sellers.“ 
Selten’s seminal work from 1965 goes in a similar direction. In a theoretical model, he 
analyzes an oligopolistic market characterized by “demand inertia”. This means that 
consumers do not immediately react to price changes. The author mentions the following 
reasons for this: price changes are not immediately discovered by the consumers, shopping 
habits change only gradually, a lack of market transparency, rigidity of sales channels, 
customer loyalty. In Selten’s work, the intertemporal dimension in the adaptation of market 
shares to price changes plays a crucial role, while (in contrast to Bain) the possibility of entry 
is neglected. According to Selten, product differentiation can also contribute to demand 
inertia by making it more difficult to switch from one supplier’s product to the product of 
another supplier. Selten focuses on markets that he refers to as “quasi-homogeneous”. 
According to him, quasi-homogeneity means that, in situations where aggregate demand is 
constant, the market split only changes when firms choose non-identical prices for their 
products. Therefore, the products of the different suppliers should – despite their 
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differentiation – be equally valuable, and the differences between them should only lead to 
more demand inertia. It is remarkable that, with his concept of demand inertia, Selten was 
almost two decades ahead of the switching cost literature. Although he did not explicitly 
define switching costs, he essentially had the idea of them in mind: consumers switch only 
gradually or incompletely to a cheaper supplier, because the products are, from their 
perspective, differentiated. However, products are not functionally different; the 
differentiation only makes it harder to switch from one supplier to another. Selten further 
motivates his concept of demand inertia by incomplete consumer information – an aspect that 
plays a major role also in this work. 
It should, however, be mentioned that Selten’s work became mostly famous for the 
introduction of the concept of the subgame perfect equilibrium, and not for its central theme, 
namely the analysis of markets with demand inertia. The latter received rather little attention 
in the literature, which may be due to the following reasons. On the one hand, with his 
concept of demand inertia, the author was perhaps too far ahead of his time to initiate a new 
strand of literature, and his analysis was too comprehensive to leave space for modifications 
or extensions. On the other hand, his formalization is mostly ad hoc, and lacks a convincing 
microeconomic foundation. E.g., the author does not clarify whether a firm’s demand results 
from different reservation prices of the consumers for an unseparable good, or whether 
consumers have possibly identical preferences, and each consumer’s demand decreases in 
price. Furthermore, the possibility of a coexistence of ‘sluggish’ and ‘non-sluggish’ 
consumers in the market is not mentioned. When products are functionally identical, the 
presence of ‘non-sluggish’ consumers (that is, of fully informed consumers without switching 
costs) precludes the existence of a dynamic price equilibrium in pure strategies, such as the 
one computed by Selten. 
Similarly as in Selten’s model, the starting point for this work is the assumption that demand 
depends upon past market outcomes. The size of a firm’s customer base, thus, affects its 
profitability. The work is divided into three main topics. The first topic are markets with fully 
informed consumers and switching costs. In such markets, consumers switch suppliers 
instantaneously (if they switch), but a given price differential does not generally induce all 
consumers to switch. The second topic are markets with incomplete consumer information 
(but no switching costs). Here, demand rigidity has a temporal dimension: for a given price 
differential, market shares change only gradually. The third topic focuses on vertically 
differentiated markets. Here, demand rigidities play only indirectly a role. It is shown that the 
standard vertical differentiation model is not able to explain certain empirical observations 
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(see below). Therefore, market imperfections must play a role that are not captured by the 
standard model. The most plausible explanation is incomplete consumer information, that can 
lead to rigidities such as the ones described for the second topic. However, they are not 
explicitly analyzed for vertically differentiated markets. 
These three topics are addressed in five chapters. Each chapter focuses on a specific question 
and can be seen as an independent work. This leads to some redundancies in the introduction 
of the modeling assumptions, but the advantage is that all chapters are self-contained. In the 
following, the contents of the five chapters is summarized. 
Chapter 1 and 2 focus on the question under what conditions firms can benefit from an 
increase in the size of their customer base. Chapter 1 analyzes this question in the context of a 
model with switching costs. For markets with switching costs, it is generally assumed that 
firms benefit from a large customer base. Klemperer (1995), however, points out that this may 
not be true if an increase in the size of a firm’s customer base induces fiercer price 
competition, possibly making the firm worse off. Using a duopoly model, chapter 1 shows 
that such an outcome is not a mere theoretical possibility but can be an empirically relevant 
result. It is shown to be obtained under plausible conditions, in particular homogeneous goods 
and dispersed switching costs. It turns out that the relation between the size of a firm’s 
customer base and profit has a maximum at an even ex-ante split of the market. This is due to 
the fact that, under the assumptions of the model, price competition is most intense for a 
skewed ex-ante split of the market. Furthermore, it is shown that the prediction that switching 
costs tend to make markets less competitive is stronger than previously shown in the 
literature. 
Chapter 2 also deals with the question when firms benefit from an increase in the size of their 
customer base, but in the context of a model with incomplete consumer information, where 
consumers are repeat purchasers. Here, the same caveat applies as in chapter 1. A large 
customer base is not automatically beneficial to a firm if this induces fierce price competition 
among the competitors. Using a duopoly model where consumers can perform active non-
sequential search or word-of-mouth communication, it is shown that the relation between the 
size of a firm’s customer base and profit is not generally monotone and can take on a 
surprising variety of shapes. When consumers are almost fully informed, a V-shaped relation 
is obtained. Therefore, a firm is better off with no customer base or with a very large customer 
base than with an intermediate one. This is due to the fact that price competition is most 
intense for an even ex-ante split of the market. Rigidity that stems from incomplete consumer 
information, thus, leads to a result that reverses the one obtained for a market with consumer 
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switching costs: there, price competition is least intense for an even ex-ante split of the 
market! In chapter 2, an endogenous determination of the amount of word-of-mouth 
communication is further introduced, and the model is extended to oligopolies with more than 
two firms. 
The analysis in chapter 3 is based on the same model as the one in chapter 2, but extends it to 
an infinitely repeated pricing game with rigid demand. The focus is now on the dynamic 
properties of the model. It is a central property of the model that market shares do not 
converge to a stable split, but fluctuate perpetually. The driving force behind these 
fluctuations is the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. Instead, firms randomize 
over their prices according to an endogenously determined distribution function that depends 
on the current market split. The resulting price dispersion is a well-known property of 
standard search models.18 However, until now, authors in this literature paid little attention to 
the market share dynamics that arise naturally under price dispersion. To the best of my 
knowledge, the analysis presented in chapter 3, in this respect, novel. It should also be 
mentioned that the possibility of repeat purchasing plays only a minor role in the existing 
search literature. In the absence of repeat purchasing, there is – despite incomplete consumer 
information – of course no demand rigidity. Therefore, the “dynamics” of a standard search 
model correspond to a simple repetition of a static game. In the model presented here, there is 
a direct link between the history of the market and the current market outcome. It should also 
be stressed that, in contrast to a variety of macroeconomic models, the dynamics in the model 
do not depend on exogenous shocks, but result solely from firms’ profit maximizing behavior. 
The goal of the analysis is to characterize these dynamics, and to reveal the driving forces 
behind them. 
Chapter 4 and 5 focus on vertically differentiated markets. Here, demand rigidities play only 
indirectly a role. A well-known result for vertically differentiated duopolies with fully 
informed consumers is that firms differentiate extensively in the quality dimension to soften 
price competition. This prediction from the theoretical literature has inspired authors to 
analyze welfare improving policy measures, such as minimum quality standards. Chapter 4 
questions the generality of these results by extending the analysis to a larger number of firms. 
 
18 The presence of price dispersion in real-world markets has been shown in empirical works. Lach (2002), e.g., 
writes: “I find that price dispersion prevails even after controlling for observed and unobserved product 
heterogeneity. Moreover, intra-distribution mobility is significant: stores move up and down the cross-sectional 
price distribution. Thus, consumers cannot learn about stores that consistently post low prices… price dispersion 
persists over time as predicted by Varian’s (1980) model of sales.“ 
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It is shown that the over-differentiation result almost entirely disappears when three or more 
firms are in the market. Therefore, almost any type of regulation is likely to do more harm 
than good, since competition already leads to a nearly optimal outcome. A laissez-faire policy 
should, thus, be adopted. This conclusion is, however, in sharp contrast to what is observed in 
reality. In particular, minimum quality standards are often used in practice, and their usage is 
clearly not restricted to duopolistic markets. Under the presumption that minimum quality 
standards can not generally be interpreted as a sign of over-regulation, it, thus, follows that 
there must be further sources of market failure that are not captured by the standard model. 
The most plausible explanation is that consumers can not correctly evaluate the quality of the 
products in the market. Therefore, the analysis in chapter 4 provides a strong argument for the 
presence of incomplete consumer information. 
In Chapter 5, only the duopoly case of a vertically differentiated market with fully informed 
consumers is analyzed. It is shown that a widely accepted view, namely that the high-quality 
provider earns the higher profit (the so-called “high-quality advantage”), is not correct. It is 
shown that a low-quality advantage can be predicted under perfectly plausible assumptions, 
such as a concave utility - quality and / or a convex unit cost - quality relation. The existence 
of a high- or a low-quality advantage depends on the nature of the firms’ strategic interaction 
for a given specification of the model. 
The results of this work suggest that a “profit or market share dilemma”, such as the one that 
Apple may currently face, can be plausible also from a theoretical standpoint. Under demand 
rigidity, it can be reasonable for a firm to cut its price or to invest in advertising and, thus, to 
forego current profit, in order to build up a larger customer base. Depending upon the 
competitors’ reaction, the larger customer base can be important for the future profitability of 
the firm. 
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Chapter 1. ON THE VALUE OF A LARGE CUSTOMER BASE 
IN MARKETS WITH CONSUMER SWITCHING COSTS 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Casual evidence suggests that managers are sometimes more concerned about market share 
targets than can be explained by short-run profit maximizing behavior. Apparently, current 
market shares can determine the future profitability of a firm, which seems rather natural, but 
can not be explained by standard oligopoly theory (e.g. the Cournot and Bertrand model).  
A strand of literature that has resolved this paradox is the one on switching costs. If 
consumers find it costly to switch from one supplier to another (e.g. because of learning costs 
of how to use the new product, or transaction costs when opening a new bank account), repeat 
purchasers are partially locked in. This gives firms some monopoly power that may lead to 
higher prices in the market. Firms, however, may also compete fiercely for new customers 
who are not yet locked in. This raises the question how the presence of switching costs affects 
the overall competitiveness of markets. Most papers in the switching cost literature have 
focused on this question, and it seems widely accepted that switching costs tend to make 
markets less competitive.19
In contrast to this literature, this chapter focuses on a different question. Namely: To what 
extend do firms actually have an incentive to build up a large customer base? The answer to 
this question is crucial when we try to explain why managers are sometimes so concerned 
about market share targets, and why they are sometimes not. Surprisingly little attention has 
been paid to this aspect by theorists. Instead, it seems that the idea that firms generally benefit 
from a large customer base has been taken mostly for granted. Klemperer (1995), however, 
points out that: “a firm with fewer old customers is relatively more interested in setting a low 
price to attract new customers than in setting a high price to exploit old customers… this 
effect can be so strong that a firm can actually be made worse off by increasing its market 
share, because reducing the competitor’s market share makes the competitor so much more 
aggressive”. 
Although the idea that a firm can be made worse off by an increase in the size of its customer 
base is not new, there remains the flavor of a mere theoretical possibility with little empirical 
relevance, except for a few special cases. One of these special cases is illustrated in 
 
19 See Klemperer, 1987b and 1995; Beggs and Klemperer, 1992; Padilla, 1995. 
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Klemperer (1987c), where an incumbent firm faces a potential entrant in a Cournot market 
with switching costs. If the incumbent firm’s customer base reaches a critical size, entry 
becomes profitable, which leads to a discontinuous drop in the incumbent’s profit. The 
incumbent may, thus, find it profitable to disinvest in the size of its customer base in order to 
deter entry. 
This chapter shows that a non-monotonic relation between the size of a firm’s customer base 
and profit can be an empirically relevant prediction in the absence of a potential entrant. It is 
obtained under simple and for some markets plausible conditions. In particular, I assume that 
products in a duopolistic market are homogeneous, and that consumers have dispersed 
switching costs20. This is sufficient to generate a non-monotonic relation between the size of a 
firm’s customer base and profit. It is shown that profits are maximized for an even ex-ante 
split of the market, that is, when each firm served half of the market in the past. The reason 
for this is, that under the assumptions of the model, price competition is more intense for 
skewed splits of the market, and softer for even splits. The effect is so strong that a firm does 
not have an incentive to increase the size of its customer base beyond 50 percent. 
If firms do not benefit from an increase in the size of their customer base, they do not have an 
incentive to invest in it. This has important dynamic implications, in particular for earlier 
stages of the market, where consumers are not yet attached to one of the suppliers. Previous 
works on markets with switching costs have shown that competition is intense in earlier 
market stages (see e.g. Klemperer, 1987a). In this chapter, however, firms do not benefit from 
an increase in the size of their customer base beyond 50 percent. Therefore, it is no longer 
obvious that competition should be particularly intense in earlier market stages. In order to 
analyze how the above non-monotonicity result affects competition in early market stages, I 
added a first stage to the game where consumers are not yet attached to firms. It is shown that 
a continuum of equilibrium prices can be sustained in the first stage. Assuming that firms 
always coordinate on the highest equilibrium price, the unambiguous prediction of the model 
is that switching costs lead to higher prices in both periods than in the absence of switching 
costs. This prediction is stronger than previously shown in the literature, where, depending on 
the parameter values, switching costs can lead to lower prices in earlier stages of the market 
than without switching costs (see Klemperer, 1987b). 
In Section 1.2, the model is introduced and the results are shown. Section 1.3 concludes. 
 
20 Many authors assume that switching costs are identical for all consumers (e.g. Klemperer, 1987b; Padilla, 
1995). 
1.2. MODEL & RESULTS 
Consider a market with a continuum of consumers with measure one. There are two periods, 
and each marginal consumer buys either zero or one unit of a homogeneous product in each 
period. Consumers’ reservation prices are represented by some distribution function , 
with support 
( )G r
[ , ]r r . Demand is served by two firms ( 1, 2i = ) that produce with zero marginal 
costs. If a consumer purchases a different product in the second period than in the first, a 
switching cost is incurred. Consumers’ switching costs are represented by the distribution 
function , with support ( )F s [ , ]s s . Consumers discover their individual switching cost only 
after consuming a product in this market. Therefore, consumers are ex-ante identical and do 
not make their first-period choice contingent on the level of their switching cost. 
Prices in period 1 are denoted by  and , and prices in period 2 by 1q 2q 1p  and 2p , 
respectively. Let the size of firm 1’s customer base at the beginning of period 2 be firm 1’s 
demand in period 1, and denote it by . If all consumers make a purchase, firm 2’s demand in 
period 1 is, thus, 1 . Firm 1’s and firm 2’s demand in period 2 are denoted by  and , 
respectively. The analysis in this chapter focuses on situations where switching costs are 
small relative to reservation prices. Most of the probability mass in the distribution function 
 is, thus, at prices above 
n
n− 1D 2D
( )G r s . The easiest way to formalize this is to assume that r s> . It 
can be shown that prices above s  are not chosen in equilibrium (see below). Therefore, in 
both periods, aggregate demand equals 1, and results are independent of the specification of 
.( )G r 21 Furthermore, prices are normalized such that 1s ≡ . 
Under the above assumptions, firm 1’s demand in period 2 is given by:22
 1 1 2 1 2 2 1( | ) ( ) (1 ) (D p p n nF p p n F p p= − − + − − ) (1)
Firm 2’s demand in period 2 equals 11 D− . Period-2-profits are given by i i ip Dπ = 1, 2i =, . 
To obtain simple analytical results, I will from now on assume that switching costs are 
uniformly distributed, and that 0s ≡ . Therefore: 
 1    , 1
( )    , 0 1
0   , 0
s
F s s s
s
>⎧⎪= ≤ ≤⎨⎪ <⎩
 
(2)
Using (1) and (2), we obtain the following expression for firm 1’s profit in period 2: 
                                                 
21 The analysis includes the special case where all consumers have an identical reservation price. 
22 Note, that  for ( ) 0F s = s s< , and  for ( ) 1F s = s s> . 
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(3)
, and similarly for firm 2. 
(3) implies that in the maximization of 1π  over 1p , firm 1 never chooses a price outside the 
interval . For the interior of this interval, firm 1’s best reply function must be 
computed separately for the case 
2 2[ 1,p p− +1]
21p p<  and 1 2p p>  (similarly for firm 2). The two firms’ 
best reply functions intersect only once in the relevant range. For , this intersection 
point is given by: 
1/ 2n ≥
 0.5
1
1
3
n np
n
≥ += , 0.52 23
n np
n
≥ −=  (4)
In this candidate equilibrium, firm 2 (the firm with the smaller customer base) is the low-
priced firm. To show that (4) is an equilibrium, we must verify that firm 2 does not benefit 
from deviating to become the high-priced firm.23 If firm 2 deviates from the candidate 
equilibrium in (4) to become the high-priced firm, it earns the following profit (using (3), and 
firm 2’s best reply for 2 1p p> ): 
 2
2
1 4 1( )
4 3
dev n nn
n
π − +⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
(5)
(4) is an equilibrium if firm 2’s profit is not smaller than  for any . Firm 2’s 
profit in the candidate equilibrium (4) equals (using (3)): 
2 ( )
dev nπ [0.5,1]n∈
 20.5
2
(2 )( )
9
n nn
n
π ≥ −=  (6)
It is easy to verify that  holds 0.52 2( ) ( )
n dn nπ π≥ ≥ ev [0.5,1]n∀ ∈ , so (4) is an equilibrium. 
Analog results are obtained for , but the roles of the two firms as high-priced and low-
priced firm are reversed. One obtains for firm 1’s price over the entire range of : 
1/ 2n <
n
 *
1
(1 ) / 3          , 0.5
( )
(1 ) / 3(1 ) , 0.5
n n n
p n
n n n
+ ≥⎧= ⎨ + − <⎩
(7)
                                                 
23 Formally, firm 2’s best reply function is discontinuous. There is a critical price  between 0 and 1 where firm 
2 “switches” from being the high-priced to being the low-priced firm. We must verify that this switching point 
lies to the left of the candidate equilibrium price  in (4). 
1p
0.5
1
np ≥
Plotting  over  using (7), we find that firm 1’s equilibrium price increases in  for 
, and decreases in  for . The maximum price of  is attained at 
.
*
1p n n
1/ 2n < n 1/ 2n > 1 1p =
1/ 2n = 24 Therefore, price competition in period 2 is most intense for skewed ex-ante splits 
of the market, and least intense for even splits. This suggests that a firm that has served at 
least half of the market in the past, may not benefit from an increase in the size of its customer 
base (in terms of period-2-profit) if the intensified price competition outweighs the benefit a 
large customer base has per se (at fixed prices). To see whether this is the case, we must 
analyze firm 1’s (or equivalently firm 2’s) profit as a function of . n
Using (3) and (7), we obtain the following expression for firm 1’s period-2-profit: 
 2
*
1 2
(1 ) / 9          , 0.5
( )
(1 ) / 9(1 ) , 0.5
n n n
n
n n n
π ⎧ + ≥⎪= ⎨ + − <⎪⎩
(8)
Figure 1 shows 1π  as a function of n .25
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Figure 1: Firm 1’s period-2-profit π1as a function of its customer base size n 
 
The main result is summarized in the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  Firm 1’s second-period profit increases in the size of its customer base  if 
, and it decreases in n  if . 
n
1/ 2n < 1/ 2n >
 
According to Proposition 1, firm 1 does not benefit from an increase in the size of its 
customer base (in terms of period-2-profit) if it has already served at least half of the market 
                                                 
24 Prices above 1 are, thus, never chosen in equilibrium. Note, that a deviation to a price above r , the lowest 
reservation price, can never be profitable as this leads to a double loss of customers: 1. of customers who switch 
to the competitor, and 2. of customers who neither want to switch, nor make a purchase at the given price. 
25 The analog curve for firm 2 is just the mirror picture and contains no additional information. 
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in the previous period. This result contradicts the commonly held belief that firms generally 
benefit from a large customer base in markets with switching costs. It is important to note that 
the non-monotonic relation between the size of firm 1’s customer base and firm 1’s period-2-
profit was obtained using simple and for some markets plausible assumptions, in particular 
homogeneous goods and uniformly distributed switching costs. The result should, thus, not be 
seen as a theoretical curiosity, but as an empirically relevant prediction.26
 
In the following, I will investigate how the above findings affect competition in earlier stages 
of the market, when consumers are not yet attached to one of the suppliers. Previous works 
have shown that competition in markets with switching costs may be particularly intense in 
early market stages because firms have an incentive to build up a large customer base that is 
valuable at later stages. According to the above result, however, this may not generally be 
true. In the present model, firms have an incentive to build up a customer base, but only as 
long as its size does not exceed 1/2. Therefore, it is no longer obvious that competition should 
be particularly intense in period 1. 
Before moving on to the fully rational case, a useful benchmark is to study the case of myopic 
consumers who do not take into account how their first-period choice affects their second-
period options. 
 
Case 1: Myopic consumers 
 25
2
2
Myopic consumers buy from the cheaper supplier in period 1. Therefore, if , then 
. If , . If , consumers are assumed to randomize, so . Using 
(8), we obtain for firm 1’s period-2-profits in these cases: 
1q q<
1n = 1 2q q> 0n = 1q q= 1/ 2n =
1(1) 4 / 9π = , 1(0) 1/ 9π = , and 
1(1/ 2) 1/ 2π = . If future profits are discounted with the factor δ , we obtain for firm 1’s total 
discounted profit in period 1: 
 
1 2
1 1 2 1 1 2
4
1 19
/ 9             ,  
( | ) ( ) / 2   ,  
        ,  
q q
q q q q q
q q
δ
δ
δ
>⎧⎪Π = + =⎨⎪
2q+ <⎩
(9)
                                                 
26 Non-monotonic relations between the size of a firm’ customer base and profit must not always be single-
peaked as in Figure 1. The type of non-monotonicity obtained depends on when price competition is particularly 
intense. See chapter 2. 
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Proposition 2: There is a continuum of equilibria. The set of equilibrium prices 
 is given by: * * * *1 2 1 2( , , ,q q p p { }7 19 9( , , , ) | , , 1q q p p q pδ δ∈ − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Proof:  
If both firms charge an identical price  in period 1, then the equilibrium price of q * 1p =  in 
period 2 follows immediately from (4). To charge an identical price in period 1 is an 
equilibrium outcome if no deviation is profitable. Undercutting  marginally yields a profit 
of 
q
4
9q δ+ . Equalizing this with the profit from not deviating, ( ) /q 2δ+ , yields for the highest 
sustainable equilibrium price in period 1: max 19q δ= . Choosing a higher price than  yields a 
profit of 
q
/ 9δ . Equalizing this with ( ) /q 2δ+ , we obtain for the lowest sustainable price in 
period 1: min 79q δ= − . Outside the interval , a profitable deviation exists, inside, 
there is no profitable deviation. There are no asymmetric equilibria because, as can easily be 
verified, at least one of the firms always has an incentive to deviate.  □ 
min max[ ,q q ]
 
According to Proposition 2, the highest sustainable price in period 1 is max / 9q δ= . Assuming 
that firms can coordinate on this price, we obtain the equilibrium profits: 
 * *
1 2
5
9
δΠ = Π =  (10)
Similarly as in a collusive setting, firms can achieve a higher profit for larger values of the 
discount factor δ . Note, that this is not only due to the higher valuation of second-period 
profits in period 1. According to max / 9q δ= , firms can also coordinate on higher first-period 
prices, the more valuable second-period profits are! This reverses the basic intuition, 
according to which firms, in an attempt to build up a large customer base, compete more 
fiercely for first-period sales the more valuable future profits are. For 0δ → , the first-period 
outcome converges to the competitive one. 
 
Case 2: Rational consumers 
In period 1, rational consumers observe  and  and anticipate second-period prices 1q 2q 1p  and 
2p  (as functions of ). Unless there is an equilibrium where all consumers purchase from the 
same supplier in period 1, the equilibrium value of  will be such that consumers are 
n
n
indifferent between firm 1’s and firm 2’s offer. Otherwise, consumers would deviate from 
their period-1 choice and purchase from the other supplier.  
 
Lemma 1: There is no equilibrium where all consumers purchase from the same firm in 
period 1. 
 
Proof:  
Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium where all consumers purchase from, say, 
firm 1 in period 1 ( * 1n = ). There are two cases to be distinguished: 1. , and 2. *1 0q ≥ *1 0q < . 
Consider the first case. Firm 2 has an incentive to deviate from  and match . This 
yields a non-negative profit in period 1, and, by Proposition 1, unambiguously leads to an 
increase in its second-period profit. Now consider the second case. Firm 1 makes losses in 
period 1. Therefore, it has an incentive to increase its price and match . This reduces firm 
1’s first-period losses, and unambiguously leads to an increase in its second-period profit. 
*
2q q> *1 *1q
*
2q
 
As a consequence of Lemma 1, we only have to look for equilibria where consumers are 
indifferent between firm 1’s and firm 2’s offer in period 1. For given prices  and ,  is, 
thus, determined by a condition of indifference. The expected discounted expenditure of a 
marginal consumer who purchases from firm 1 in period 1 is (I assume that consumers 
discount the future with the same rate as firms): 
1q 2q n
 ( )1 1 2Pr[1 1] Pr[1 2] [ |1 2]q p p E sδ δ+ → + → + → (11)
, where “1 ”, e.g., denotes the event that the consumer purchases from firm 1 in period 1, 
and switches to firm 2 in period 2. An analog expression is obtained for firm 2. In 
equilibrium, the two expressions must be equal. Consumers are, then, indifferent between the 
two suppliers. 
2
2
→
A consumer switches from firm 1 to firm 2 in period 2 if her cost of switching is smaller than 
the price differential 1p p− . Therefore, we have: , and 
. Similarly,  and . 
Assuming that  without loss of generality, it follows that  and 
1 2Pr[1 2] ( )F p p→ = −
1 2Pr[1 1] 1 ( )F p p→ = − − 2 1Pr[2 1] ( )F p p→ = − 2 1Pr[2 2] 1 ( )F p p→ = − −
1q q≤ 2 1/ 2n ≥ 1 2p p≥  
(otherwise, firm 1 would be the low-priced firm in both periods, so all consumers would buy 
from firm 1 in period 1). Using (2), we, thus, obtain: 1 2Pr[1 2] p p→ = − , 
1 2Pr[1 1] 1 p p→ = − + , , and . For the conditional expectation in Pr[2 1] 0→ = Pr[2 2] 1→ =
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(11), we get: . This yields the following condition of indifference 
that implicitly defines n : 
1 2[ |1 2] ( ) / 2E s p p→ = −
 ( )
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1 1(1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2) ( ) ( ) / 2q p p p p p p p p q pδ δ δ+ − + + − + − = +  (12)
Consumers correctly anticipate second-period prices. Therefore, we can use (4) to replace 1p  
and 2p  in (12). Solving for , we, thus, obtain the following dependency of first-period 
market shares from first-period prices: 
n
 ( )2 1
1 2
2 1
3 2(
( , )
8 18( )
q q
n q q
q q
δ δ δ
δ
+ − −= − −
) (13)
An analog expression is obtained for . 1 2q q>
For a given value of , firm 1 maximizes: 2q
 ( )
( )
( )
2
1 2
1 1 2 1 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 1 2
1 2
1 ( , )
( , )      ,  
9 ( , )
( | )
1 ( , )
( , )     ,  
9 1 ( , )
n q q
q n q q q q
n q q
q q
n q q
q n q q q q
n q q
δ
δ
⎧ ++ ≤⎪⎪Π = ⎨ +⎪ + >⎪ −⎩
 
(14)
It can be shown that firm 1 never benefits from choosing a price greater than  (  is 
decreasing in  for ). The same is true for firm 2. Therefore, if a pure strategy 
equilibrium exists, then it must be symmetric: 
2q 1 1 2( | )q qΠ
1q 1 2 0q q> ≥
* *
1 2q q q= ≡ . The resulting profit is: 
 * *
1 2 ( ) /q δΠ = Π = + 2  (15)
A pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist if for a given value for 2q q= ,  is not a global 
maximum of (14). It turns out that this is the case if  is relatively large. A deviation to a 
price below  is, then, profitable. This is intuitive, because firm 1 is obviously more 
interested in undercutting  when  is large (note, that  depends only on the 
difference between  and ). On the other hand, when  is small, undercutting  yields 
little or no additional profit in period 1, whereas profit in period 2 decreases according to 
Proposition 1. Therefore, as in the case with myopic consumers, there is an upper bound  
to the set of first-period prices that can be sustained in equilibrium.  
1q q=
q
q
2q = q 2q 1 2( , )n q q
1q 2q q q
maxq
To compute , we have to know which deviation from  is most profitable (if any).  
is, then, the highest common price level  from which no profitable deviation exists. It can be 
shown that, for intermediate values of q , 
maxq q maxq
q
1 1 2( | )q q qΠ =  is U-shaped for . Therefore, 1q ≤ q
the most profitable deviation is to choose the highest price that is sufficiently low to attract 
the entire market demand in period 1 ( 1n = ). Using (13), we obtain for this price:  
 5
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devq q δ= −  (16)
The highest sustainable equilibrium price in period 1 is, thus, determined by the condition: 
 max max
1 1 2 1 1 2( ) ( ,
devq q q q q q qΠ = = = Π = = ) (17)
Using (14), this yields:  
 max 2
3
q δ=  (18)
The lowest sustainable price  is computed in a similar way. Firm 1’s best deviation 
upwards when  is negative is to choose a price  that is sufficiently high so that 
minq
q 1q 0n = . 
Therefore, firm 1’s first-period profit equals zero, and the second-period profit equals 
1(0) 1/ 9π = . One obtains the same value for the lowest sustainable price as in the case with 
myopic consumers: min 79q δ= − . 
It is plausible to assume that firms coordinate on the highest sustainable price in period 1. 
This yields for the equilibrium profits: 
 * *
1 2
5
6
δΠ = Π =  (19)
The results are summarized by the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: When consumers are rational and forward-looking, first-period prices are 
above the competitive price, and they are larger than in the case with myopic consumers. In 
both cases, first-period prices are increasing in the discount factor δ . 
 
That first-period prices are higher when consumers are rational than in the case with myopic 
consumers is not surprising. Myopic consumers purchase from the cheaper supplier in period 
1. This makes price competition fairly intense. When consumers are rational and forward-
looking, they realize that a firm that cuts its price in period 1 will charge a higher price in 
period 2 than its competitor. This prevents that all consumers pick the cheap supplier in 
period 1, and demand becomes continuous in prices. Firms’ incentives to undercut the 
competitor’s price are, thus, lower, and equilibrium prices higher than in the myopic case.  
The most fundamental insight from the analysis is, that the non-monotonicity in the relation 
between the size of a firm’s customer base and profit in period 2 allows firms to sustain prices 
above the competitive level also in period 1. Unlike in previous works, price competition in 
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earlier stages of a market with switching costs is, thus, not particularly intense (in the present 
model, it is only slightly more intense in the first than in the second period). This is because 
firms have only a limited interest in building up a customer base. A large customer base is 
less valuable than an intermediate one because it implies tough price competition in the 
second period. The strength of this effect depends upon the valuation of future profits. If they 
are fully discounted ( 0δ = ), first-period prices collapse to the competitive level. The finding 
that a higher discount factor yields higher profits is reminiscent of a collusive outcome, but it 
is entirely based on switching costs. 
1.3. CONCLUSION 
It is usually assumed than, in markets where current market shares determine the future 
profitability of firms, firms generally benefit from a large customer base. The present chapter 
shows that this is not true for markets where consumers face costs of switching the supplier. A 
non-monotonic relation between the size of a firm’s customer base and profit is obtained 
under plausible conditions, in particular homogeneous goods and dispersed switching cost. 
Under the assumptions of the model, price competition is least intense for an even ex-ante 
split of the market. The effect is so strong that firms do not benefit from an increase in the 
size of their customer base beyond 50 percent. This prediction is in sharp contrast with the 
existing literature on switching costs, according to which firms generally have an incentive to 
invest in future market shares. In fact, the entire literature on dynamic price competition with 
switching costs is based on this idea.27 If firms have only a limited interest in building up a 
customer base, there are fewer incentives to compete for consumers who are not yet attached 
to one of the suppliers in the market. This strengthens the notion that switching costs lead to 
higher prices in the market than in the absence of switching costs. 
                                                 
27 see, e.g., Klemperer (1987) and Padilla (1995) 
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Chapter 2. ON THE VALUE OF A LARGE CUSTOMER BASE 
IN MARKETS WITH INCOMPLETE CONSUMER INFORMATION 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Firms can only compete for consumers who are aware of the existence and the prices of their 
products, as well as about the products’ main characteristics and the suppliers’ locations. 
Therefore, the competitiveness of product markets depends crucially upon the amount of 
information available to the consumers. Many authors abstract from informational constraints 
and assume full information, without specifying the sources of the relevant information. Such 
sources are, e.g., advertising, active search, or consumers’ word-of-mouth communication.28 
The latter has received little attention in the economics literature, although casual evidence 
suggests that it is an important source of information.29 In markets with repeat purchasing, a 
major source of information are also the consumers’ own previous consumption experiences. 
Consumers may, e.g., remember the location of their previous supplier and the product’s 
characteristics. If consumers have superior information about their previous supplier, a direct 
link between past sales and current demand emerges. 
In this chapter, I analyze price competition in a market characterized by incomplete consumer 
information and repeat purchasing. Consumers gather information via active search or via 
word-of-mouth communication. In the model, there is a direct link between a firm’s previous 
sales and current demand. The main question that shall be answered is whether it is generally 
true that firms benefit from having a large customer base, as economic intuition would 
suggest. Although a static modeling framework is chosen, the inclusion of firms’ past market 
shares introduces an important dynamic aspect into the model. 
Apart from the word-of-mouth information process, the main difference between the work in 
this chapter and most of the existing literature (e.g. on consumer search) is the explicit 
treatment of ex-ante asymmetric splits of the market, and the analysis of the dependency of 
current profits from past sales. I have not found any detailed study on the shape of past sales – 
current profit relations anywhere in the literature. This chapter performs this exercise for 
markets characterized by incomplete consumer information and repeat purchasing. 
 
28 Another way to gather information is to observe other consumers’ choices. 
29 Word-of-mouth seems especially prevalent in markets for music, film, literature, restaurants etc.. 
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The main assumptions of the model are as follows. There is a homogeneous good duopoly, 
and a unit mass of consumers with a uniform reservation price. The market is characterized by 
repeat purchasing, and all consumers have made a purchase before. The consumers who 
purchased a firm’s product in the past are the firm’s customer base. The size of a firm’s 
customer base matters because consumers are assumed to have information from past 
consumption experiences. In particular, consumers are aware of existence and location of 
their previous supplier, and about the respective product’s characteristics. Given this 
information, a current price quote can always be obtained for free. 
There are three types of consumers. The first type uses word-of-mouth as a potential source of 
information about the other supplier. Each ‘word-of-mouth consumer’ asks one other 
consumer randomly chosen from the population about her previous choice. If it differs from 
the consumer’s own previous choice, the relevant information on the other supplier’s 
existence, location, and product characteristics30 is transmitted, and a current price quote is 
obtained for free (see Butters, 1977, and Fishman and Rob, 1995). Consumers who are aware 
of both firms’ offers always buy from the firm that currently offers the lower price.31 Word-
of-mouth consumers who ask consumers from their own customer base do not find out about 
the other firm’s offer and buy from their previous supplier unless the current price exceeds the 
reservation price. Since the probability that a word-of-mouth consumer asks a consumer from 
a given firm’s customer base increases in the size of this customer base, a firm that previously 
served a large fraction of market demand is in an advantageous position. The word-of-mouth 
process, thus, exhibits “popularity weighting”. The second type of consumers are the 
“searchers” who perform active non-sequential search and are always informed about both 
firms’ offers. The third consumer type does not search actively or communicate via word-of-
mouth. Consumers of this “ignorant type” simply return to their previous supplier. Other 
authors, e.g. Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian (1980), Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales (2004), 
also introduced consumers who learn only one supplier’s price, but assume that they choose 
the supplier randomly. The above assumptions about the ignorant types and the word-of-
mouth consumers formalize the idea that consumers are repeat purchasers with superior 
information about their previous supplier.  
It is shown that no pure strategy equilibrium exists, and an equilibrium in mixed pricing 
strategies is derived. Market outcomes are, thus, characterized by price distributions, a 
property well-known from the search literature. The model allows for asymmetric 
 
30 Although products are assumed to be homogeneous in the model, consumers may not be aware of this. 
31 If both firms offer the same price, a tie braking rule is applied. 
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distributions of past market shares and for non-identical marginal production costs. It offers 
not only a resolution to the “Bertrand Paradox”, according to which under full information, no 
capacity constraints, and identical marginal costs, firms price competitively. It also offers a 
resolution to what might be referred to as a “second Bertrand Paradox”, which states that 
whenever there is a difference in marginal production costs, a high-cost firm obtains zero 
market share. In this chapter, the inefficient firm retains a positive market share if it has a 
positive customer base. If it does not have a customer base (entry), the incumbent conducts 
limit pricing if the entrant’s marginal costs are sufficiently higher than the incumbent’s. 
The central question that shall be answered is whether it is generally true that current 
(expected) profit monotonically increases in the size of a firm’s customer base. It turns out 
that this is not the case. There is, in fact, a surprising variety of possible shapes of this 
relation. E.g., when most consumers are searchers, so we are only a small step away from the 
standard Bertrand model with full information, the past sales – current profit relation is V-
shaped. The reason for this result is that price competition is particularly intense for an even 
ex-ante split of the market.32 A reduction in the size of a firm’s customer base is, thus, in the 
firm’s interest if the benefit of softened price competition outweighs the loss of monopoly 
power over uninformed repeat purchasers. 
In most sections of this chapter, the fraction of word-of-mouth consumers and ignorant types 
in the population is treated as exogenous. The rationale behind this is that consumers are often 
poorly informed about the characteristics of markets, such as the number of suppliers, 
technology, aggregate demand etc.. Therefore, they can not condition their search decision 
upon these characteristics.33 An alternative explanation is that searchers enjoy shopping and 
have negligible search costs, word-of-mouth consumers enjoy chatting, while the ignorant 
types find both activities prohibitively costly. In order to analyze under what conditions well 
informed rational consumers rely on word-of-mouth, and to check the robustness of the main 
non-monotonicity result, I introduce an endogenization of the fraction of word-of-mouth 
consumers in the population. To this end, I assume that active search is costly, and word-of-
mouth communication is for free (as a by-product of social interaction). Consumers are 
 
32 In chapter 1, I showed that in a duopolistic market with full information and switching costs, profits are 
maximized for an even ex-ante split of the market. This finding is in stark contrast to the V-shaped past sales – 
current profit relation derived in this chapter. 
33 Hehenkamp (2002) introduces an evolutionary model where both consumers and firms are poorly informed, 
and firms make decisions by imitation and experimentation. However, it seems plausible to assume that 
consumers (who are active in a variety of markets) are poorly informed about a specific market, while firms (that 
are active in few markets) are well informed. This view is adopted in the present chapter. 
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informed about the main characteristics of the market, including the past distribution of 
market shares, and they use this information to compute expected utility gains or losses from 
active search. It is shown that the equilibrium fraction of word-of-mouth consumers is 
(weakly) increasing in the search cost. For some parameter values, there are multiple 
equilibria: an equilibrium with a large fraction of searchers, and a “no-search-equilibrium” 
where all consumers rely on word-of-mouth. 
Finally, the analysis is extended to a larger number of firms. The main question is whether the 
non-monotonicities that were observed in the duopoly case persist when the number of 
competitors increases. It is shown that they can persist if the number of firms remains finite, 
but they always disappear when the number of firms approaches infinity. I further analyze 
whether prices and aggregate industry profits converge to zero as the number of firms 
approaches infinity, a question that has often been analyzed in the search literature. 
It is important to note, that a static modeling framework is chosen in this chapter, so firms’ 
incentives to invest (or disinvest) in future market shares are excluded. Although a full-
fledged dynamic analysis would be desirable, the static approach chosen in the present 
chapter is justified for two reasons. First, a dynamic analysis is only useful when the 
properties of the static game are already well understood since the effects that are found in the 
static game are also present in a dynamic setting. This understanding is provided in this 
chapter, and it is shown that the static game is rich enough to deserve special attention in its 
own right. And more importantly, the static game is shown to be a good approximation of a 
more general dynamic model under certain conditions (see Section 2.6). In brief, suppose the 
products sold in our market are durable, but durability is finite. Therefore, only a fraction of 
all potential consumers make a purchase each period, an assumption that holds for many real-
world markets.34 As a consequence, even if a firm serves a large fraction of current market 
demand, the total size of its customer base (including all consumers who purchased the firm’s 
product when they last made a purchase) remains small if it served only a small fraction of 
market demand in previous periods. It is shown that, as the durability of the products becomes 
large, the initial split of the market next period (the state) becomes insensitive to current 
prices. The static model is, thus, obtained in the limit as durability approaches infinity. 
 
A brief review of the related literature: 
The model is related to the existing literature on word-of-mouth communication. Ellison and 
Fudenberg (1995), e.g., analyze the effectiveness of word-of-mouth communication in a non-
 
34 Word-of-mouth consumers are, thus, likely to ask consumers who’s last purchase is several periods ago. 
market situation. They consider a population in which each individual can choose between 
two alternatives. Payoffs are stochastic with an idiosyncratic and a common component. 
Agents who re-evaluate their last-period choice ask a sample of  other agents about their 
last-period choice and payoff.
N
35 The other agents stick to their previous choice. The authors 
show that there is convergence towards the alternative that is on average superior if the 
sample size ( ) is not too large. N
In this chapter, it is assumed that word-of-mouth consumers ask only one other consumer 
instead of . Although this formalization is less general, I believe that it captures the 
essence of word-of-mouth communication (in particular the ‘popularity weighting’ property) 
sufficiently well while achieving analytical tractability. Consumers who ask several other 
consumers are well informed and, thus, similar to searchers. The searchers in this chapter may 
be interpreted as word-of-mouth consumers with a larger sample size. 
1N ≥
Rob and Fishman (2005) introduce a dynamic model of a product market with continuous 
investments in quality. In their model, word-of-mouth communication is defined as follows. 
Consumers live for one period. New consumers who enter the market meet with a certain 
probability old consumers who leave the market and find out about the “tenure” of the firm 
that was patronized by the old consumer. The ‘tenure’ is defined as the number of periods 
since the firm last produced a low-quality product. Each new consumer can either visit the 
firm that she finds out about via word-of-mouth (if any), or search for another firm, where to 
‘search’ means simply to choose another supplier randomly.36 In contrast to the model 
introduced in this chapter, the authors abstract from price competition by assuming that each 
supplier has monopoly power over the consumers visiting it this period. The main result is 
that firms’ incentives to invest in quality are increasing in the size of their customer base.37  
The present model is also closely related to the literature on consumer search. Stiglitz (1989), 
e.g., analyzes search in a market where consumers find out about the price of a randomly 
chosen store without cost. To obtain a price quote from a second store, a search cost is 
incurred. More search is prohibitively costly. The author shows that, when the number of 
 35
                                                 
35 Satterthwaite (1979) introduces a word-of-mouth process where consumers pass on information also about 
suppliers they have heard of from other consumers, and gradually forget the information over time. 
36 This word-of-mouth process could also be interpreted in terms of repeat-purchasing, assuming that only a 
certain fraction of the consumers leaves the market each period, and those who stay are aware of the tenure of 
their previous supplier. 
37 Vettas (1997) considers a monopolist who sells a durable good in a market where consumers communicate via 
word-of-mouth. Consumers who purchase the good become informed about its quality and pass on this 
information to other consumers. Therefore, the quantity sold affects consumers’ information about quality. 
stores is raised, the average price increases. Stiglitz argues that word-of-mouth 
communication (with “friendly neighbors”) can be modeled in the same way if one assumes 
that each consumer visits one randomly chosen store, and some consumers find out about the 
price of a second store by talking to a neighbor. Stahl (1989) analyzes sequential search in a 
market where an exogenous fraction of the consumers (the “shoppers”) have zero search cost. 
The others incur a cost whenever they visit a different store, but the first search is free.  
Similarly as Stiglitz (1989) and Stahl (1989), many authors of search models assume that 
consumers can obtain the first price quote for free. Since they do not possess knowledge from 
past consumption experiences, consumers randomize over the identity of the first store they 
visit.38 Alternatively, one could assume there is repeat purchasing, and the store from which 
consumers obtain the free price quote is the one where they made their last purchase. But 
since all authors have restricted their attention to ex-ante symmetric situations, this 
interpretation would imply that all firms had identical market shares in the past. The main 
contribution of this chapter is to consider ex-ante asymmetric situations and to perform an 
explicit analysis of the past sales – current profit relation. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the model is introduced, and 
the main properties of the equilibrium are identified. The analysis is performed on a general 
level and allows for other information processes than the one introduced in this chapter. In 
Section 2.3, the results are applied to the word-of-mouth information process, and the shape 
of the past sales – current profit relation is analyzed. Section 2.4 contains the endogenization 
of the fraction of word-of-mouth consumers. Section 2.5 extends the analysis to oligopolies 
with more than two firms. Section 2.6 contains a discussion of the main modeling choices. 
Section 2.7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
2.2. THE MODEL 
Consider a homogeneous good duopoly where firms produce with constant marginal cost 
technologies, and let  ( ) denote firm i ’s marginal cost of production. On the 
demand side, there is a continuum of consumers of measure one. Each (marginal) consumer 
1ic < {1, 2}i∈
 36
                                                 
38 Bester and Petrakis (1995) assume that consumers live in the neighborhood of either store 1 or store 2. The 
only way to find out about the other store’s price is via advertising. The authors assume that a transportation cost 
is incurred when the distant store is visited. 
buys either zero or one unit in the market. All consumers have the same reservation price, 
normalized to 1 without loss of generality.39 Note, that the monopoly price also equals 1.  
Suppose, there is repeat purchasing, and the market is ‘mature’ in the sense that all consumers 
have made a purchase in this market before. Let the size of firm ’s customer base, , be the 
mass of consumers who purchased firm ’s product when they last made a purchase. 
Therefore,  is equal to firm i ’s previous market share. 
i in
i
in
By assumption, consumers are not fully informed about the existence or the location of the 
suppliers or about the relevant characteristics of the products. Therefore, the firm that charges 
the lower price in the market will generally not serve the entire market demand. Let  be 
the demand of the low-priced firm when the size of its customer base is . Similarly, let  
be the firm’s demand when it charges the higher price. I assume that firms are identical except 
for the size of their customer base and their marginal production costs. Therefore, the 
functions  and  do not depend on the identity of the firm (
( )h n
n ( )l n
(.)l (.)h {1, 2}i∈ ). A specification of 
 and  is called an information process. (.)l (.)h
Without loss of generality, strategies with  are eliminated from the strategy space. Firm 
’s demand is, thus, given by ( , 
1ip >
i , {1, 2}i j∈ j i≠ ): 
 ( )   if   [0, )
( | )         if   
( )    if   ( ,1]
i i
i i j i i j
i i
h n p p
D p p n p p
l n p p
⎧ ∈⎪= =⎨⎪ ∈⎩
j
j
)
(1)
Firm i ’s ex-post profit equals ( | ) ( ) ( |i i j i i i i jp p p c D p pπ = − . 
 
Under the above assumptions, the following symmetry property holds generally for all 
information processes ( )(.), (.)l h  and [0,1]n∀ ∈ : 
 ( ) 1 (1 )l n h n= − −  (2)
This follows immediately from ( ) ( ) 1i jl n h n+ =  if  and if  (all consumers 
buy), and from the ‘mature market’ condition: 
ip p> j jip p<
1i jn n+ = . 
 
Definition 1: A symmetric information process ( )(.), (.)l h  is strictly monotone if  is 
strictly increasing. It is imperfect if 
(.)h
( ) 1h n <  and non-trivial if  . An ( )h n n> [0,1)n∀ ∈
                                                 
39 The uniform reservation price could be replaced by a downward-sloping demand function, but this would add 
little to our understanding of the effects that drive the main results in this chapter. 
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information process ( )(.), (.)l h  that is symmetric, strictly monotone, imperfect, and non-trivial 
is referred to as a “SMIT” information process. 
 
Lemma 1: Given some SMIT information process, if both firms have a positive40 customer 
base, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. 
 
According to Lemma 1, if an equilibrium exists, then market outcomes are characterized by 
price distributions. Pure strategy equilibria are only obtained if one of the conditions in 
Lemma 1 is violated. E.g., if the information process is not imperfect, the standard Bertrand 
model with full information is obtained. If the information process is trivial, both firms 
choose the monopoly price with probability one. If one of the firms had a market share of size 
zero in the past (this case can be used to describe entry), and this firm’s marginal cost is 
sufficiently higher than the incumbent’s, then the incumbent conducts limit pricing (see 
below). The mixed strategy equilibrium derived in this section is well-behaved in the sense 
that all these results are obtained in the limit. 
Mixed strategy equilibria are defined by the condition that firms are indifferent between all 
prices that are chosen with positive probability or to which a positive density is attached. Let 
 be firm ’s price distribution function, with the convention that the mass or density at 
the price 
(.)iF i
ip p=  itself is not included, that is: ( ) Pr[ ]i iF p P p≡ < , where  is the random 
variable from which  is drawn.
iP
p 41 Let  be the support of .iS (.)iF
42
 
Lemma 2: Given some SMIT information process, if both firms have a positive customer 
base,  and  have the same support  (1(.)F 2 (.)F S 1 2S S S= ≡ ).  is convex, the maximum of 
 is the monopoly price 1, and the minimum (denoted by 
S
S p ) lies in the interval 
. ( )1 2max{ , },1c c
 
Lemma 3: Given some SMIT information process, if both firms have a positive customer 
base, there is no equilibrium where more than one firm attaches positive probability mass to 
                                                 
40 A firm has a ‘positive’ customer base if it’s previous market share is bounded away from zero. 
41 Under this convention, 1 (1)iF−  is the probability mass at the monopoly price. 
42  is the smallest closed set of prices  whose complement has a probability of zero. iS p
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any single price. Furthermore, if a mass point is part of a firm’s equilibrium strategy, it is 
located at the monopoly price 1. 
Suppose, an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists. Given firm ’s price distribution function, 
firm 
i
j ’s ex-ante expected profit (for jp p= ) equals: 
 ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )j j j i j ip c l n F p h n F pπ = − + − (3)
In (3),  is firm ( ) ( )j il n F p j ’s demand when it is the high-priced firm times the probability of 
this event. 
By Lemma 1, the right-hand-side in (3) must be independent of  p p S∀ ∈ . (3) can be solved 
for firm i ’s price distribution function ( i j, {1, 2}∈ , j i≠ ): 
 ( ) /( )
( )
( ) ( )
j j j
i
j j
h n p c
F p
h n l n
π− −= −  
(4)
By Lemma 2 and 3, the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
  :  ( ) 0 ,  {1, 2}ip F p i∃ = ∈  , and (5)
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2(i) (1) 1  (1) 1   (ii) (1) 1  (1) 1   (iii) (1) (1) 1F F F F F F< ∧ = ∨ = ∧ < ∨ = = (6)
Under case (i) in (6), firm 1’s price distribution function has a mass point at the monopoly 
price 1, but not firm 2’s. Under case (ii), the situation is reversed. We would normally expect 
the firm with the smaller customer base to price more aggressively, so the distribution 
function of the firm with the larger customer base should have a mass point. Below, it is 
shown that this intuition is correct only when firms have identical marginal costs. 
 
To simplify the exposition, suppose from now on that when marginal costs are not identical, 
firm 1 is always the more efficient firm. Without loss of generality, firm 1’s marginal cost is 
normalized to zero ( 1 0c ≡ ). For an ease of notation, let 2c c≡ , with [0,1)c∈ . Therefore, c  is 
the difference in marginal costs. Furthermore, let  be the size of firm 1’s customer base 
( , ). Note, that n  fully describes the distribution of past market shares. 
n
1n n≡ 2 1n = − n
 
Using (3) and (5), we obtain for the lower boundary of the support : S
 1
( )
p
h n
π=  (7)
Using (3) and (5) once more, we obtain an equation that links 1π  and 2π : 
 1 2
( ) (1 )
c
h n h n
π π= +−  
(8)
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Lemma 4: Given some SMIT information process, there is a critical value for n  (denoted by 
ν ) such that  has a mass point at 2 (.)F 1p =  if n ν< , and  has a mass point at 1(.)F 1p =  if 
n ν> . ν  solves: 
 (1 ) ( ) (1 )c h hν ν− = −  (9)
The solution to (9) is unique, and ν  is increasing in . If c 0c = , then 1/ 2ν = . 
 
Lemma 4 can be restated as follows. If firms have identical marginal costs, the distribution 
function of the firm with the larger customer base has a mass point at the monopoly price 1. If 
firms have non-identical marginal costs, the distribution function of the efficient firm (firm 1) 
has a mass point at 1p =  if its past market share n  is greater than the critical value ν , where 
ν  is increasing in the difference between marginal costs c . If the critical value ν  is greater 
than 1, firm 2’s distribution function has a mass point at 1p =  for any possible value of .n 43 
The intuition behind this is, that the inefficient firm finds it hard to defend its customer base, 
so it tends to exploit the uninformed among its previous customers by choosing the monopoly 
price with positive probability. 
By Lemma 4, if n ν≥  holds, the condition 2 (1) 1F =  can be used to compute the equilibrium 
profits. Using (4), one obtains: 
 
1 ( )
n l nνπ ≥ =  (10)
If n ν< , use  in (4) to obtain: 1(1) 1F =
 
2 (1 ) (1 )
n c l nνπ < = − ⋅ −  (11)
Analog expressions for 2
n νπ ≥  and 1n νπ <  follow from (8). The results can be summarized as 
follows: 
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1
( )                                     , 
( ) (1 )(1 ) ( ) , 
(1 )
l n n
h n l nc c h n n
h n
ν
π ν
≥⎧⎪= −⎨ − + ⋅⎪ −⎩ < ,
2
(1 ) ( ) (1 )  , 
( )
(1 ) (1 )                  , 
h n l n c h n n
h n
c l n n
νπ
ν
−⎧ − ⋅ − ≥⎪= ⎨⎪ − ⋅ − <⎩  
(12)
 
(4), (9), and (12) give a complete description of the equilibrium for an arbitrary SMIT 
information process.  
Interestingly, by (12), firm 1’s expected profit is independent of firm 2’s marginal cost  as 
long as n
c
ν≥  holds. Therefore, by (4), firm 2’s price distribution function is independent of 
firm 2’s own marginal cost. As long as n ν≥  holds, an increase in  shifts firm 1’s price c
                                                 
43 The case 0ν <  never occurs as ν  is increasing in . c
distribution function towards lower prices44, while firm 1’s profit is not affected and firm 2’s 
profit decreases since the probability that it loses market shares (compared to the past) is 
raised and due to the increased production costs. 
 
Lemma 4 stated an important result concerning the identity of the firm that chooses the 
monopoly price 1 with positive probability. The following Proposition summarizes further 
predictions about the relative location of the price distribution functions that can be made, 
depending on the relation between n  and ν . 
 
Proposition 1: Given some SMIT information process, if both firms have a positive customer 
base, the distribution function of the firm with the larger customer base first order 
stochastically dominates the competitor’s distribution function if . If , the 
distribution function of the inefficient firm (firm 2) first order stochastically dominates firm 
1’s if 
0c = 0c >
n ν< . 
 
Corollary 1: If , the firm with the smaller customer base is likely to gain market shares 
compared to the past, where ‘likely’ means with probability greater than 1/2. If , the 
efficient firm (firm 1) is likely to gain market shares if n
0c =
0c >
ν< . 
 
Note, that since ν  increases in c  (so 1/ 2ν ≥ ), the stochastic dominance result of Proposition 
1 holds for at least half of all possible distributions of past market shares. Only if  and 0c >
n ν> , there is no stochastic dominance. The price distribution functions, then, always have an 
intersection point. This is illustrated for a numerical example in Figure 1 (using the word-of-
mouth information process introduced in Section 2.3). 
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Figure 1: price distribution functions; c = 0.4, λ = 0.5, ρ = 0, n = 0.98; F2(p): dashed 
                                                 
44 This can be shown formally using (4), (7), (10), and (12).  
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Figure 1 shows that the efficient firm (firm 1) chooses the monopoly price with positive 
probability when n ν> , but it also attaches more weight to prices near p  than firm 2. 
 
The following Proposition concerns the behavior of the model in the limit as . This case 
is used to describe entry by the less efficient firm 2. 
1n→
 
Proposition 2: Given some SMIT information process, if  and  (entry), the 
incumbent (firm 1) conducts limit pricing, where ‘limit pricing’ means that firm 1 chooses 
 with probability one, and the entrant obtains zero market share. 
(1)c l≥ 1n→
p c=
 
Proposition 2 implies that entry does not occur in equilibrium if the difference in marginal 
costs is sufficiently large. If the condition  is fulfilled, but firm 2 has a positive 
customer base, the limit pricing result of Proposition 2 does not apply. However, for this case, 
we can still predict that the market at least tends to become more concentrated, because the 
inefficient firm loses market shares with probability greater than 1/2 for all . This 
follows from Proposition 1 and from the fact that the condition  is equivalent to 
(1)c l≥
1n <
(1)c l≥ 1ν ≥  
(see the Proof or Proposition 2). 
2.3. THE PAST SALES – CURRENT PROFIT RELATION UNDER WORD-OF-MOUTH 
In the previous section, I derived the equilibrium for the duopoly case for a general 
information process and identified its main properties. The parameter n  that represents the 
size of firm 1’s customer base played a central role in the characterization of the equilibrium. 
In this section, I analyze whether firms benefit from having a large customer base, as 
economic intuition would suggest. To this end, the information process with word-of-mouth 
communication is introduced. The results of Section 2.2 are, then, used to analyze the shape 
of the past sales – current profit relation for this specific information process. It turns out that 
this relation is not generally monotone. There is a surprising variety of possible shapes. 
 
The information process is based on the following assumptions. Consumers are heterogeneous 
with respect to their search behavior. Let λ  be the fraction of word-of-mouth consumers in 
the population. Each of them is informed about the current offer of her previous supplier, and, 
in addition, asks one other randomly chosen consumer about his previous choice and finds out 
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about the respective firm’s current offer.45 Let ρ  be the fraction of consumers of the ignorant 
type. These consumers simply return to their previous supplier and buy if the price is not 
greater than 1. The fraction of searchers in the population equals 1 λ ρ− − . Searchers are 
aware of all firms’ offers and may, e.g., obtain their information from consumer reports 
(active non-sequential search).46 Consumers who find out about both firms’ offers buy the 
cheaper product. If prices are identical, they decide for the one they have purchased 
previously.47 By assumption, λ  and ρ  are exogenously fixed, and the customer base of each 
firm contains the same fraction of word-of-mouth consumers and ignorant types.48 Under 
these assumptions, the mass of consumers in a firm’s customer base of size  who find out 
about the other firm’s offer equals: 
n
 2(1 )n nρ λ− −  (13)
2nλ  is the mass of word-of-mouth consumers who ask a consumer within the same customer 
base. If λ  and ρ  are both close to zero, most consumers are fully informed, so the firm that 
charges the lower price will serve almost the entire market. If many consumers rely on word-
of-mouth, the ‘popularity weighting’ effect arises since word-of-mouth consumers are more 
likely to meet a consumer from a large customer base. 
Under the above assumptions, the functions  and  introduced in Section 2.2 read:  (.)l (.)h
 2( )l n n nρ λ= +   and   2( ) 1 (1 ) (1 )h n n nρ λ= − − − − (14)
It is easy to check that this is a SMIT information process if 0 λ ρ< +  and 1ρ < . 
Using (14), an explicit solution to (9), that defines the critical value ν , is obtained: 
 ( )2 2 24( ) (1 ) (4 ) 2( ) (2 ) / 2c c c cν λ ρ λ ρ λ ρ λ ρ λ= + − + + − + + +  (15)
To apply the results of Propositions 1 and 2, it should be noted that, given (14), the condition 
 reads: (1)c l≥ c λ ρ≥ + . The value of  for which c 1ν = , thus, equals λ ρ+ . By Proposition 
2, entry into the market is impossible if the entrant’s marginal cost exceeds this value. 
                                                 
45 Once a consumer has found out about the existence of the rival firm’s product, the location of the supplier, 
and/or the product’s characteristics, a price quote can be obtained for free. 
46 Searchers are assumed to pass on information to word-of-mouth consumers only about the product they 
previously purchased. Results are qualitatively the same if they pass on information about all firms’ offers. 
47 Intergenerational aspects can be incorporated by assuming that young consumers who enter this market inherit 
the information of their parents. 
48 In Section 2.4, an endogenization of λ  is introduced for the duopoly case, assuming that consumers are 
identical and that active search is not prohibitively costly. 
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In the following, the shape of the past sales – current profit relation is analyzed given the 
above information process. The results are obtained using particular parameter values. By 
continuity, each result extends readily to some range of parameter values.49
First consider the case where marginal costs are identical ( 0c = ). Figure 2 shows firm 1’s 
expected profit as a function of the size of it’s customer base ( ) for n 0.1λ =  and 0ρ = .50, 51
 
 
Figure 2: π1 as a function of n; c = 0, λ = 0.1, ρ = 0 
 
Observation 1: Given the information process specified in (14), there is a range of parameter 
values for which the past sales – current profit relation is V-shaped, with the minimum at 
. 1/ 2n =
 
According to Observation 1, profits are minimized when each firm served half of the market 
in the past. Firms, thus, prefer to have either a small or a large customer base. Or, to put it 
another way, a firm that served half of the consumers in the past would be willing to give up 
its entire customer base and transfer it to the competitor if it could do so without cost. 
Interestingly, the V-shaped relation is obtained when most consumers are searchers, so we are 
only a small step away from the standard Bertrand model with full information.52 The reason 
for this surprising result is that price competition is more intense for even distributions of past 
                                                 
49 Proofs are not shown. All results follow directly from (12), (14), and (15). 
50 Note that, if , firms are identical except for the size of their customer base. Therefore, the past sales – 
current profit relation for firm 2 is simply the mirror picture of Figure 1. It, thus, suffices to plot firm 1’s profit 
over . If , both firms’ profits must be plotted to obtain a complete description of the past sales – current 
profit relation. 
0c =
n 0c >
51 Similar curves as in Figure 2 are obtained for 0λ =  if ρ  is small. 
52 If λ  and ρ  approach zero, prices converge to zero, but the V-shape is maintained. 
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market shares. This can be confirmed by comparing the location of the price distribution 
functions for different values of .n 53
To understand the intuition why price competition is less intense for skewed distributions of 
past market shares, note that, if past market shares become more skewed (in a comparative 
statics sense), the firm with the large customer base (say, firm 1) can attract fewer consumers 
from firm 2’s customer base (by choosing the lower price), while firm 2 can attract more 
consumers from firm 1. When there are word-of-mouth consumers, the popularity weighting 
effect must be taken into account. For skewed distributions of past market shares, a higher 
fraction of firm 2’s customers find out about firm 1’s offer, but the total mass of informed 
consumers in firm 2’s customer base is still decreasing in  (vice versa for firm 1). Therefore, 
firm 1 always has weaker incentives, and firm 2 has stronger incentives to price aggressively 
as  increases. It turns out that the first effect dominates, so overall, price competition is less 
intense for skewed distributions of past market shares.
n
n
54  
Figure 3 shows the past sales – current profit relation for 1λ =  and 0ρ = . 
 
 
Figure 3: π1 as a function of n; c = 0, λ = 1, ρ = 0 
 
Observation 2: Given the information process specified in (14), there is a range of parameter 
values for which the past sales – current profit relation comprises a local maximum. 
 
To understand the intuition behind this result, remember that price competition is less intense 
for skewed distributions of past market shares. Therefore, starting from an even split of the 
market, a firm benefits from a reduction in the size of its customer base. However, as its 
                                                 
53 They are located further “to the right” (towards higher prices) when  differs from 0.5. It can easily be 
confirmed that the lowest price (
n
p ) is increasing in n  for . 1/ 2n ≥
54 Note, that prices are strategic complements. 
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customer base becomes small, the firm is in a disadvantageous position when most consumers 
rely on word-of-mouth since few consumers find out about the firm’s offer. This explains the 
presence of a local maximum for large values of λ .55
Now consider the case with non-identical marginal costs ( ). As Figure 2 and 3 
illustrated, there is usually a kink in the past sales – current profit relation at the critical point 
0c >
ν . Since ν  shifts to the right as the difference between marginal costs c  increases, there is a 
variety of shapes of the past sales – current profit relation that can be generated. E.g., the local 
maximum in Figure 3 can become a global maximum if ν  is greater than 1.56 In contrast to 
Observation 1, firms, then, prefer even splits of the market. 
The following graph was obtained for 0.1c = , 0.1λ = , 0ρ = , and shows an even more 
surprising result. 
 
 
Figure 4: π1 and π2 as functions of n; c = 0.1, λ = 0.1, ρ = 0; π2: dashed
 
Observation 3: Given the information process specified in (14), there is a range of parameter 
values for which the efficient firm’s past sales – current profit relation is monotonically 
decreasing. 
 
Observation 3 completely reverses the basic intuition that firms should benefit from having a 
large customer base. The efficient firm (firm 1) prefers to have no customer base at all. The 
expected profit of the inefficient firm, however, increases in the size of its customer base 
(1 ). As before, the result stems from the altered intensity of price competition as the past 
distribution of market shares is changed.  
n−
                                                 
55 In Figure 3, firm 1’s profit approaches zero for . This holds for 0n → 1λ = , because when everybody relies 
on word-of-mouth, nobody will find out about the offer of a firm with zero sales in the past. Entry is, then, 
impossible unless the entrant finds other ways to spread the information (like advertising). 
56 This is e.g. the case for 0.5λ = , 0ρ = , 0.5c = . 
 46
The above observations show that the most counter-intuitive results are obtained for small 
values of λ  and ρ , that is, when most consumers are fully informed. It is, however, 
reassuring that also parameter values exist for which our basic intuition is confirmed, that is, 
where each firm benefits from an increase in the size of its own customer base.57
2.4. ENDOGENOUS WORD-OF-MOUTH 
In Section 2.3, I assumed that the characteristics of the market, in particular the size-
distribution of firms’ customer bases, have no impact on consumers’ search decisions. This is 
plausible if consumers are poorly informed about the relevant characteristics of the market. 
The fractions of word-of-mouth consumers and consumers of the ignorant type in the 
population were, thus, treated as exogenous. In the following, I will instead assume that 
consumers are informed about the characteristics of the market and use their information to 
decide rationally whether to search actively or to communicate via word-of-mouth. The 
question that shall be tackled is under what conditions rational consumers decide to rely on 
word-of-mouth. 
Suppose, word-of-mouth communication is for free, while active search is costly. Word-of-
mouth may be interpreted as a free by-product of social interaction. Therefore, there will be 
no consumers of the ignorant type in equilibrium.58 The analysis in this section is restricted to 
the duopoly case with identical marginal costs ( 0c = , so 1/ 2ν =  by Lemma 4). Consumers 
are assumed to be identical except for the identity of their previous supplier. They are aware 
of the number of suppliers in the market and their cost functions, as well as about the total 
mass of consumers and their uniform reservation price. As before, every consumer can obtain 
a price quote from her previous supplier for free, and find out about the other firm’s offer by 
active search or via word-of-mouth. 
Let the search cost be , and denote by 0z > L  the expected loss of utility due to incomplete 
information when the consumer does not search actively. Rational consumers, thus, search 
actively if L z≥ . Without loss of generality, let firm 1 be the firm with the larger customer 
                                                 
57 This is e.g. the case for , 0c = 0λ = , 0.7ρ =  (as an example with many ignorant types), or for 0.7c = , 
0.5λ = , 0ρ =  (as an example with a large difference in marginal costs). 
58 This is only to simplify the exposition. To obtain an equilibrium with consumers of the ignorant type and 
word-of-mouth consumers, one must assume that word-of-mouth is costly, too (at least for some consumers), but 
not as costly as active search. To obtain an equilibrium only with consumers of the ignorant type and searchers, 
use ( )l n nρ=  instead of 2( )l n nλ=  in the formula for  derived in the Appendix. Equation (16) (below) must 
also be modified. All other computations remain valid. 
L
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base, and let  be the size of its customer base (so ). Since 1n n≡ 1/ 2n ≥ L  depends on , 
consumers must have some prior beliefs about the distribution of past market shares. For 
simplicity, suppose that consumers know the value of . To obtain an equilibrium where the 
same fraction of consumers in both firms’ customer bases decide to search actively, I assume 
that consumers do not know whether their previous supplier was the one with the larger or the 
smaller customer base. 
n
n
L , thus, equals: 
 2 2
1
Pr |i i j i j i
i
jL n P P E P P p p
=
⎡ ⎤ ⎡= ⋅ > ⋅ − > ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣∑ ⎦ (16)
in  is the probability that the consumer belongs to firm ’s customer base. The probability that 
he asks another consumer from firm i ’s customer base and, thus, remains ignorant about firm 
i
j ’s ( j i≠ ) offer is also equal to . This yields .in 2in 59  is the random variable from which 
firm ’s price is drawn, and  is the probability that firm i  charges the higher price 
in the market. (Otherwise, there is no disadvantage in being ignorant about firm 
iP
i Pr i jP P⎡ >⎣ ⎤⎦
j ’s offer.) 
The computation of L  is shown in the Appendix. The expression that is derived can be 
evaluated numerically. Figure 5 shows the dependency of L  from n  and λ  in a 3-D-plot. 
 
 
Figure 5: L as a function of n and λ 
 
Figure 5 illustrates that L  increases in  and n λ  unless  and n λ  are sufficiently large. This 
can be explained as follows. When past market shares become more skewed or when more 
consumers rely on word-of-mouth, price competition gets softer. Starting from an even 
                                                 
59 When word-of-mouth communication is assumed to be prohibitively costly, and the fraction of ignorant types 
( ρ ) rather than λ  is to be endogenized, is to be replaced by  in (16). 2in in
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distribution of past market shares (  near 1/2) and a low fraction word-of-mouth consumers, 
this leads to an increase in the expected price differential. However, when  and 
n
n λ  are 
sufficiently large, both prices approach the monopoly price level, so the expected price 
differential and, thus, L  decreases when  or n λ  is increased further. 
The equilibrium values for λ  are defined by the condition: 
 ( , )L n zλ =  (17)
They correspond to the intersections of the L  - curve (for a fixed value of n ) and a horizontal 
line at the level . If  is sufficiently large, there are no intersection points. Active search is, 
then, too costly so all consumers rely on word-of-mouth (
z z
1λ = ). If there are two 
intersections, a simple argument reveals that the larger equilibrium value for λ  is unstable. 
At this point, the L  - curve is decreasing in λ . If a searcher deviates and becomes a word-of-
mouth consumer, λ  increases, so the expected loss due to incomplete information for all 
word-of-mouth consumers decreases. Therefore, more searchers will deviate and become 
word-of-mouth consumers, and so on. There is, thus, another stable equilibrium at 1λ = , that 
is referred to as the “no-search-equilibrium”. To see this, note that, when everybody believes 
that nobody will search actively, expected prices are close to the monopoly price, so the 
expected price differential is small. Therefore, nobody has an incentive to search actively 
unless  is sufficiently small. Figure 6 shows the equilibrium values for z λ , for . 0.7n =
 
 
Figure 6: endogenous λ as a function of z, n = 0.7; unstable equilibrium: dashed 
 
To see how profits are affected by changes in the search cost , note that the expected profit 
of the firm with the larger customer base (firm 1) is increasing in 
z
λ  for all values of  
(this follows immediately from (12) and (14)). It can further be shown that firm 2’s expected 
profit is increasing in 
1/ 2n ≥
λ  unless  and n λ  are sufficiently large. Therefore, if we are on the 
increasing branch in Figure 6 where an increase in  leads to an increase in z λ  and, thus, to 
less active search, in most cases, both firms will benefit from the increase in . Only if  and z n
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λ  are sufficiently large, an increase in  that leads to an increase in z λ  may reduce firm 2’s 
profit. This is because a firm with a very small customer base is in an unfavorable position in 
a market where most consumers rely on word-of-mouth, so it prefers more active search. If 
we are on the horizontal line in Figure 6, that represents the no-search equilibrium, an 
increase in  has no effect upon the amount of search and, thus, upon profits. However, a 
small reduction in  can induce a large amount of active search if the reduction goes beyond 
the point where the no-search-equilibrium exists, which adversely affects profits. 
z
z
Although an endogenous determination of λ  clearly affects the shape of the past sales – 
current profit relation that was the focus of Section 2.3, the basic non-monotonicity result is 
preserved. To see this, suppose e.g. that the search cost  is sufficiently small, so that the no-
search equilibrium does not exist for most values of n  (see Figures 5 and 6). Therefore, a 
large fraction of consumers will search actively unless  is close to 1, so 
z
n λ  is small for most 
values of n . The past sales – current profit relation will, thus, have the V-shape that is typical 
for the case with almost full information. 
2.5. THE OLIGOPOLY CASE 
This section contains an extension of the model introduced in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 to 
oligopolies with more than two firms. The following questions will be tackled: 1. Do prices 
and profits converge to zero as the number of competitors becomes infinite? And 2.: Do the 
non-monotonicities in the past sales – current profit relation persist when the number of firms 
is raised? The analysis is restricted to situations where all firms have the same marginal cost 
(normalized to zero), and the information process introduced in Section 2.3 is used. 
Let 2M ≥  be the number of competitors in the market. Under the assumptions of Section 2.3, 
the mass of consumers in firm i ’s customer base who find out about firm j ’s offer equals 
( , , {1, 2,..., }i j M∈ j i≠ ): 
 (1 ) i in n n jλ ρ λ− − +  (18)
Note, that while in the duopoly case, firm 1’s past market share was sufficient to describe the 
initial split of the market, 1M −  parameters are needed in the oligopoly case. To obtain 
tractable results, only two special cases are analyzed. In the symmetric oligopoly case, all 
firms had the same market share in the past.60 This case is used to analyze prices and profits 
as the number of firms approaches infinity. In the asymmetric oligopoly case, all firms but one 
                                                 
60 This is essentially the case that has been studied extensively in the search literature. The only difference is that 
the present model incorporates word-of-mouth communication. 
 50
had the same market share in the past. This is used to characterize the shape of the past sales – 
current profit relation in oligopoly. 
2.5.1. The symmetric oligopoly case 
Let 1 ... Mn n n≡ = =  be the mass of consumers per firm. When the number of firms ( M ) is 
varied, it is sometimes desirable to keep the mass of consumers per firm constant. The total 
mass of consumers (the market size), in the following denoted by , must then be adjusted: N
 N n M= ⋅  (19)
A symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies is derived.61 Let  be the equilibrium price 
distribution function of all firms, and let 
(.)F
( ) 1 ( )G p F p≡ − . Consider firm i  playing against 
1M −  competitors that randomize according to . Firm i ’s expected profit is: (.)F
 ( )1/ 2 ( 1) ( ) / (1 ) ( )Mpn M M G p M M G pπ λ ρ λ λ ρ −= + + − ⋅ + − − ⋅  (20)
, where /n Mλ  is the mass of word-of-mouth consumers in firm ’s customer base who ask a 
consumer within the same customer base, and 
i
nρ  is the mass of consumers of the ignorant 
type in firm i ’s customer base. ( / ) (n M G p)λ  is the mass of word-of-mouth consumers in 
firm ’s customer base who ask a consumer from a competitor’s customer base times the 
probability that this firm charges a higher price than firm .
i
i 62 Since firm  has i 1M −  
competitors, this must be multiplied by 1M − . It is further multiplied by 2 to account for the 
competitors’ word-of-mouth consumers who switch to firm , since there are also i /n Mλ  
consumers in each of the competitors’ customer bases who ask a consumer from firm ’s 
customer base. The expression 
i
1(1 ) ( )Mn M G pλ ρ −− − ⋅  is the total mass of searchers in the 
population times the probability that firm i  charges the lowest price in the market. 
In a symmetric equilibrium, it must hold that (1) 1F = , so (1) 0G = . Therefore, one obtains for 
the equilibrium profit per firm (using (20)): 
 ( )/n Mπ λ ρ= +  (21)
Using (20) and (21), the condition ( ) 1G p =  yields for the minimum of the support of : (.)F
                                                 
61 Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1992) show that in Varian’s (1980) model, asymmetric equilibria can exist for 
2M > , but the only equilibrium that is consistent with an intuitive equilibrium refinement is the symmetric one. 
For the model presented in this chapter, such asymmetric equilibria can only exist if 0λ =  (not shown). 
62 Remember, that each word-of-mouth consumer finds out about at most two offers (one of them being the offer 
of her previous supplier). 
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22 ( 1) (1 )
Mp
M M M
λ ρ
λ ρ λ λ ρ
+= + + − + − −
(22)
 
Proposition 3: If 0ρ = , aggregate industry profit is independent of the number of firms if the 
mass of consumers per firm ( ) is held fixed, while prices converge to the competitive price 
as . 
n
M →∞
 
While prices and individual profits converge to zero for  when there are only word-
of-mouth consumers and searchers, by Proposition 3, industry profit remains constant when 
the market size is adjusted such that the mass of consumers per firm remains constant. In 
terms of industry profit, when 
M →∞
M  increases, the intensified price competition and increased 
market size are two forces that cancel each other out. Note, that, when there are infinitely 
many firms, the probability that a consumer asks another consumer from the same customer 
base is zero, so all consumers are aware of at least two offers. This drives prices down to zero.  
Different results are obtained when there are consumers of the ignorant type and searchers: 
 
Proposition 4: If 0λ = , aggregate industry profit is independent of the number of firms if the 
market size ( ) is constant, while prices converge to the monopoly price as . N M →∞
 
It is surprising to note that, while prices converge to the monopoly price as  for M →∞ 0λ =  
(Proposition 4), the lowest price ( p ) does not. Using (22), it can easily be confirmed that p  
converges to zero as . To understand the intuition behind this, it is useful to plot the 
density function  for a finite number of firms. When 
M →∞
'(.)F λ  equals zero, the distribution 
function  can easily be solved for (see the Proof of Proposition 4): ( )F p
 1/( 1)/( ) 1
(1 )
M
pF p
M
ρ ρ
ρ
−⎛ ⎞−= − ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  
(23)
The density function  is simply the first derivative of . Figure 7 shows  for 
 and 
'(.)F (.)F '( )F p
8M = 0.1ρ = . 
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Figure 7: density function; M = 8, λ = 0, ρ = 0.1 
 
As Figure 7 illustrates, firms choose low prices (close to the competitive price) and high 
prices (close to the monopoly price) with high probability, while the density at intermediate 
prices is low. This can be explained as follows. Firms have an incentive to exploit the 
ignorant types among their previous customers, which makes the choice of high prices 
attractive. On the other hand, they can try to undercut the competitors’ prices to attract the 
searchers. To achieve this with “reasonable” probability, a firm must choose a sufficiently low 
price. This explains why intermediate prices are chosen with lower probability than extreme 
prices. When the number of firms gets large, the chance to become the firm with the lowest 
price is small, so it becomes relatively more profitable to exploit the ignorant types. This 
explains why the density converges to zero for all prices below 1 as . That the 
industry profit does not increase in 
M →∞
M  despite the fact that prices converge to the monopoly 
level is due to the fact that the average price charged is constant. Individual firms choose 
higher prices, but since there are more firms, the expected lowest price falls in M .63  
The results of Proposition 3 and 4 can be compared to a result from the search literature, 
according to which markets may become less competitive as the number of suppliers 
increases (see Rosenthal (1980), Stiglitz (1987), Stahl (1989), Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez 
(2004)). Proposition 4 reproduces this result for the case with searchers and consumers of the 
ignorant type, but it is not obtained for the case with searchers and word-of-mouth consumers. 
                                                 
63 For 0λ = , industry profit equals Nρ  (see (21)), which is simply the industry profit when all searchers pay a 
price of zero, and consumers of the ignorant type pay the monopoly price. 
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2.5.2. The asymmetric oligopoly case 
Let  be the size of firm 1’s customer base, and let 1n n≡ 2 ... Mn n n≡ = =  be the size of each of 
the other firms’ customer bases.64 Let the market size be constant ( ). Therefore, we 
have: 
1N ≡
 1
1
nn
M
−= −  
(24)
An asymmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies is derived. Let  be firm 1’s, and let  
be all other firms’ equilibrium price distribution function. Let , and 
. When all other firms randomize according to , firm 1’s expected profit 
equals: 
1(.)F (.)F
1( ) 1 ( )G p F p≡ − 1
( ) 1 ( )G p F p≡ − (.)F
65
 ( )2 11 2 ( 1) ( ) (1 ) ( )Mp n n nn M G p G pπ λ ρ λ λ ρ −= + + − + − −  (25)
Now consider one of the other firms (firm i , {2,3,..., }i M∈ ). When all competitors 
(including firm 1) randomize according to their equilibrium distribution function, firm i ’s 
expected profit is: 
 ( )2 2 21 12 ( 2) ( ) 2 ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )Mp n n n M G p nn G p G p G pπ λ ρ λ λ λ ρ −= + + − + ⋅ + − −  (26)
Two cases must be distinguished: 1. , and  2. 1/n M≥ 1/n M< . 
First consider the case . If  is strictly greater than 1/1/n M≥ n M , firm 1 has the largest 
customer base ( n n> ), and  first order stochastically dominates . By an analog of 
Lemma 3,  can not have a mass point, while  has a mass point at  when 
.
1(.)F (.)F
(.)F 1(.)F 1p =
1/n > M 66 The following condition is, thus, used to characterize the equilibrium: 
. Using (25), this yields: (1) 1  (1) 0F G= ⇔ =
 ( )1 n nπ λ ρ= +  (27)
Note, that by (27), 1π  is monotonically increasing in .n 67 The following Proposition follows 
immediately from the fact that (27) holds for all : 1/n M≥
                                                 
64  is, thus, sufficient to describe the size-distribution of the firms’ customer bases n
65 see the explanation of equation (20) 
66 Formal proofs are not shown here. 
67 That firm 1’s profit is increasing quadratically in the size of its customer base for  and 1/n M≥ 0λ >  can be 
explained by two effects that occur simultaneously: 1. An increase in n yields a higher profit at fixed prices, and 
2. price competition becomes softer when n increases since firm 1’s competitors become “weaker” (fewer 
customers find out about their offer via word-of-mouth). 
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 Proposition 5: Under the word-of-mouth information process, all non-monotonicities 
disappear from the past sales – current profit relation as . M →∞
 
Proposition 5 gives an answer to the question whether the non-monotonicities in the past sales 
– current profit relation that were observed in the duopoly case can persist for the case where 
the number of firms becomes infinite. They can not. The intuition behind this result is as 
follows. Non-monotonicities arise if a reduction in the size of a firm’s customer base induces 
softer price competition and this more than compensates the firm for the loss of monopoly 
power over repeat purchasers. When there are many firms, the reduction has a smaller effect 
upon the competitors’ pricing behavior since they are also engaged in a struggle for each 
other’s customers. As a result, the non-monotonicities disappear. 
Proposition 5 leaves open the question whether the non-monotonicities already disappear 
when there is only a finite number of firms (greater than two). It is clear that the non-
monotonicities must at least become less significant when M  is increased, as the interval 
where the past sales – current profit relation can be decreasing (the interval from 0 to 1/ M ) 
becomes smaller. To obtain general results, the case 1/n M<  must be analyzed.  
It can be shown that for , neither  nor  can have a mass point. Furthermore, 
 first order stochastically dominates . An analog of Lemma 2, however, does not 
obtain for the case 
1/n < M (.)F 1(.)F
(.)F 1(.)F
1/n M< . More specifically, for 1/n M< , the support of  and the 
support of  do not have the same maximum. While the former is still the monopoly price 
1, the maximum of the support of  (denoted by 
(.)F
1(.)F
1(.)F σ ) lies within the interval ( ,1)p .  
The easiest way to proceed is to compute a candidate equilibrium, and to verify that it fulfills 
1p σ< < .68 The candidate equilibrium is computed as follows. Denote the interval from p  to 
σ  interval A , and the one from σ  to 1 interval B . Let  
 ( )  for  
( )
( )  for  1
A
B
F p p p
F p
F p p
σ
σ
≤ ≤⎧⎪≡ ⎨ < ≤⎪⎩
(28)
be the distribution function of firm 2, 3, …, and M .  and  are defined 
accordingly. Figure 8 shows  and  for 
(.)AG (.)BG
(.)F 1(.)F 3M = , 0.5λ = , 0ρ = , .0.1n = 69, 70
                                                 
68 It must also be verified that firm 1 does not benefit from deviating to a price between σ  and 1. It can be 
shown that this is always fulfilled. 
69 To construct Figure 10, the equilibrium must, of course, first be computed; see below. 
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Figure 8: distribution functions, M = 3, λ = 0.5, ρ = 0, n = 0.1 
 
For interval A , equations (25) and (26) are valid if  is replaced by . For interval B, 
(26) is valid for 
(.)G (.)AG
1(.) 0G = . This yields: 
 ( )2 22 ( 2) ( )Bp n n n M G pπ λ ρ λ= + + − (29)
Using the equilibrium condition (1) 0BG = , (29) yields: 
 ( )n nπ λ ρ= +  (30)
Note, that (30) is identical to (27) when n  is replaced by . n
Using (30) and the equilibrium condition 1( ) ( ) 1AG p G p= = , (25) and (26) yield: 
 2
1 2
(2 ) 1( )
(2 3) 2 1
n nn n
n n M nn
λ ρ λ λ ρπ λ ρ ρ λ λ
+ − + − −= + λ ρ+ − + + − −  
(31)
All that remains to be done is to compute σ , and to verify that 1p σ< <  holds. Using the 
condition 1( ) 0G σ = , for p σ= , (25), (26), and (30) yield two equations from which ( )AG σ  
can be eliminated to yield a single equation that implicitly defines σ . A general solution to 
this equation can be obtained for the special case without searchers ( 1λ ρ+ = ) (not shown). 
For 1λ ρ+ < , a numerical analysis confirmed that 1p σ< <  always holds for . 1/n M<
Figure 9 shows firm 1’s profit as a function of the size of its customer base ( ) as defined by 
(31) for , and (27) for , for 
n
1/n < M 1/n M≥ 3M = , 1λ = , and 0ρ = . 
                                                                                                                                                        
1/n M< n
0n →
1
70 Figure 10 illustrates that, when , firm 1 tends to choose lower prices than the competitors. When  
gets smaller, firm 1’s distribution function becomes steeper. It can be shown that, for  (entry into a market 
with M −  incumbents), firm 1 chooses 
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p p=  with probability one if . 1λ =
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Figure 9: π1as a function of n; M  = 3, λ = 1, ρ = 0 
 
The comparison of Figure 9 and Figure 3, that were constructed for the same parameters 
(except M ), shows that the local maximum that was obtained in the duopoly case disappears 
when the number of firms is raised to three. However, for other parameter values71, non-
monotonicities are still obtained. It must, thus, be concluded that non-monotonicities can 
persist when the number of firms is raised but remains finite. 
2.6. DISCUSSION 
The discussion addresses two modeling choices that deserve special attention. 
The first concerns the use of mixed pricing strategies. The equilibrium derived in this chapter 
has the peculiar property that ex-post, given the price of the competitor (in duopoly), a firm’s 
randomly chosen price is non-optimal with probability one. It would always be more 
profitable for the firm to undercut the competitor’s price marginally if the competitor’s price 
were ex ante known.72 However, the fact that this does not occur in equilibrium is the essence 
of the mixed strategy equilibrium. Since a firm with a predictable pricing behavior can be 
taken advantage of, firms have an incentive to be unpredictable. Mixed strategy equilibria are, 
thus, a typical feature of search models with homogeneous products.73 My decision not to 
include product differentiation, switching costs, or other features that might lead to pure 
strategy equilibria can be justified by a principle of parsimony. The goal was to build a model 
that yields an important improvement over the standard Bertrand model (in particular the 
inclusion of incomplete information and repeat purchasing), without deviating in more ways 
than necessary from the standard model. 
                                                 
71 e.g. 4M = , 0.1λ = , 0ρ =  
72 unless the competitor chooses p p= , but this event occurs with zero probability in equilibrium 
73 See Varian (1980), and the discussion in Rosenthal (1980), page 1578. 
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The second point relates to the fact that I explicitly included the history of the market in the 
model, but not the future. It would, indeed, be desirable to build a full-fledged dynamic model 
of price competition under word-of-mouth communication. However, static models are 
widely used in economic theory, and a separate analysis of the static case seems justified in 
this case. In a dynamic setting, the effects that were found in the chapter would still be 
present, but additional effects stemming from the incentives to invest or to disinvest in future 
market shares would be added. However, these additional effects will not overturn all the 
results from the static analysis. To see this, consider e.g. the case with almost complete 
information (λ ρ+  near zero). In this case, market shares are very “volatile” in the sense that 
the low-priced firm always serves almost the entire market demand, irrespective of the size of 
its customer base. Therefore, the incentives to invest in future market shares are almost 
negligible, and the V-shaped relation between past sales and current profits is preserved.74
Furthermore, the static framework is a good approximation of a more general dynamic model, 
introduced in the following. Suppose, the products sold in our market have limited durability, 
and denote the constant failure rate per period by α . The idea is that, even if a firm serves a 
high fraction of current market demand, the competitor’s customer base may still be large if 
the competitor served most of the market in previous periods, since not every consumer is 
making a new purchase each period. Word-of-mouth consumers are, thus, likely to ask 
consumers who’s previous purchase is several periods ago, and the size-distribution of firms’ 
total customer bases (including all consumers who purchased from the respective firm when 
they last made a purchase) is less volatile than in the case where each consumer makes a 
purchase each period. 
Let  be the total population size. If all consumers have purchased a product in this market 
before, the mass of consumers who purchase a product per period is 
Ω
α ⋅Ω . In the context of 
the model introduced in Section 2.2, we, thus, have: 
 1α ⋅Ω =  (32)
Let  be the total mass of consumers who purchased firm ’s product when they last made a 
purchase. In the context of the model of Section 2.2, we have: 
iΩ i
 i in α= ⋅Ω  (33)
                                                 
74 Of course, this depends on the equilibrium concept chosen, since the set of equilibria in a dynamic pricing 
game is potentially overwhelming. To rule out collusive equilibria, the Markov perfection equilibrium 
refinement may be imposed. 
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Let  be the total mass of consumers who previously purchased firm i ’s product, evaluated 
next period. If  is firm ’s current demand, we have: 
'iΩ
iD i
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i ' (1 )i i DαΩ = − Ω +  (34)
Using (33) (evaluated next period), (34) can be written as: 
 ' (1 )i in n iDα α= − +  (35)
Let  be the state variable of the dynamic game. If the failure rate in α  converges to zero, and 
the total population size is adjusted so that (32) remains valid, then, by (35), the state next 
period is identical to the current state, irrespective of whether firm i  is the high- or the low-
priced firm in the current period.75 If future profits are discounted, and collusive strategies are 
ruled out, e.g. by imposing the Markov perfection equilibrium refinement, then the static 
model is obtained in the limit as the failure rate α  approaches zero. The static model, then, 
describes competition in a single period of the dynamic game. Intuitively, if the durability of 
the products is large, then firms find themselves in the same situation (same size-distribution 
of customer bases) for many periods to come, irrespective of whether they charge the higher 
or the lower price in the market. Due to discounting, profits accumulate mostly over a limited 
number of periods, while the size-distribution of customer bases changes only in the distant 
future. The incentives to invest or disinvest in future market shares, thus, vanish. 
2.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In markets characterized by repeat purchasing, different types of market imperfection, such as  
incomplete consumer information or switching costs, can lead to a direct dependency of 
current profits from past sales. Economic intuition suggests that, if such a link exists, firms 
are better off with a large customer base. This is generally true if the size-distribution of the 
firms’ customer bases has no effect upon the intensity of price competition. However, if the 
intensity of price competition is affected, this intuition may be misleading. Firms may have an 
incentive to disinvest in the size of their customer base if this induces softer price competition 
in the future. The present chapter showed that, in a duopoly with incomplete information, 
non-monotonic relations between the size of a firm’s customer base and profit are obtained 
for a large set of parameter values. Interestingly, the non-monotonicities are particularly 
pronounced when most consumers are fully informed, so we are only a small step away from 
the standard Bertrand model with full information. When the number of firms is raised, the 
non-monotonicities become less significant, and they disappear when the number of firms 
                                                 
75 Note, that . [0,1]iD ∈
approaches infinity. Furthermore, it was shown that rational consumers rely on word-of-
mouth as a free by-product of social interaction if the expected loss due to incomplete 
information is not greater than the search cost. 
The following chapter will extend the model to a full-fledged dynamic game. The results on 
the shape of the past sales – current profit relation obtained in the static framework promise 
interesting implications for firms’ investment incentives in future market shares, and for the 
endogenous market share dynamics generated by firms’ random pricing strategies. 
2.8. APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
Note first that since the information process is imperfect and each firm had a strictly positive 
market share in the past, all prices above marginal cost (including the monopoly price 1) yield 
a strictly positive profit. Suppose both firms charge an identical price . 
This can not be an equilibrium because each firm would benefit from marginally undercutting 
, as this leads to a discontinuous rise in demand since the information process is non-trivial. 
If both firms choose 
1 2(max{ , },1]p c c∈
p
1 2max{ , }p c c= , the profit of the inefficient firm (or both firms when 
) is zero. This can not be an equilibrium since higher prices yield strictly positive 
profit. If 
1c c= 2
21p p≠  and , the high-priced firm would benefit from 
deviating to the monopoly price. It can not be an equilibrium for one firm to choose the 
monopoly price, and for the other to marginally undercut this price, as the high-priced firm 
would benefit from matching the lower price. It can not be an equilibrium for one firm to 
choose the monopoly price, and for the other to undercut this price more than marginally, as 
the low-priced firm would benefit from deviating to a higher price. 
1 2 1 2, [max{ , },p p c c∈ 1)
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
Suppose  (i jS S≠ j i≠ ). Therefore, for 1i =  or for 2i = , there is a price , with 1p <? ip S∈?  
but jp S∉? . This can not be an equilibrium because, since jS  is open, there exists a price 
 with p p> ? jp S∉  that yields the same expected demand to firm  as  but a higher profit. 
This holds if  is above the maximum of 
i p?
p jS  (if the maximum is below 1), below the 
minimum of jS , or within some intermediate range that is not part of jS  when jS  is not 
convex. Therefore, 1 2S S S= ≡ . The maximum of  must be the monopoly price 1, because 
otherwise, each firm would benefit from deviating to the monopoly price. This yields the 
S
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same demand as the maximum of  but a higher profit. S p  must be greater than  
because 
1 2max{ , }c c
p p=  yields zero profit to the inefficient firm. p  is smaller than 1 since (by Lemma 
1), there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Furthermore,  is convex. Suppose to the contrary 
that there is an intermediate range that is not part of . Firm ’s expected demand would be 
constant over this range, but expected profit would be increasing. Therefore, expected profit 
would be higher in the upper interval of . This can not be an equilibrium. □ 
S
S i
S
 
Proof of Lemma 3:  
Suppose both firms attach positive probability mass to some identical price level  in p
[ ,1]S p= . Each firm would, then, benefit from shifting its mass point to a price level 
marginally below p  because this leads to a discontinuous rise in expected demand. Strategies 
containing a single mass point at some price p  in the interval ( ,1)p  can not be an equilibrium 
either since the competitor’s expected demand (and, thus, profit) would fall discontinuously at 
. There can be no equilibrium where the distribution function of one firm contains a mass 
point at 
p
p p=  as the competitor’s expected profit would be larger at prices marginally below 
p  than at prices above p . This can not be an equilibrium since prices below p  are not part 
of the support. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4:  
Case (i) in (6) is obtained if . Using (4), this condition can be written as: 2 1(1) (1)F F>
 ( ) 1 2(1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) 0c h n h n c π π− − − − − + > (36)
Use (8) to replace 2π  by . Then use (7) to replace ( 1(1 ) / ( )h n h n cπ− )− 1π  by ( )ph n . This 
yields after rearranging: 
 ( )(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) 0p c h n h n− − − − > (37)
Since 1p <  under the conditions of Lemma 4, this is fulfilled if and only if 
 (1 ) ( ) (1 )c h n h n− > −  (38)
Since  and  is strictly increasing, the left-hand-side is strictly increasing, and the 
right-hand-side is strictly decreasing in . It follows immediately that there is at most one 
single value for  (
1c < (.)h
n
n ν ) in the interval [0  that fulfills ,1] (1 ) ( ) (1 )c h n h n− = −  (this yields (9)). 
If n ν> , condition (38) is clearly fulfilled and case (i) in (6) is obtained. If n ν< , the 
condition is violated and case (ii) in (6) is obtained (to see this, simply replace all “>” signs 
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in the above proof by a “ ” sign). For < 0c = , (9) simplifies to ( ) (1 )h hν ν= − . Since  is 
strictly increasing, this requires that 
(.)h
1   1/ 2ν ν ν= − ⇔ = . To show that ν  is increasing in , 
differentiate (9) w.r.t.  and solve for 
c
c /d dcν . If the information process is strictly monotone 
and non-trivial, /d dcν  is greater than zero for all [1/ 2,1]ν ∈ . □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
The second claim (for ) shall be proved first. First order stochastic dominance of firm 
2’s over firm 1’s price distribution function requires that  holds for all 
0c >
1 2( ) ( )F p F p≥
[ ,1]p p∈ , with strict inequality for some  for strict dominance. It must be shown that this is 
fulfilled when 
p
n ν< . To this end, similar steps are used as in the proof of Lemma 4. Using (4)
, the above condition can (for strict dominance) be written as: 
 ( ) 1 2( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )p p c h n h n p c pπ π− − − + − − 0> (39)
Use (8) to replace 2π  by , and (7) to replace ( 1(1 ) / ( )h n h n cπ− )− 1π  by ( )ph n . This yields 
after rearranging: 
 ( )( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0p p ph n p c h n− − − − > (40)
For p p> , this is equivalent to: 
 (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0ph n p c h n− − − >  (41)
(1 ) ( ) ( )ph n p c h n− − −  is decreasing in  if the first derivative is smaller or equal to zero: 
  . Since  is strictly increasing, this is equivalent to 
. Therefore, if condition (41) is fulfilled for 
p
(1 ) ( ) 0h n h n− − ≤ ⇔ ( ) (1 )h n h n≥ − (.)h
1/ 2n ≥ 1p = , it is also fulfilled for all other 
prices in the interval ( , ]p r . Given that , the condition can, thus, be rewritten as: 1/ 2n ≥
 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) 0h n c h n− − − >  (42)
By Lemma 4, this is equivalent to n ν< .  
If , then . Since , condition (41) is, thus, fulfilled. 1/ 2n < (1 ) ( )h n h n− > p c>
To show the first claim (for ), note that the above proof already covers the case where 
. For , replace all “ ” signs above by “
0c =
1/ 2n < 1/ 2n ≥ > ≤” signs to show that firm 1’s price 
distribution function first order stochastically dominates firm 2’s. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
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)Using the symmetry property, the condition  can be written as . This is 
equivalent to 
(1)c l≥ 1 (0c h≥ −
1ν ≥ , as can be confirmed using (9).76 To show that firm 1 conducts limit 
pricing, it must be shown that  1( ) 1F p → p c∀ >  when , so firm 1 chooses  with 
probability one. Using (4), (12), and the symmetry property, one obtains (note, that since 
1n→ p c=
1ν ≥ , case (ii) in (6) is always relevant): 
 ( )
1
(1 ) (1 ) 1 ( ) ( )
( )  
(1 ) ( ) 1
h n c h n p c
F p
h n h n
− − − − −= − + −  
(43)
 ( )11 11 lim ( ) 1 lim 1 ( ) (0)n ncF p h n hp c→ →
−⇒ = − ⋅ −−
(44)
Since  for , ( ) 1h n → 1n→ 11lim ( ) 1n F p→ =  p c∀ > .
77 If 1n = , firm 2 may, instead of 
randomizing over [ , , simply choose 1]c p c=  with probability one as well. To see that this is 
an equilibrium (in pure strategies), note that firm 2 does not benefit from deviating to some 
higher price, because being the high-priced firm (without a customer base), its demand equals 
zero. If firm 1 deviates to some price greater than c , its demand drops to . The best 
deviation is to choose the monopoly price, which yields a profit of . If nobody deviates, 
firm 1’s profit equals . Therefore, deviating is not profitable if . □ 
(1) 1l <
(1)l
c (1)c l≥
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
The first claim follows directly from (19) and (21). The second claim can be proved as 
follows: Using (20) and (21), and 0ρ = , one obtains the following equation that implicitly 
defines the function : (.)G
 2 11 11 2( 1) ( ) ( )MM G p M G p
p
λ
λ
−−= + − ⋅ + ⋅ (45)
Since the left-hand-side (LHS) of this equation is greater than zero, finite , and 
independent of 
(0,1]p∀ ∈
M , while the RHS converges to infinity for  unless  converges 
to zero,  must converge to zero 
M →∞ ( )G p
( )G p (0,1]p∀ ∈  (and ). Therefore, firms choose the 
competitive price (zero) with probability one. □ 
( ) 1F p →
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
                                                 
76 Note, that  under the assumptions of Lemma 1, and see also the Proof of Lemma 4. (1) 1h =
77 The mixed strategy equilibrium, thus, converges to an equilibrium where firm 1 chooses  with 
probability one, while firm 2 randomizes over the interval [ , . 
p c=
1]c
The first claim follows from (19) and (21). The second claim is proved as follows: Using (20), 
(21), and 0λ = , one obtains the following equation that defines : (.)G
 ( )1(1 ) ( )Mp M G pρ ρ ρ −= + − ⋅ (46)
Unless  converges to one for  ( )G p M →∞ [0,1)p∀ ∈ , the RHS will converge to pρ , which 
is smaller than the LHS ( ρ ) . Therefore,  must converge to one for  
 (and ), so firms choose the monopoly price 1 with probability one. □ 
[0,1)p∀ ∈ ( )G p M →∞
[0,1)p∀ ∈ ( ) 0F p →
 
Computation of expected loss, Section 2.4:  
The computation of L  as defined in (16) is shown. Let 1 2Z P P≡ −  be the random variable 
that describes the price differential, and let ( )Zf z  be the density function of Z .
78 (16), thus, 
reads: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]2 21 2Pr 0 | 0 Pr 0 | 0L n Z E Z z n Z E Z z= ⋅ > ⋅ > + ⋅ < ⋅ − <  (47)
(47) can be written as: 
 [ ] [ ]2 21 0 2 0Z ZL n E Z n E Z> <= ⋅ − ⋅ (48)
, where [ ] ( )0
0
r p
Z ZE Z z f z d
−
> ≡ ⋅∫ z  and [ ] ( )00
( )
Z Z
r p
E Z z f z d<
− −
≡ ⋅∫ z . 
To evaluate (48), ( )Zf z  must be determined. To this end, the density functions 
( ) '( )i if p F p≡ ,  are needed. Using (4) and (5), it is convenient to rewrite  and 
 as follows: 
1, 2i = 1( )F p
2 ( )F p
 ( )1 1( ) 1 /1F p p ppµ−= −− , ( )2 1( ) 1 /1F p p pp= −−  (49)
, where 11 (1F )µ ≡ −  is the probability mass that firm 1 attaches to the monopoly price. µ  and 
p  depend on , ( )l n (1 )l n− , , and ( )h n (1 )h n− . Using the symmetry property, one obtains: 
 (1 )1
( )
h n
h n
µ −= − , 1 (1 )
( )
h np
h n
− −=  (50)
Using (49), one obtains for the density functions: 
 2
1 1( ) /f p pβ=  and 22 2( ) /f p pβ=  (51)
, where 1 (1 ) /(1 )p pβ µ≡ − −  and 2 /(1 )p pβ ≡ − . 
                                                 
78 Capitals are used for random variables, lower case letters for their realizations. 
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Since  and  are independent, 1P 2P ( )Zf z  can be written as a convolution integral: 
 ( ) (2 1( )Z )f z f z t dF
∞
−∞
= +∫ t  (52)
Evaluating (52), two cases must be distinguished: , and 0z ≥ 0z < . Note also that, since firm 
1’s price distribution function has a mass point at 1p = , 1( )f p  is non-negative for [ ,1]p p∈ , 
and infinite at 1p ε= + .79 Using (51), one, thus, obtains for ( )Zf z : 
 1
1 2 2 2
1
2
1 2 2 2 2
                 for  0
( )
( )
 for  0
( ) ( 1)
z
p
Z
p z
dt z
t z t
f z
dt z
t z t z
β β
β µβ β
−
−
⎧ ≥⎪ +⎪= ⎨⎪ + <⎪ + +⎩
∫
∫
(53)
Use (53) in (48) to obtain an expression for L . The integrals can be evaluated with the help of 
a computer. Then replace 1β , 2β , µ , and p  to obtain L  as a function of , , and 
. Use (14) to replace  and 
n ( )h n
(1 )h n− ( )h n (1 )h n−  to obtain L  as a function of  and n λ  (or, 
alternatively, as a function of  and n ρ  when word-of-mouth is prohibitively costly, so 
instead of λ , ρ  is endogenized). This function is complicated, and the equation ( , )L n zλ =  
can not be solved for the endogenous value of λ  analytically. But the function can be plotted, 
and the equation ( , )L n zλ =  can be solved for λ  numerically on a computer (see main text). 
                                                 
79 Remember, that ( ) Pr[ ]i iF p P≡ < p . Therefore, the jump in 1(.)F  lies marginally above 1. 
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Chapter 3. Dynamic Price Competition under Word-of-
Mouth Communication 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The model introduced in this chapter extends the analysis of the previous chapter to an 
infinitely repeated pricing game between duopolistic firms in a homogeneous goods market. 
Whereas in chapter 2, the focus is on the shape of the past sales – current profit relation, the 
focus of the present chapter is on market share dynamics. As in the static version of the 
model, firms use mixed pricing strategies in equilibrium, and the resulting price dispersion 
generates market share dynamics. Note, that since there are no external sources of uncertainty 
or noise in the model, the dynamics result solely from firms’ profit maximizing behavior. 
The prediction that mixed pricing strategies lead to price dispersion in equilibrium is well-
known from the literature on consumers’ search (see e.g. Varian, 1980, and Stahl, 1989). 
There is also empirical evidence that price dispersion plays an important role in real-world 
markets, and that it persists over time so that consumers can not learn which store is the low-
priced one (Lach, 2002). However, authors in the theoretical seach literature have paid little 
attention to the market share dynamics that result naturally from such price dispersion. In the 
absence of any intertemporal links that emerge when consumers are acting as repeat 
purchasers, the dynamics of a search market can be represented by a simple repetition of a 
static game. 
Chen and Rosenthal (1996) introduce an infinitely repeated pricing game with an explicit 
intertemporal link. The authors assume that the firm that currently offers the lower price loses 
market shares compared to the previous period, but its market share does not drop to zero 
(unless it was zero or just above zero before). However, the authors assume that a firm that 
looses or gains market shares always looses or gains exactly the same number of consumers. 
There is, thus, a uniform ‘step size’ upwards and downwards in the market share space, an 
assumption that seems poorly justified. This chapter offers a more rigorous microeconomic 
foundation for market share dynamics generated by mixed pricing equilibria. 
The underlying information process is the same as the one introduced in chapter 2. The main 
assumptions are briefly summarized here for convenience. By assumption, all consumers have 
made a purchase in this market before, and remember the relevant information80 about their 
previous supplier.81 Consumers who become informed about both firms’ offers purchase the 
cheaper one (if prices are identical, they return to their previous supplier). The other 
consumers always return to their previous supplier and buy unless the price exceeds the 
reservation price. There are three types of consumers. Let λ  be the fraction of word-of-mouth 
consumers in the population. These consumers ask one other consumer randomly chosen from 
the population about this consumer’s previous choice, and in case it differs from the 
consumer’s own previous choice, the consumer learns the relevant information about the other 
firm. Let ρ  be the fraction of ignorant types. These consumers perform neither search nor 
word-of-mouth communication, and simply return to their previous supplier. The fraction of 
searchers equals (1 )λ ρ− − . Searchers perform active search and are informed about both 
firms’ current offers. By assumption, λ  and ρ  are exogenously fixed, and the customer base 
of both firms contains the same fraction of word-of-mouth consumers and ignorant types in 
every period (irrespective of the history of the game). The ‘type’ of a consumer is, thus, a 
transient attribute. 
Apart from the above assumptions on the information process, an important feature of the 
model introduced in this chapter is that I allow for different frequencies of repeat purchasing. 
The model covers the extreme cases where all consumers make a purchase in each period 
(non-durable goods), and where the frequency of purchases per consumer approaches zero 
(durable goods). If the frequency of repeat purchasing is low, current market demand is more 
volatile than the total size of a firm’s customer base, including all consumers who purchased 
the firm’s product when they last made a purchase in this market. This adds another source of 
inertia to the model, and may explain why firms are often so concerned about market share 
targets. It also helps to explain why entry into a market with incomplete consumer 
information may be rather time consuming: even if the entrant undercuts the incumbent’s 
price for a sustained period of time, its market share increases only gradually. 
In order to disentangle effects that stem from firms’ profit maximizing behavior, and effects 
that stem from the properties inherent to the information process, the analysis of market share 
dynamics is split into several subcases. The first case (the “stochastic benchmark case”) 
                                                 
80 The ‘relevant information’ concerns the existence and location of the respective supplier, and knowledge about 
the product’s characteristics. Once this information is obtained, a current price quote can be obtained for free. 
81 Consumers, thus, forget the information from earlier consumption experiences. An alternative interpretation is 
that old consumers are replaced by young consumers who enter the market and inherit information from their 
parents, but only about the product that the parents consumed previously. 
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considers the dynamic evolution of market shares in the absence of strategic interaction. This 
allows to isolate the driving forces behind the dynamics that are inherent to the information 
process. Under the stochastic benchmark, the probability that each of the firms charges the 
lower price in the market is, by assumption, equal to 1/2 in each period. Since analytical 
results are surprisingly difficult to obtain (the reasons for this will become clear in the main 
text), the analysis is supplemented by a “deterministic benchmark”. Under this case, firms 
simply alternate in choosing the higher and the lower price in the market. Using a fixed point 
analysis, analytical results are derived that help to describe and explain the patterns of market 
share evolution in the stochastic benchmark. In brief, the stochastic benchmark produces 
highly volatile market share dynamics if most consumers are searchers (λ ρ+  near zero). 
Market shares, then, oscillate between the extremes. If the fraction of ignorant types in the 
population, ρ , is increased, market shares become less volatile, and the market split tends to 
be an even one most of the time. If the fraction of word-of-mouth consumers, λ , is large, the 
market split tends to be a skewed one, but unlike in the case where most consumers are fully 
informed, a firm that obtains a large market share in some period tends to maintain the 
dominant position in the market for many consecutive periods, which can be attributed to the 
popularity weighting property of the word-of-mouth process.  
The second case (the “repeated static game”) considers the dynamic evolution of market 
shares under firms’ strategic interaction when future profits are fully discounted. Firms’ 
incentives to invest (or disinvest, depending on the shape of the value function) in future 
market shares are, thus, “switched off”. This allows to isolate the dynamic effects stemming 
from firms’ incentives to maximize current expected profits. To this end, the resulting market 
share dynamics are compared with the stochastic benchmark case. The main result is that, 
unless most consumers are searchers, market splits tend to be more even than under the 
stochastic benchmark. This is because a firm with a smaller customer base prices more 
aggressively than a firm with a large customer base and, thus, tends to gain market shares 
compared to the previous period. 
The third case is the full-fledged dynamic model where future profits are not fully discounted. 
The driving forces isolated in the stochastic benchmark and in the repeated static case are still 
present, but supplemented by firms’ incentives to invest or disinvest in future market shares. 
The main results are as follows. If most consumers are searchers, market shares are very 
volatile, and the low-priced firm serves most of the current market demand irrespective of the 
size of its customer base. The incentives to invest in future market shares are, thus, almost 
negligible, and market share dynamics closely resemble those under the stochastic benchmark 
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and the repeated static case. If λ  is large, the market split tends to be a more skewed one than 
in the repeated static game. This result can be attributed to the fact that a firm with a large 
customer base has an incentive to defend its customer base against an aggressive competitor 
with a smaller customer base, an effect that is not present in the repeated static case. This 
counteracts the tendency towards even market splits observed in the repeated static case. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the basic model is introduced, 
and equilibrium conditions are derived. The analysis is performed on a general level and is 
not restricted to the information process introduced above. Section 3.3 discusses market share 
dynamics under the above information process in the absence of strategic interaction. (Section 
3.3.1 deals with the deterministic, and Section 3.3.2 with the stochastic benchmark case.) 
Section 4 discusses market share dynamics under firms’ strategic interaction. (Section 3.4.1 
analyzes the repeated static case, and Section 3.4.2 deals with the full-fledged dynamic game). 
Section 3.5 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
3.2. THE MODEL 
There are two firms ( ) in a market for a homogeneous good. Time is discrete, the 
horizon is infinite, and firms simultaneously choose prices  in every period t  ( ). 
The firms’ marginal costs are constant and identical and, for simplicity, normalized to zero. 
On the demand side, there is a continuum of consumers with measure Ω . Consumers are 
repeat purchasers, and all consumers have made a purchase in this market before. Each 
marginal consumer desires to have exactly one unit of the product in each period, and the 
valuation per period is 1 for all consumers. Therefore, the monopoly price in this market 
equals 1, and prices above 1 can be eliminated from the firms’ strategy space without loss of 
generality.
{1, 2}i∈
,i tp 1, 2,...t =
82 It is assumed that the good is durable, albeit with a limited durability. Let the 
failure rate per period be 1α ≤ . The mass of consumers who make a purchase per period is, 
thus, α ⋅Ω . By appropriately adjusting the measure of the population size, we can assume that 
a unit mass of consumers make a purchase each period: 
 1α ⋅Ω =  (1)
Firm ’s demand ( ) in period t  is denoted by . Under the above assumptions, we 
have : 
i {1, 2}i∈ ,i tD
1t∀ ≥
 1, 2, 1t tD D+ =  (2)
                                                 
82 Prices below zero are possible. Since marginal costs are normalized to zero, they are interpreted as sales below 
marginal cost. 
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Note, that firm ’s realized market share in period  is identical to firm ’s demand .  i t i ,i tD
By assumption, firm i ’s demand in period t  may depend upon prices in period , as well as 
upon the distribution of the firms’ market shares in previous periods. Let  be the mass of 
consumers who purchased firm 1’s product when they last made a purchase in this market, 
evaluated at the beginning of period . Among these consumers, let  be the mass of those 
who make a new purchase in period . I will refer to  as the size of firm 1’s customer base 
in period . Under the above assumptions, we have: 
t
tΩ
t tn
t tn
t
 t tn α= ⋅Ω  (3)
The size of firm 1’s customer base, , is used as the state variable in period t .  tn
The law of motion for tΩ  is given by the following equation: 
 1 1,(1 )t t D 1tα − −Ω = − Ω +  (4)
Using (3), (4) can be written as: 
 1 1,(1 )t tn n 1tDα α− −= − +  (5)
Note, that, if the frequency of purchases α  equals 1, then the size of firm 1’s customer base 
in period  is equal to firm 1’s demand in the previous period. t
By assumption, firm 1’s current demand may only depend on whether it charges the higher or 
the lower price in the current period, and on the size of its customer base. Let  be firm 1’s 
demand if it charges the higher price in the market, given that the current size of its customer 
base is . Similarly, let  be firm 1’s demand if it is the low-priced firm. If both firms 
charge an identical price, consumers purchase from their previous supplier. By assumption, 
the functions  and  are time-invariant and identical for both firms. Since the demand 
of the high- and low-priced firm depends upon the amount of information available to the 
consumers, a specification of  and  is called an information process.  
( )l n
n ( )h n
(.)l (.)h
(.)l (.)h
Given some information process ( )(.), (.)l h , if the current state (the size of firm 1’s customer 
base) is n , and current prices are 1p  and 2p , firm 1’s current demand, thus, equals:
83
 
1 2
1 1 2 1 2
1 2
( )    if   
( , | )          if  
( )     if   
h n p p
D n p p n p p
l n p p
<⎧⎪= =⎨⎪ >⎩
(6)
                                                 
83 Time subscripts are omitted when this does not lead to confusion. 
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(1) defines a generalized Bertrand model where, due to incomplete information on the 
consumer side, the firm that charges the lower price does not serve the entire market demand. 
Firm 1’s expected profit in the current period is [ ]
21 1 1 1 1 2
( , ) ( , | )E pn p p E D n p pπ ≡ . Firm 2’s 
demand and profit are obtained by replacing  by 1n n− . 
Under the above assumptions, the following symmetry property holds for any information 
process ( )(.), (.)l h  (it follows from (2) and (1)): 
 ( ) 1 (1 )l n h n= − −   [0,1]n∀ ∈  (7)
By assumption,  is continuous, strictly increasing, and (.)h ( ) 1n h n< <  holds . [0,1)n∀ ∈
Given some information process ( )(.), (.)l h , the history of market shares up to period t  is 
fully described by the initial size of firm 1’s customer base in period 1 ( ), and a binary 
sequence 
1n
{ }ts Iτ≡  ( 1, 2,..., tτ = ), with 1Iτ =  if 1, 2,p pτ τ< , and 0Iτ =  otherwise.84 If firm 1 
gains market shares in period τ , the τ ’th entry in the sequence is, thus, equal to 1. 
Let δ  be the discount factor for future profits.85 In period , firm  maximizes the present 
discounted value of future expected profits over an infinite number of periods: 
t i
 
, , 1
, ,, ,...
( ) max ( |
i t i t
t E
i t i ip p t
V H E p Hτ )τ τ τ
τ
δ π
+
∞ −
=
≡ ∑ (8)
, where  denotes the history up to period t . The history  contains all prices chosen up to 
period , as well as the initial state .
tH tH
1t − 1n 86 The expectation in (8) is over firm j ’s prices 
( j i≠ ). Note, that there is no external source of uncertainty in the model. In equilibrium, 
uncertainty arises only if firms use mixed pricing strategies. 
In general, firms can condition their choice in period t  on the entire history up to period , 
. However, as is well-known from the Folk-theorem, the set of possible equilibria in 
dynamic pricing games is potentially overwhelming. In order to rule out collusive equilibria, a 
useful equilibrium refinement appears to be Markov perfection. The payoff-relevant state 
variable in period t  is . Under Markov perfection, firms are restricted to condition their 
price only on the current state. 
t
tH
tn
                                                 
84 The event 1, 2,p pτ τ=  occurs with probability zero in equilibrium and can be neglected. 
85 The case where firms are myopic corresponds to 0δ = . Note, that already this case produces non-trivial 
market share dynamics (see Section 3.4.1). 
86 The states in periods 2 through t , captured by the sequence ts  that describes firm 1’s market share gains and 
losses, can be inferred from the sequence of prices and . 1n
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The Bellman-equation for a firm with a customer base of size n  (firm 1) reads:  
 [ ]( ) max ( , ) ( ') | ,E
p
V n n p E V n n pπ δ⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ (9)
, where  and  stand for  and n 'n tn 1tn + , respectively. By omitting the subscript for the identity 
of the firm, (9) contains the following symmetry assumption: a firm’s present value only 
depends upon the size of its current customer base, n , and not upon the identity of the firm. 
The value of the competitor (firm 2) is, thus, obtained by replacing  by 1 . n n−
 
Lemma 1: If δ  is sufficiently small, there is no Markov perfect equilibrium that comprises 
pure strategies for any . [0,1]n∈
 
The result in Lemma 1 is restricted to the case where the discount factor for future profits, δ , 
is “sufficiently small”. This is because an increase in the size of a firm’s customer base may 
lead to reduced profits in the future as the intensity of future price competition may increase. 
If δ  is large, a firm may, thus, be reluctant to undercut the competitor’s price if this price can 
be predicted with certainty. 
Let the equilibrium price distribution function of a firm with a customer base of size  in the 
present period be , with the convention that the mass or density at the price  itself is 
not included, that is: , where  is the random variable from which  
is drawn.
n
( , )F n p p
( , ) Pr[ | ]F n p P p n≡ < P p
87 The price distribution function  does not depend on the identity of the firm 
(index ) because it is implicitly assumed that the equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that, 
exchanging n  by 1 , the roles of the firms are inverted, but the equilibrium is otherwise not 
affected. 
( , )F n p
i
n−
 
Lemma 2: If δ  is sufficiently small,  and ( , )F n p (1 , )F n p−  have the same support88. The 
support is convex in  , the maximum is the monopoly price 1, and the minimum 
(denoted by 
p [0,1]n∀ ∈
p ) is smaller than 1. 
 
Lemma 3: If δ  is sufficiently small, there is no Markov perfect equilibrium where more than 
one firm attaches positive probability mass to any single price. Furthermore, if a mass point is 
part of a firm’s equilibrium strategy for the given state , it is located at the monopoly price. n
                                                 
)87 Under this convention, 1 ( ,1F n−  is the probability mass at the monopoly price. 
88 The support is the smallest closed set of prices whose complement has a probability of zero. 
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Consider the profit maximization problem of a firm with a customer base of size  (firm 1). 
Suppose, the competitor (firm 2) randomizes over its price according to the equilibrium 
distribution function . Firm 1’s expected profit in the current period is given by: 
n
(1 , )F n p−
 ( )( )( , ) ( ) (1 , ) ( ) 1 (1 , )E n p p l n F n p h n F n pπ = − + − − (10)
, where  is firm 1’s demand if it chooses the higher price in the market times 
the probability of this event. 
( ) (1 , )l n F n p−
Firm 1’s expected value in the next period, given that it chooses  this period, is given by: p
 [ ] ( ) ( )( )( ') | , ( ) (1 , ) ( ) 1 (1 , )E V n n p V l n F n p V h n F n p= − + − −  (11)
, where  is the firm’s value after losing market shares (the size of its 
customer base is, then, ) times the probability that the competitor chooses the lower price. 
( )( ) (1 , )V l n F n p−
( )l n
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the maximum in (9) is attained over a set of prices, and the 
support of  contains only prices within this set.( , )F n p 89 For all prices p  outside the support 
of , it must hold that: ( , )F n p
 [ ]( , ) ( ') | , ( )E n p E V n n p V nπ δ+ ≤ (12)
(12) is to assure that there is no profitable deviation from the equilibrium strategy . ( , )F n p
Using (10) and (11) in (9), we obtain the following expression for the value function : ( )V n
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 , )
         ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 , )
V n ph n p h n l n F n p
V h n V h n V l n F n pδ δ
= − − −
+ − − −  
(13)
The - operator has been omitted because, for prices within the support of , the 
right-hand side must be independent of  in a mixed strategy equilibrium. 
max ( , )F n p
p
(13) can be solved for the price distribution function (1 , )F n p− . Replacing 1  by , we 
obtain for the price distribution function of a firm with a customer base of size : 
n− n
n
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) 1 (1 )
( , )  , [0,1]
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
V h n V n h n p
F n p n
V h n V l n h n l n p
δ
δ δ
− − − + −= ∀− − − + − − − ∈  
(14)
If the value function  is known, (14) allows to compute the price distribution function for 
all possible values of the state, . For a fixed value of n ,  depends upon the value of 
the - function only at the positions 1
(.)V
n ( , )F n p
(.)V n− , (1 )h n− , and (1 )l n− . 
                                                 
89 Otherwise, the firm would choose prices that yield a lower expected profit than the prices within the set with 
positive probability, so this can not be an equilibrium. 
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Equilibrium conditions: 
By Lemma 2, the following condition must be fulfilled in equilibrium: 
  :  ( , ) 0  (1 , ) 0p F n p F n p∃ = ∧ − = (15)
Using (14), (15) yields: 
 ( ) ( )1 (1
(1 )
V n V h n
p
h n
δ− − −= −
)
 , and  ( ) ( )( )
( )
V n V h n
p
h n
δ−=  (16)
Equalizing the two expressions for p  in (16), we obtain the first equilibrium condition: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )h n V n h n V h n h n V n h n V h nδ δ− − − = − − −  (17)
The second equilibrium condition follows from Lemma 3: 
 ( ) ( ) (a)  ( ,1) 1  (1 ,1) 1    (b)  ( ,1) 1  (1 ,1) 1F n F n F n F n≤ ∧ − = ∨ = ∧ − <  (18)
According to (18), the maximum of the support of  and ( , )F n p (1 , )F n p−  is the monopoly 
price 1, and at most one of the two price distribution functions can have a mass point at 1p = . 
The first case in (18) is referred to as “case a”, the second as “case b”. Under case a, the price 
distribution function of the firm with the customer base of size  (firm 1) can have a mass 
point at the monopoly price, and the competitor’s price distribution function can not (vice 
versa for case b). Intuitively, we would expect that firm 1 chooses the monopoly price with 
positive probability whenever its customer base is greater than 1/2 (case a), because it should 
have a larger incentive to exploit its monopoly power over uninformed repeat purchasers, 
while firm 2 has a greater incentive to increase the size of its customer base and, thus, prices 
more aggressively. If firm 2’s customer base is greater than 1/2, we expect firm 2’s price 
distribution function to have a mass point at 
n
1p =  (case b).  
Suppose, for the given state , case a is relevant. By (18), the condition  must 
hold in equilibrium. Using (14), this can be written as: 
n (1 ,1) 1F n− =
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )V n V l n l nδ− =  (19)
If case b is relevant (given ), using n ( ,1) 1F n =  in (14), we obtain: 
 ( ) ( )1 (1 ) (V n V l n l nδ− − − = −1 ) (20)
Together with an (until now) unknown rule that states whether case a or case b is relevant for 
every possible state , (17), (19), and (20) implicitly define the value function . Note, 
that this is a continuum of equations because (17) and (19), resp. (20), must be fulfilled 
. 
n (.)V
[0,1]n∀ ∈
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Solution procedure: 
There are (at least) two possible solution procedures. One is based on a discretization of the 
state space ( ). The equilibrium conditions (17) and (19), resp. (20), can, then, be 
solved analytically with the help of a computer using the market share grid. Note, that this is 
simply a system of linear equations. The only difficulty is that the rule that determines when 
case a and case b is relevant (that is, whether (19) or (20) must be used for a given n ) is not 
known. As mentioned above, the most obvious guess is that case a is relevant if , and 
case b otherwise. Using this guess, a candidate equilibrium can be computed. It must, then, be 
checked that condition (18) is fulfilled for all values of . If it is not fulfilled, then the 
decision rule must have been wrong, or no equilibrium exists for the given parameter set. It 
turns out that, if 
[0,1]n∈
1/ 2n ≥
n
δ  is sufficiently small, the above decision rule is always correct, and the 
solution procedure yields good results if the market share grid is sufficiently fine. Problems 
arise only if the parameters λ  and δ  are both fairly large (see below). For large values of ρ  
and δ , a solution is always obtained. The difficulties may, thus, be related to feedback effects 
due to the popularity weighting property of the word-of-mouth process.  
The second procedure is to iterate on the value function. While the first procedure 
(discretizing the state space) yields an analytical solution to an approximated problem, the 
iteration procedure yields an approximate solution to the original problem. The iteration 
procedure has the advantage that the decision rule to be used at each iteration round, that 
states whether case a or b is relevant for any given , can be derived analytically. The 
procedure is now described in more detail.
n
90
The iteration process is similar to a solution by backwards induction of a finite game with T  
periods. The first approximation of the value function  that is used to start the iteration is 
  (V  denotes iterated value function). Counting backwards, the iterated 
value function for period  in the hypothetical finite game is computed recursively. 
Replacing V  by V , the equilibrium conditions (17), (19), and (20) read after rearranging:
(.)V
( ) 0V n ≡? [0,1]n∀ ∈ ?
t T<
? 91
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 1 ' (1 ) '(1 )h nV n V n V h n V h nh n δ δ= − − − +−? ? ? ? ( )
                                                
 
(21)
 
90 It is sometimes useful to apply both procedures when complications arise. This helps to find out whether the 
complications are due to the solution procedure (or its implementation on a computer), or due to the fact that the 
dynamic program does not have a (stable) solution for the given parameter values (see below). 
91 Furthermore, taking account of the iteration procedure, V  and  is to be distinguished (they are not identical 
unless the iteration process has converged). 
? 'V?
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 ( ) ( )( ) ' ( )V n l n V l nδ= +? ?  (22)
 ( ) ( )1 (1 ) ' (1V n l n V l nδ− = − + −? ? ) (23)
(22) is valid if case a is relevant. If this holds for the given value of , then the first part of 
condition (18) must be fulfilled, too ((22) was derived from the second part). That is, it must 
hold that . Using (21) and (22) in (14), this yields the following condition that 
assures that case a is relevant: 
n
( ,1) 1F n ≤
 ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
(1 )(1 ) ( ) ' ( ) ' ( )
( ) 1
' (1 ) ' (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
h nh n l n V l n V h n
h n
V h n V l n h n l n
δ δ
δ δ
−− − + −
≤− − − + − − −
? ?
? ?  
(24)
If (24) is fulfilled, case a is relevant, if it is violated, case b is relevant. Using the definition: 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) (1 ) ( ) ' ( ) ' ( )n h n l n V l n V h nβ δ δ≡ − + −? ? (25)
, (24) can be written more conveniently as follows:  
 ( ) (1 )n nβ β≥ −  (26)
If (26) is fulfilled, then case a is relevant for the given value of . Obviously, (26) holds with 
equality for . Therefore, at this point, there is always a potential change from case a to 
case b (or vice versa). For all values of n  that fulfill (26), the iteration formula (22) is to be 
used in the current iteration round. For all other values of , case b is relevant. Plugging the 
expression for 
n
1/ 2n =
n
( )1V n−?  in (23) into (21), we obtain the following iteration formula for case b: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) (1 ) ' (1 ) ' (1 ) ' ( )(1 )h nV n l n V l n V h n V h nh n δ δ δ= − + − − − +−? ? ?  (27)
Using the definition of β , this can be written more conveniently as: 
 ( ) ( )(1 ) ' ( )
(1 )
nV n V h n
h n
β δ−= +−? ?  
(28)
Combining (22), (26), and (28), the complete iteration formula for both cases reads: 
 ( )
( )
( ) ' ( )            if  ( ) (1 )
( ) (1 ) ' ( )    if  ( ) (1 )
(1 )
l n V l n n n
V n n V h n n n
h n
δ β
β δ β β
⎧ + ≥⎪= ⎨ −
β −
+ < −⎪ −⎩
?
? ?
(29)
Using (29), the iteration on the value function  is easy to implement on a computer. (.)V
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 Existence of equilibrium  
For small values of δ , the iteration procedure converges quickly. If λ  and δ  are both fairly 
large, the iteration process often takes many rounds to converge or fails to converge.92 As a 
general rule, I have found that the iteration process converges whenever (26) is fulfilled with 
equality only at  (and no other value of ) after several iteration rounds, which 
corresponds to the postulated simple decision rule mentioned above. The iteration procedure, 
and the procedure with the discretized state space, then, yield identical results up to some 
numerical imprecision. Apparently, the lack of a solution (if it occurs) is related to highly 
irregular patterns in the shape of the invariant distributions (see Section 3.4). It turns out that a 
small change in the initial state  may, then, affect the probability distribution of the firms’ 
customer base sizes over many future periods and can, thus, lead to a substantial change in a 
firm’s value if the discount factor for future profits, 
1/ 2n = n
1n
δ , is sufficiently large. In such situations, 
the dynamic program may not have a solution. The observation that, for some parameter 
values, a small alteration in the starting value  can lead to a significantly different evolution 
of market shares over many periods is reminiscent of chaotic behavior. 
1n
3.3. MARKET SHARE DYNAMICS IN THE ABSENCE OF STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION 
Before analyzing market share dynamics generated by competition among profit maximizing 
firms, it is useful to characterize these dynamics in a non-strategic environment, given the 
word-of-mouth information process introduced in Section 3.1. Consider as a benchmark the 
simple stochastic process that assigns equal probabilities of winning or losing market shares 
to both firms in each period. It turns out that this benchmark process without strategic 
interaction already generates non-trivial market share patterns. The dynamic evolution of 
market shares in a strategic environment can only be understood against the background of 
the dynamic properties inherent to the information process, that are revealed by the stochastic 
benchmark case. 
                                                 
92 Whether this is the case also depends on the failure rate α . If α  is small, the value function converges also 
for large values of δ  when λ  is large. The problem becomes more “nicely behaved”, which is apparently 
related to the fact that the invariant distributions (of market shares and of the state) are less irregular for these 
parameter values. When λ  is small, the situation is reversed. For 1α = , the iteration, then, converges for all 
values of δ , while for small values of α , the invariant distributions become highly irregular, and the iteration 
does not converge if δ  is large. See below. 
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Under the word-of-mouth information process introduced in Section 3.1, the mass of 
consumers in firm 1’s customer base who find out about firm 2’s current offer (given that the 
current state is ) equals: n
 2(1 )n nρ λ− −  (30)
, where 2nλ  is the mass of consumers in firm 1’s customer base who rely on word-of-mouth 
and ask a consumer within firm 1’s customer base. 
Using (13), we obtain for the functions  and  introduced in Section 3.2:  (.)l (.)h
 2( )l n n nρ λ= +  ,   2( ) 1 (1 ) (1 )h n n nρ λ= − − − − (31)
It is easy to verify that this information process fulfills the assumptions made in Section 3.2 if 
0 λ ρ< +  and 1ρ <  hold. 
To get an idea why the information process specified in (14) can lead to non-trivial market 
share dynamics, consider a simple numerical example. Suppose, the initial size of firm 1’s 
customer base is , and let 1 0.5n = 1α = , 0λ = , and 0.6ρ = . If firm 1 loses market shares in 
period 1, and gains market shares in period 2, the sequence of firm 1’s market shares is: 
, . As the example illustrates, a loss of market shares followed by a gain of 
market shares does usually not yield the initial market share again (
2 0.2n = 3 0.6n =
3 1n n≠ ).  
More generally, the size-distribution of firms’ customer bases in period t  not only depends 
upon the initial market split  and the number of periods with market share gains and losses, 
but on the exact sequence of events. The non-trivial market share dynamics ‘inherent’ to the 
information process stem from the fact that the step sizes “upwards”: , and 
“downwards”:  are usually not identical. 
1n
( )h n n−
( )n l n−
As mentioned before, the benchmark case against which to compare sequences generated 
under strategic pricing behavior is the stochastic process assigning equal probabilities of 
gaining or losing market shares to both firms in all periods: 1, 2,Pr[ ] 1/ 2t tp p< =  . To 
obtain tractable results, I first analyze the evolution of market shares under the following 
deterministic sequence of events, that is used as a proxy for the stochastic benchmark: 
. Under this sequence of events, firms alternate in setting the higher and the 
lower price in the market. The idea is that, if market shares converge to ‘fix points’ under this 
alternating sequence (the “deterministic benchmark”), then the stochastic benchmark will 
produce markets shares near these fix points with high frequency. The analysis of the 
deterministic benchmark, thus, yields some qualitative predictions about the behavior of the 
1t∀ ≥
(0,1,0,1,...)altS ≡
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stochastic benchmark, and it helps to get an intuition of the main driving forces underlying the 
stochastic market share patterns. 
3.3.1. The deterministic benchmark 
For simplicity, the analysis in this Section is restricted to the case 1α =  (each consumer 
makes a purchase in each period). To characterize the evolution of market shares when firms 
alternate in setting the higher and the lower price, it is useful to define fix points: 
 
Definition 1: Given an information process ( )(.), (.)l h , fixn  is a fix point of the sequence of 
firm 1’s market shares if . ( )( ) [0,1fix fixn h l n= ∈ ]
 
According to this definition, if firm 1 starts from a fix point fixn , then loses and afterwards 
gains market shares once, it reaches its original market share fixn  again. Therefore, the fix 
point is reached in all even-numbered periods under the alternating sequence . In all odd-
numbered periods, the market share  is attained.  
altS
( )fixl n
Fix points are points that the sequence of firm 1’s market shares can either converge to or 
diverge away from. If it converges to a fix point, starting from any initial market share  
within some non-empty neighborhood of 
1n
fixn , the fix point is ‘stable’: 
 
Definition 2: A fix point fixn  of an information process ( )(.), (.)l h  is stable if there is a 
neighborhood { }( ) [0,1] :  fix fixU n n n nε ε≡ ∈ − < , with 0ε > , such that every sequence of 
firm 1’s market shares that starts from some  within 1n ( )
fixU nε  converges to 
fixn  under 
. (0,1,0,1,...)altS =
 
To simplify the exposition, it is useful to define the following function: 
 ( )( ) ( )g n h l n≡  (32)
The sequence of firm 1’s realized market shares in even-numbered periods, expressed in 
terms of the state , is under the alternating sequence  given by the following law of 
motion:  
n altS
 2( )t tn g n −=  (33)
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This is a simple deterministic process that can be analyzed using standard tools of dynamic 
systems theory. According to Definition 1, a fix point fulfills: 
 ( )fix fixn g n=  (34)
 
Lemma 4: Given some information process ( )(.), (.)l h , if  is continuous, and (.)g fixn  is a fix 
point, then fixn  is stable if ( ) / 1fixn ndg n dn = < . 
 
A proof is omitted since this is a standard result from dynamic systems theory. 
 
Lemma 5: Given some information process ( )(.), (.)l h , if fixn  is a fix point, then  is 
also a fix point. 
(1 )fixh n−
 
Proof:  
(1 )fixh n−  is a fix point if ( )( )(1 ) ( (1 )) (1 )fix fix fixh n g h n h l h n− = − = −  holds. By strict 
monotonicity of , this is equivalent to: (.)h ( )1 (1fix fixn l h n− = − ) . Applying the symmetry 
property  twice, this yields: ( ) 1 (1 )h n l n= − − ( )( ) (fix fix fixn h l n g n= = ) , which is true since 
fixn  is a fix point. 
 
Definition 3: Given some information process ( )(.), (.)l h , a fix point fixn  is called degenerate 
if the corresponding fix point  is identical to (1 )fixh n− fixn . 
 
Using the symmetry property, the condition  can be written as . 
Starting from a degenerate fix point , the sequence of firm 1’s market shares 
alternates between the values  and  that are located 
symmetrically around . Non-degenerate fix points are generally located further away 
from the center of the market share space, and if  holds, then . 
(1 )fix fixn h n= − ( ) 1fix fixl n n= −
1/ 2fixn >
( ) 1 1/ 2fix fixl n n= − < 1/ 2fixn >
1/ 2n =
1/ 2fixn > ( ) 1/ 2fixl n >
For the information process specified in (14), using (34), we obtain the following fix points:93
                                                 
93 Note, that  and  are only fix point if they lie in the interval [0,1] for the given parameter values. There 
are two other solutions to (34). One lies always outside the interval [0,1], the other is the corresponding fix point 
to . 
*n **n
**n
 80
 ( )* 2(1 ) 4 1 / 2n ρ λ ρ λ≡ + + − −  ,  ( )** 2(1 ) 4(1 ) 1 / 2n ρ λ ρ λ≡ + − − + −  (35)
It is straight-forward to show that  is degenerate, while  is non-degenerate. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1, for 
*n **n
0.7λ =  and 0.2ρ = , where  denotes the corresponding fix 
point to : . 
***n
**n *** **(1 )n h n≡ −
 
Figure 1: Fix points in the market share space; λ = 0.7, ρ = 0.2 
To obtain tractable results, it is useful to analyze the following special cases separately: 1. 
0ρ = , and 2. 0λ = . 
 
Case 1: 
Using 0ρ = , we obtain the following expression for  using (14) and (32): (.)g
 ( )22( ) 1 1g n nλ λ= − −  (36)
The expressions for  and  in (35) simplify to: *n **n
 ( )* 4 1 1 / 2n λ λ≡ + −  , ( )** 4 3 1 / 2n λ λ≡ − +  (37)
Figure 2 shows  and  as functions of *n **n λ , for .1/ 2n ≥ 94
 
Figure 2: Fix points as a function of λ; ρ = 0.5 (dashed: unstable fix point) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2,  holds for the entire interval * [0,1]n ∈ [0,1]λ ∈ . At 3/ 4λ = , there 
is a bifurcation where the fix point  starts to exist. **n
                                                 
94 Due to the symmetry property, the picture for 1/ 2n ≤  contains no additional information. 
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Proposition 1.1: Given the information process specified in (14), for 0ρ = , the fix point  
is stable if 
*n
3/ 4λ < .  is stable if **n 3/ 4λ > . 
 
Proof:  
By Lemma 1,  ( ) is stable if *n **n *( ) / 1n ndg n dn = <  ( **( ) / 1n ndg n dn = < ) holds. Using (36) 
and (37), this condition yields 3/ 4λ <  ( 3/ 4λ > ) as claimed. 
 
It can be shown that for 3 / 4λ <  and 0ρ = , all sequences of market shares converge to  
under the alternating sequence  (irrespective of the starting point ), while for 
*n
altS 1n 3/ 4λ > , 
convergence to  is obtained if , and to  if **n *1n n> ***n *1n n< .95
According to (37) and Proposition 1.1, for 0ρ = , we expect the stochastic benchmark process 
with   to yield market shares near the extremes when 1, 2,Pr[ ] 1/ 2t tp p< = 0t∀ > λ  is small. 
The step-size upwards, following a loss of market shares, is large since most consumers are 
fully informed. Market shares, thus, tend to fluctuate between values near the two extremes. 
When λ  increases, we expect to observe more even distributions of market shares (see Figure 
2). However, as λ  approaches 3/4, the “attractor”  becomes unstable, and two stable fix 
points (  and ) that are located closer to the extremes emerge. Therefore, for large value 
of 
*n
**n ***n
λ , we expect to observe skewed distributions of market shares with high frequency again, 
but this time without the tendency to fluctuate between values near 0 and 1. Instead, market 
shares become ‘sticky’ and tend to rest near 0 or near 1 for several consecutive periods. This 
result can be explained by the ‘popularity weighting’ property of the word-of-mouth process. 
If firm 1 has the larger customer base, a large fraction of the consumers in firm 2’s customer 
base find out about firm 1’s current offer. The step size upwards (for firm 1) is, thus, larger 
than downwards for an uneven but not extreme split of the market. This produces the above 
result. Under strategic interaction (see Section 3.4), firm 1 will, thus, find it easy to “defend” 
its customer base, while it is difficult for firm 2 to attract new customers if most consumers 
rely on word-of-mouth communication.  
As the above discussion shows, when skewed distributions of market shares are predicted to 
occur frequently, this leaves open the question whether a firm with a large customer base is 
                                                 
95 This is because, starting from some , the first “jump” to the left in the market share space (of firm 1) 
goes to a point that lies to the left of . From there,  is approached. If the starting point is , the 
sequence of market shares remains at the unstable fix point forever. 
*
1n n<
*1 n− ***n *1n n=
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likely to maintain the dominant position96 in the market for many consecutive periods, or 
whether market shares tend to fluctuate between values near the two extremes. In the 
following, a simple measure is introduced that helps to characterize the ‘persistence’ of a 
dominant position. 
Let  be the minimum number of consecutive market share losses of firm 1, that, starting 
from , are sufficient to destroy firm 1’s dominant position. Only if  is large and the 
information process favors skewed distributions of market shares, then a firm with a dominant 
position is likely to maintain this position for many consecutive periods under the stochastic 
benchmark process. 
k
1 1n ≡ k
 
Proposition 1.2: Given the information process specified in (14), for 0ρ =  and , the 
minimum number of consecutive market share losses , such that firm 1’s market share falls 
below 1/2, is given by the smallest integer greater than: 
1 1n =
k
 ln 2( ) ln 1 / ln 2
ln
k λ λ
⎛ ⎞≡ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
?  (38)
 
Proof:  
For 0ρ = ,  (in (14)) simplifies to: ( )l n 2( )l n nλ= . Therefore, applying the function   
times to , we obtain for firm 1’s market share: 
(.)l k
1 1n = 2 1(1) kkl λ −= . For , this must be 
equal to 1/2. Solving for , we obtain (38). □ 
k k= ?
k?
 
For example, , and ( 0.79)k λ = =? 2 (0.91) 3k =? . For values of λ  between 0.79 and 0.91, two 
consecutive market share losses are, thus, sufficient to destroy firm 1’s dominant position in 
the market (starting from ).1 1n = 97 For values of λ  greater than, say, 0.95, market shares 
generated under the stochastic benchmark will rarely cross the 1/2 – 1/2 line (see Section 
3.3.2, below). 
 
Case 2: 
Using 0λ = , we obtain for  using (14) and (32): (.)g
                                                 
96 To have a “dominant position” means that the size of the respective firm’s customer base is greater than 1/2. 
97 Under the stochastic benchmark process with 1, 2,Pr[ ] 1/ 2t tp p< = , the probability to observe  consecutive 
market share losses starting from the current period equals 1/ . 
k
2k
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 ( )( ) 1 1g n nρ ρ= − −  (39)
Using (39), one obtains the following solution to (34): 
 * 1/(1 )n ρ= +  (40)
Obviously,  holds for the entire interval * [0,1]n ∈ [0,1]ρ ∈ . 
 
Proposition 2.1: Given the information process specified in (14), for 0λ =  and 1ρ < , the fix 
point  is always stable. *n
 
Proof:  By (39), 2( ) / 1dg n dn ρ= < , which holds since 1ρ <  by assumption. □ 
 
According to (40) and Proposition 2.1, if 0λ =  and ρ  is small, we expect the stochastic 
benchmark process to fluctuate between values near the extremes. When ρ  is close to 1, we 
expect market shares near 1/2 with high frequency. Market shares are, then, very “sticky” 
because the step sizes (upwards and downwards) are small. However, in contrast to the case 
0ρ =  and λ  near 1, the market split tends to be an even one. This result can be explained as 
follows. Since a fixed fraction of consumers in firms’ customer bases are searchers, the mass 
of consumers in firm 1’s customer base who find out about firm 2’s offer increases in the size 
of firm 1’s customer base. As a consequence, step sizes “downwards” (towards the middle of 
the market share range) are larger than “upwards” if . This explains the tendency to 
produce even distributions of market shares. Note, that the same effect occurs in the case 
1/ 2n >
0ρ =  and 0λ > . However, as λ  gets large, the popularity weighting property of the word-
of-mouth process becomes dominant and neutralizes the effect that tends to produce even 
splits of the market. 
 
Proposition 2.2: Given the information process specified in (14), for 0λ = , and starting from 
, the minimum number of consecutive market share losses k , such that firm 1’s market 
share falls below 1/2, is given by the smallest integer greater than: 
1 1n =
 ln 2( )
ln
k ρ ρ≡ −
?  (41)
 
Proof:  For 0λ = ,  (in (14)) simplifies to: ( )l n ( )l n nρ= . Applying   times to (.)l k 1 1n = , 
we obtain: (1)k kl ρ= . For , this equals 1/2. Solving for , we obtain (41). □ k k= ? k?
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For example, , and ( 0.71)k ρ = =? (0.79) 3k =? . Note, that in contrast to the case 0ρ =  and 
λ  near 1 (see above), a large value of ρ , and, thus, of  does not imply that market shares 
near the extremes are to be expected with high frequency, because the “attractor”  is close 
to 1/2 if 
k
*n
ρ  is large. However, it implies that, given that a firm has a large or a small market 
share at the beginning, an even split of the market is obtained only gradually. An entrant with 
a customer base initially equal to zero can, thus, increase its market share only gradually (see 
Section 3.4.2). 
3.3.2. The stochastic benchmark 
We are now equipped with a number of qualitative predictions about the market share 
dynamics under the stochastic benchmark. In the following, these predictions are confirmed 
by means of simulation. The reason why analytical results on the patterns of market share 
evolution are difficult to obtain even for the simple stochastic benchmark case will become 
clear below, when the shape of the invariant distribution of market shares is discussed. 
The following Figures show simulations of dynamic market share patterns under the 
stochastic benchmark for different parameter values ρ  and λ , and approximations of the 
invariant distribution of market shares for each set of parameter values. For every parameter 
set, a different characteristic pattern of market share evolution is obtained. The invariant 
distributions are also computed by simulation, but with a much higher number of periods.98 
Note, that the invariant distribution shows the frequency of each possible state, but it does not 
reveal the patterns of transition between the states, e.g., whether a high market share of one 
firm is often maintained for many consecutive periods, or whether market shares tend to 
fluctuate between the extremes. 
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98 usually between 105 and 106 periods; for the market share grid of the approximated invariant distribution I 
used a uniform step size of 0.01 
Figure 3a: Simulated evolution of market shares, stoch. benchmark; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, α = 1 
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Figure 3b: distribution of market shares, stoch. benchmark; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, α = 1 
 
Figure 3a shows a simulated evolution of market shares for 0.95λ = , 0ρ = , and 1α = . 
Using (37) and (14), we obtain the fix point , and . By (38), ** 0.997n = **( ) 0.944l n = 4k =  
consecutive market share losses are necessary to destroy firm 1’s dominant position if 1 1n = . 
Market shares near the extremes are, thus, predicted to occur with high frequency, and a firm 
with a dominant position is likely to maintain this position for many consecutive periods. The 
predictions are confirmed by Figure 3a.  
Figure 3b shows the invariant distribution for the same parameter values, and illustrates that it 
has a highly irregular shape. The highest peaks at the extremes in Figure 3b correspond to the 
fix point computed above. The irregular shape of this distribution gives an idea why 
quantitative results are hard to obtain analytically. 
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Figure 4a: Simulated evolution of market shares, stoch. benchmark; λ = 0, ρ = 0.5, α = 1 
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Figure 4b: Invariant distribution of market shares, stoch benchmark; λ = 0, ρ 0.5, α = 1 
 
Figure 4a is a simulation for 0λ = , 0.5ρ = , and 1α = . Using (40), we obtain the fix point 
, and . According to (41), a single loss of market share is always 
sufficient to destroy a firm’s dominant position. Therefore, if a firm obtains a dominant 
position, it is unlikely to maintain this position for several consecutive periods. Figure 4b 
shows the approximated invariant distribution for 
* 2 / 3n = *( ) 1/ 3l n =
0λ =  and 0.5ρ = . Interestingly, for these 
parameter values, the invariant distribution is uniform.99 All market shares in the open interval 
(0,1) occur with the same frequency. However, if ρ  differs only slightly from 1/2, highly 
irregular invariant distributions are obtained again (not shown). 
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Figure 5a: Simulated evolution of market shares, stoch. benchmark; λ = 0, ρ 0.95, α = 1 
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 n
1
2
3
4
5
density
 
Figure 5b: Invariant distribution of market shares, stoch. benchmark; λ = 0, ρ 0.95, α = 1 
 
Figure 5a shows a simulation for 0λ = , 0.9ρ = , and 1α = . According to the results of 
Section 3.3.1, market shares near  and  should occur with high 
frequency, and this is confirmed. Figure 5b shows the approximated invariant distribution. 
The tendency towards even splits of the market is confirmed. Unlike for smaller values of 
* 0.53n = *( ) 0.47l n =
ρ , 
                                                 
99 The small bumps are due to numerical imprecision. Unlike the ones in Figure 3b, they become smaller as the 
number of periods is raised. 
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a regular shape is now obtained. The comparison of Figures 3a and 5a illustrates that the 
presence of word-of-mouth consumers and consumers of the ignorant type can lead to 
markedly different market share dynamics. When there is a large fraction of word-of-mouth 
consumers in the population, market shares tend to be skewed, and a firm with a large 
customer base tends to maintain the dominant position in the market for many consecutive 
periods. When most consumers are of the ignorant type, market shares tend to fluctuate 
around 1/2. 
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Figure 6a: Simulated evolution of market shares, stoch. benchm.; λ = 0.49, ρ = 0.49, α = 1 
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Figure 6b: Invariant distribution of market shares, stoch. benchm.; λ = 0.49, ρ = 0.49, α = 1 
 
Figure 6a shows a simulation with word-of-mouth consumers and ignorant types. Note, that 
the sum of λ  and ρ  must be strictly below one, for otherwise, a firm that obtains a market 
share of 1 will maintain it forever.100 The simulated process shows no clear tendency towards 
even or skewed distributions of market shares, but the approximated invariant distribution in 
Figure 6b reveals that skewed distributions occur with higher frequency than even ones. 
If the frequency of purchases α  is below one, the dynamic evolution of the state variable is 
not identical to the evolution of the realized market shares. The latter is more volatile than the 
former if 1α < . This is illustrated in Figure 7a that shows a simulation for the stochastic 
                                                 
100 This is because nobody finds out about the offer of a firm with no customer base if there are no searchers.  
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benchmark, for 0.95λ = , 0ρ = , and 0.2α = . Figure 7b shows the approximated invariant 
distribution of realized market shares for these parameter values. 
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Figure 7a: Simulated evolution of state and market shares, stoch. benchmark; α = 0.95, ρ = 0, α = 0.2 (thick 
curve: evolution of the state, thin: realized market shares) 
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Figure 7b: Invariant distribution of market shares, stoch. b.m.; α = 0.95, ρ = 0, α = 0.2 
 
The thin curve in Figure 7a, that represents firm 1’s realized market shares, oscillates around 
the thick curve that shows the evolution of the state . The comparison of Figures 7a and 3a, 
that were obtained for the same parameters except 
n
α , shows that the state and the realized 
market shares tend to be less extreme for 0.2α =  than for 1α = , but the volatility of realized 
market shares is higher for 0.2α = . This is because for 1α = , market shares are near 0 or 1 
most of the time, and step sizes are smaller near the extremes. The comparison of Figures 7b 
and 3b illustrates that the invariant distribution becomes regular shaped when the failure rate 
α  is reduced (this holds for large values of λ ). As a consequence, if the iteration procedure 
introduced in Section 3.2 fails to converge for large values of δ  and λ  when 1α = , it may 
converge when α  is reduced.  
3.4. MARKET SHARE DYNAMICS UNDER FIRMS’ STRATEGIC INTERACTION 
In Section 3.2, it was shown that the equilibrium of the game is in mixed strategies and, thus, 
yields price dispersion that generates non-trivial market share dynamics. In this Section, these 
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market share dynamics are analyzed. There are two cases that are analyzed separately: 1. the 
repeated static game / myopic firms (Section 3.5.1), and 2. the full-fledged dynamic game 
(Section 3.5.2). While in the latter, firms’ incentives to invest (or disinvest, depending on the 
shape of the value function) in future market shares play an important role, they are excluded 
in the repeated static game. However, the forces that drive the dynamic evolution of market 
shares in the repeated static game are also present when future profits are important. Market 
share dynamics in the dynamic game with 0δ >  should, thus, be discussed in comparison 
with the repeated static game which, in turn, is compared to the stochastic benchmark case 
without strategic interaction.  
3.4.1. Market share dynamics in the repeated static game 
The static game can be solved analytically.101 The solution is given by the iteration formula 
(29) (for 0δ = ), together with (14), (25), and (14). As in Section 3.3.2, the dynamic evolution 
of market shares is analyzed by means of simulation. By convention, 1α =  holds unless 
stated otherwise (each consumer makes a purchase in each period). 
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Figure 8a: Dynamic evolution of market shares; λ = 0.1, ρ = 0, δ = 0, α = 1 
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101 See chapter 2, where the shape of the past sales – current profit relation is analyzed in the static case (market 
share dynamics are not discussed). In the present chapter, the focus is on market share dynamics. 
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Figure 8b: Invariant distribution of market shares; λ = 0.1, ρ = 0, δ = 0, α = 1 
 
Figure 8c: Value function V(n); λ = 0.1, ρ = 0, δ = 0, α = 1 
 
Figure 8a shows a simulation of the dynamic evolution of market shares for 0.1λ =  and 
0ρ = . It illustrates that for λ  and ρ  near zero, market shares are very volatile and oscillate 
between values of n  near zero and near one. This case is interesting because it is only a small 
step away from the standard Bertrand model with fully informed consumers. The evolution of 
market shares in Figure 8a is far from being a plausible prediction for most markets in the real 
world, where market shares are less volatile, and firms can often maintain a dominant position 
in a market over a long period of time. This indicates that consumers are less well informed in 
the real world, or other mechanisms (such as superior production technologies or product 
innovations) must be at work that help firms sustain a dominant market position.  
Figure 8b shows the approximated invariant distribution of market shares, and reveals that 
there are roughly four different splits of the market that can occur starting from period 2 
onwards. One of them ( ) is obtained if firm 1 gains market shares when the size of its 
customer base is near zero, and the other if it gains market shares once more afterwards (it, 
then, serves almost the entire market: 
0.9n ≅
1n ≅ ). The other two splits follow from symmetry. 
These findings can be compared with the stochastic benchmark case. It turns out that for 
λ ρ+  near zero, the stochastic benchmark yields very similar dynamics as the repeated static 
game (not shown). This is related to the fact that the probability of gaining or losing market 
shares is always near 1/2 (irrespective of n ).102
It is interesting to note, that for small values of λ  and ρ , the value function (that for 0δ =  
simply reflects firm 1’s current expected profit as a function of n ) is V-shaped (see Figure 
8c). This result is related to the fact that price competition is particularly intense for even ex-
                                                 
102 In the repeated static game, the probability to maintain a dominant market position is somewhat lower than in 
the stochastic benchmark because the firm with the smaller customer base prices more aggressively, so the firm 
with the dominant market position loses market shares with a probability (slightly) greater than 1/2. 
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ante splits of the market.103 It implies that firms prefer to enter the market either with a small 
or with a large customer base. Whether this gives firms an incentive to invest or disinvest in 
future market shares when 0δ >  is discussed in Section 3.4.2, below. 
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Figure 9a: Dynamic evolution of market shares; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, δ = 0, α = 1 
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Figure 9b: Invariant distribution of market shares; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, δ = 0, α = 1 
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Figure 9c: Value function V(n); λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, δ = 0, α = 1 
 
Figure 9a illustrates the characteristic evolution of market shares for 0.95λ =  and 0ρ = . For 
these parameters, the stochastic benchmark showed a strong tendency towards skewed market 
                                                 
103 See chapter 2. 
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shares and a high degree of persistence near the extremes104 (see Figure 3a), reflecting the 
popularity weighting property of the word-of-mouth process. Under strategic pricing, market 
shares are on average less skewed, and there is less persistence at the extremes. This is related 
to the fact that a firm with a small customer base prices aggressively in order to gain market 
shares. A firm with a large customer base is, thus, likely to lose market shares, which yields a 
tendency towards even splits of the market. This effect partly neutralizes the tendency 
inherent in the word-of-mouth process to produce market shares near the extremes.  
Figure 9b shows the invariant distribution for 0.95λ =  and 0ρ = . It is irregular, but 
confirms the tendency towards more even splits of the market. Figure 9c illustrates that firm 
1’s value function has a local maximum between 0n =  and 1/ 2n =  for large values of λ . 
This is related to the fact that, starting from an even ex-ante split of the market (  near 1/2), 
firm 1 benefits from a small reduction in the size of its customer base as this softens price 
competition. A larger reduction is not beneficial because a firm with a very small customer 
base is in an unfavorable position in a market where most consumers rely on word-of-mouth 
as almost nobody will find out about this firm’s offer. 
n
 
Figure 10a: Evolution of state and market shares; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, α = 0.2, δ = 0 
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Figure 10b: Invariant distribution of market shares; = 0.95, ρ = 0, α = 0.2, δ = 0 
                                                 
104 This means that a firm with a dominant position in the market is likely to maintain this position for many 
consecutive periods. Remember, that for small values of λ  and ρ , market shares are skewed, too, but fluctuate 
between the extremes. 
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Figure 10a shows a simulation of the evolution of market shares for 0.95λ = , 0ρ = , and 
0.2α = . The invariant distribution in Figure 10b reveals a bimodal shape. This can be 
explained as follows. The state variable  is not very volatile and tends to be near 1/2. Firm 
1’s realized market shares to fluctuate around the state variable, and, thus, around 1/2. The 
average step size is around 0.5, so the highest peaks in the invariant distribution have roughly 
this distance. 
n
3.4.2. Market share evolution in the full-fledged dynamic game (δ > 0) 
The evolution of market shares for 0δ >  is analyzed using simulations based on the 
approximated value function . The value function is approximated using the iteration 
procedure or the method of discretizing the state space (see Section 3.2).
( )V n?
105 Note, that the 
dynamic evolution of market shares and the shape of the value function are closely linked and 
can not be understood in isolation. The link is as follows. The shape of the value function 
implies the shape of the price distribution functions via (14) for every possible state n . The 
price distribution functions generate (for the given information process) the stochastic process 
of market share evolution. The value function itself, however, depends on the properties of 
this stochastic process. 
The first result is that, for values of λ  and ρ  near zero, market share dynamics for 0δ >  are 
very similar to those for 0δ =  (see Figure 8a). The reason for this is the following. If λ ρ+  
is near zero, most consumers are fully informed. Therefore, irrespective of the size 
distribution of firms’ customer bases, the firm that currently offers the lower price serves most 
of current market demand. Firms, thus, have little incentive to invest or disinvest in future 
market shares. The shape of the value function and market share dynamics are, thus, similar to 
the ones for 0δ = . 
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Figure 11: Approx. value function v(n); λ = 0.1, ρ = 0, δ = 0.95 
                                                 
105 The procedure with the discretized state space is computationally faster when the iteration process takes many 
rounds to converge. Both methods yield (up to some numerical imprecision) identical results. 
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Figure 11 shows the approximated value function  for ( )V n? 0.1λ = , 0ρ = , and 0.95δ = . It 
illustrates that the V-shape is preserved when δ  is raised (see Figure 8c). However, the value 
function is shifted upwards because profits accumulate over several periods. Since 
competition in future periods is almost unaffected by the current market outcome, future 
expected profits are essentially a constant that is added to current expected profit. 
In sum, when most consumers are fully informed, market shares are very volatile and tend to 
oscillate between values near 0 and near 1, irrespective of the discount factor for future 
profits. Furthermore, the value function for this case is typically V-shaped, because current 
price competition is particularly intense for an even ex-ante split of the market.106
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Figure 12a: Dynamic evolution of market shares; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, δ = 0.5 
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Figure 12b: Invariant distribution of market shares; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, δ = 0.5 
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Figure 12c: Approx. value function v(n); λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, δ = 0.5 
                                                 
106 See chapter 2. 
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Figure 12a shows a simulation of the dynamic evolution of market shares for 0.95λ = , 
0ρ = , and 0.5δ = . As the comparison with Figure 9a shows, for larger values of the 
discount factor δ , market shares tend to be more skewed, and a firm that has obtained a 
dominant position in the market is more likely to maintain this position for several 
consecutive periods. The evolution of market shares in Figure 12a is more similar to the 
stochastic benchmark case (see Figure 3a) than to the one for 0δ =  (Figure 9a).  
The results can be explained as follows. When future profits are important, a firm with a large 
customer base (say, firm 1) has an incentive to defend its dominant position in the market. 
This leads to more intense price competition near the extremes, which partly neutralizes the 
tendency towards even market splits observed for 0δ = . This effect is particularly strong 
when  is not equal to 1, but lies somewhere between 0.5 and 1. This can be confirmed by 
analyzing the location of the price distribution functions for different values of n . It turns out 
that for , firm 1’s price distribution function first order stochastically dominates firm 2’s, 
so firm 1 is likely to lose market shares. For lower values of n  (between 1/2 and 1), the 
situation is reversed, and firm 1 is likely to gain market shares. This explains why in Figure 
12a, market shares tend to oscillate between 0.7 and 1 (or, by symmetry, between 0 and 0.3), 
and rarely remain at the extremes for several periods. 
n
1n =
Figure 12b shows the approximated invariant distribution for the same parameters. The 
comparison with Figure 9b confirms the observation that market shares tend to be more 
skewed for larger values of δ . The invariant distribution is highly irregular, which indicates 
that for larger values of the discount factor δ , and λ  near 1, the dynamic program may not 
have a solution (feedback effects become important, and a slight change in the size of a firm’s 
customer base may imply a substantial change in the firm’s value). It turns out that the 
iteration procedure fails to converge if δ  is increased beyond, say, 0.6. However, if the 
frequency of purchases α  is reduced, the irregularities disappear from the invariant 
distribution, and the model can be solved also for large values of δ  (see below). 
Figure 12c shows the approximated value function  for ( )V n? 0.95λ = , 0ρ = , and 0.5δ = . 
The local maximum that was obtained for 0δ =  (see Figure 9c) is no longer obtained. The 
relation between a firm’s value and the size of its customer base is now monotonously 
increasing. Interestingly, for values of  around 1/3, the expected profit in the dynamic case 
(Figure 12c) is actually lower than for 
n
0δ =  (see Figure 9c), despite the fact that profits are 
accumulated over several periods. This can be explained as follows. For n  near 1/3, the firm 
with the smaller customer base (firm 2) is willing to fight for the dominant position in the 
market because it has a realistic chance to achieve this, while firm 1 tries to defend its 
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dominant position. This leads to intense price competition. At lower values of n , firm 2 can 
not obtain the dominant position in the market within a small number of periods (due to the 
popularity weighting property of the word-of-mouth process). It, thus, constitutes a ‘weak 
competitor’ to firm 1, which softens price competition. 
δIn sum: when most consumers rely on word-of-mouth, and the discount factor  is greater 
than zero, the typical evolution of market shares is as follows. One of the firms obtains a 
market share near 1. This is followed by an exploitation of its market power over the 
uninformed repeat purchasers, which leads to a loss of market shares. This is followed by an 
effort to maintain the dominant position in the market, that usually leads to a gain of market 
shares again. Market shares, thus, tend to fluctuate between values above 1/2 and near 1 (or, 
by symmetry, below 1/2 and near 0), and are on average more skewed than for 0δ = . The 
value function is monotone. 
 
Markets with finitely durable goods / Entry: 
In the following, I want to analyze how a reduction in the frequency of purchases α  affects 
the dynamic evolution of market shares when 0δ > . The idea that not every consumer makes 
a new purchase in each period adds an important aspect of real-world markets to the model. It 
helps to explain why firms can enter only slowly into existing markets, and why firms are so 
concerned about market share targets in general. 
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Figure 13a: Evolution of state and market shares; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, α = 0.2, δ = 0.7 
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Figure 13b: Invariant distribution of market shares; λ = 0.95, ρ = 0, α = 0.2, δ = 0.7 
 
Figure 13a shows the simulated evolution of the state and realized market shares for 
0.95λ = , 0ρ = , 0.2α = , and 0.7δ = . It is similar to the one under the stochastic 
benchmark shown in Figure 7a. Firm 1’s realized market shares oscillate around the state, and 
the state moves only slowly. The invariant distribution shown in Figure 13b reveals an 
interesting result: market shares near the extremes and even splits of the market occur more 
frequently than market shares near 0.8 (or 0.2). This is related to the fact that the invariant 
distribution of the state has two peaks located at about 0.2 and 0.8 (not shown). Since firm 1’s 
realized market shares tend to oscillate around the state, we observe the two areas with low 
frequencies around 0.2 and 0.8 in Figure 13b. The intuitive explanation for this result is 
similar as for 1α =  (see above). Given that firm 1’s total customer base size, including all 
consumers who purchased from firm 1 when they last made a purchase, is large, firm 1 tends 
to exploit the uninformed consumers in its customer base, and, thus, tends to lose market 
shares. For lower values of  (between 1/2 and 1), firm 1 tries to defend the dominant 
position in the market. As a consequence, the state tends to remain near 0.8 (or 0.2) for many 
consecutive periods, and firm 1’s realized market shares oscillate around the state. 
n
 
 
Figure 14: Evolution of state and market shares; λ = 0.49, ρ = 0.49, α = 0,1, δ = 0.5 
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Figure 14 illustrates the effects of incomplete consumer information (λ ρ+  near 1) and a low 
frequency of purchases ( 0.1α = ) on the dynamics of entry into the market. The entrant (firm 
2) starts with a customer base of size 0, and gradually captures a greater share of the market 
by undercutting the incumbent’s price. The state gradually approaches values near 1/2, where 
most of the probability mass is located in the state’s invariant distribution for the given 
parameter values (not shown). As  decreases, market shares start to fluctuate around the 
state. Figure 14 nicely illustrates that entry into a market with incomplete consumer 
information (that induces customer loyalty towards incumbent suppliers) and a low frequency 
of purchases is time consuming and requires the entrant to price more aggressively than the 
incumbent over many periods. 
n
3.5. CONCLUSION 
Although repeat purchasing appears to be the rule rather than the exception in most markets 
for consumption goods, in search models, it is usually assumed that knowledge from previous 
consumption experiences plays no role. A static modeling framework, thus, seems 
appropriate. Within this framework, a typical feature of search games are mixed pricing 
equilibria that generate price dispersion. Firms’ market shares are, thus, not constant over 
time. But in the absence of an intertemporal link, these dynamics are rather trivial, so authors 
paid little attention to them. The empirical literature, however, emphasizes that market shares 
tend to have a high persistence over time, that is, skewed or even splits of the market are 
usually preserved for extended periods of time.107 This suggests that there must be an 
intertemporal link that is not captured by the simple repetition of a static search game.  
In the present chapter, an intertemporal link is introduced by assuming that consumers are 
repeat purchasers who possess superior information about the product they purchased 
previously. Combined with the price dispersion generated by the firms’ use of mixed pricing 
strategies, this leads to non-trivial market share dynamics. In brief, when many consumers 
search actively, market shares are very volatile, and firms have little incentive to invest in 
future market shares. The dynamics under strategic profit maximizing behavior, thus, 
resemble those generated by a simple stochastic process that assigns equal probabilities of 
gaining or losing market shares to both firms in each period. When many consumers rely on 
word-of-mouth communication as a source of information, market shares tend to be skewed, 
and a firm with a large customer base tends to maintain the dominant position in the market 
for many consecutive periods. This is especially true if the discount factor for future profits is 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., Pakes (1987). 
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sufficiently large, which gives a firm with a dominant position in the market an incentive to 
defend its customer base against an aggressive competitor with a smaller customer base. If 
consumers do not make a purchase in each period, market shares tend to be more sticky. This 
helps to explain why entry into a market often takes so much time (in standard models such as 
the Cournot model, an entrant immediately obtains its long run market share), and why firms 
are so concerned about market share targets in general. 
3.6. APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
Proof by contradiction. Suppose there is a Markov perfect equilibrium that assigns the pure 
strategies 1p  and 2p  to the state [0,1]n∈ . It must be shown that, for any 1p  and 2p  
( ), at least one of the firms has an incentive to deviate. If 1 2,p p ≤1 1 2p p= ≡ p  and , 
either firm would benefit from marginally undercutting the common price level  as this 
leads to a discontinuous rise in current demand that, for a sufficiently low 
0p >
p
δ , more than 
compensates for potential future losses resulting from the increase in the size of the firm’s 
customer base. The case 1 2p p= ≡ p  and 0p ≤  can not be an equilibrium because, if it were 
an equilibrium, the state  would remain constant, so firms choose n 1 2p p p= ≡  in all periods 
and total discounted profits are non-positive, while deviating to the monopoly price 1 yields a 
positive profit to a firm with a strictly positive customer base (and there is at least one such 
firm). If 1 2p p≠  and , the high-priced firm would benefit from deviating to the 
monopoly price because current demand and, thus, the state next period are not affected. 
There can be no equilibrium where 
1 2,p p <1
1ip =  and 1j ip ≠ < , as the low-priced firm would benefit 
from deviating to a higher price, or the high-priced firm from marginally undercutting the 
lower price (or both). 
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
Let  and  be the supports of, respectively,  and 1S 2S ( , )F n p (1 , )F n p− . Suppose  for 
a given value of . Therefore, there is a price 
1S S≠ 2
n 1p <? , with ip S∈?  but jp S∉?  
( ,, {1, 2}i j∈ j i≠ ). This can not be an equilibrium because, since jS  is open, there exists a 
price  with p p> ? jp S∉  that yields the same expected demand to firm i  in the current period 
as , but a higher profit if p? δ  is sufficiently small. This holds if  is above the maximum of p
jS  (if the maximum is below 1), below the minimum of jS , or within some intermediate 
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range that is not part of jS  when jS  is not convex. Therefore, 1 2S S S= ≡ . The maximum of 
 must be the monopoly price 1, because otherwise, each firm would benefit from deviating 
to the monopoly price. This yields the same demand as the maximum of  but a higher profit. 
The minimum of the support, 
S
S
p , is smaller than 1 since (by Lemma 1), there is no pure 
strategy equilibrium. Furthermore,  is convex. Suppose to the contrary that there is an 
intermediate range that is not part of . Firm i ’s expected demand would be constant over 
this range, but expected profit would be increasing. Therefore, expected profit would be 
higher in the upper interval of . This can not be an equilibrium. □ 
S
S
S
 
Proof of Lemma 3:  
Suppose both firms attach positive probability mass to some identical price level  in p
[ ,1]S p=  when the current state is . Each firm would, then, benefit from shifting its mass 
point to a price level marginally below 
n
p  because this leads to a discontinuous rise in current 
expected demand, which always benefits the firm if δ  is sufficiently small. Strategies 
containing a single mass point at some price  in the interval p ( ,1)p  can not be an equilibrium 
either since the competitor’s expected demand would fall discontinuously at . There can be 
no equilibrium where the distribution function of one firm contains a mass point at 
p
0p p= >  
as the competitor’s current expected profit would be larger at prices marginally below p  than 
at prices above p . This can not be an equilibrium since prices below p  are not part of the 
support. There can be no equilibrium where the distribution function of one firm contains a 
mass point at 0p p= ≤  as the firm would benefit from shifting the mass point to some higher 
price level. 
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Chapter 4. ON THE REGULATION OF VERTICALLY 
DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS WITH MORE THAN TWO FIRMS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognized that in markets where firms choose not only prices but also the 
quality level of their products, market outcomes can lead to inefficiencies in the provision of 
quality. This view is supported by the widespread usage of policy measures, in particular 
minimum quality standards, that aim at improving the overall provision of quality in markets. 
There is, however, no general agreement among theorists about the reasons behind the 
inefficient provision of quality under market conditions. The literature offers two types of 
explanation that are surprisingly divergent. 
One strand of literature (see e.g. Leland, 1979; Shapiro, 1983; Albano and Lizzeri, 2001) 
refers to incomplete consumer information as the primary source of inefficiencies in vertically 
differentiated markets. If consumers can not observe all relevant product characteristics 
before purchase (experience goods), or possibly not even after purchase (credence goods), 
then firms may be in a position to exploit them by offering poor quality at excessive prices. In 
the worst case, the market can collapse (see Akerlof’s market for Lemons, 1970). There are, 
of course, remedies to this problem. E.g., when consumers repurchase a product frequently, 
then firms can build up a reputation for being a high quality provider. Shapiro (1983) shows 
in a competitive modeling framework, that high quality providers charge prices above 
marginal costs. The prices are just high enough to deter them from cheating (by cutting 
quality). The rents, however, only compensate the firms for initial losses when building up 
their reputation. Another possibility is that firms let external experts test / certify their 
products to overcome the information asymmetry (see Albano and Lizzeri, 2001). However, 
this may not always be the most efficient way to eliminate the information asymmetry 
between consumers and firms. Furthermore, even if consumers are provided with very 
detailed product information, they may sometimes find it difficult to correctly interpret this 
information.108 Minimum quality standards, thus, often specify upper limits to chemicals or 
other inputs. 
 
108 E.g., how can a consumer tell what is an acceptable amount of certain chemicals or ingredients in food, or of 
radiation from a microwave oven etc.? 
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A second stand of literature abstracts from information asymmetries, and explains 
inefficiencies as the outcome of firms’ strategic interaction or monopolistic exploitation. In 
particular, it has been shown that duopolistic firms over-differentiate in the quality space in an 
attempt to soften price competition (see Cremer and Thisse, 1994). This result should not be 
confused with the “principle of differentiation” (Tirole, 1988), according to which firms do 
not choose identical positions in the quality space in order to avoid marginal cost pricing. 
Whereas the principle of differentiation only says that two firms do not offer identical 
qualities in equilibrium, the over-differentiation result implies that qualities are too dispersed 
from a welfare perspective. This means that the low-quality provider in a duopoly 
underprovides quality, whereas the high-quality provider offers a product of an excessively 
high quality.  
This chapter contributes to the second strand of literature, namely to the analysis of firms’ 
strategic interaction in oligopolistic markets with endogenous quality choice and fully 
informed consumers. However, it also very clearly shows the limits to this approach in 
explaining inefficiencies in the provision of quality. I extend the analysis of previous works 
(that were mainly focused on duopolies) to a larger number of firms. The main result of the 
present chapter is that the over-differentiation result that is obtained for duopolistic markets 
almost entirely disappears as soon as three or more competitors are in the market. The reason 
behind this is, that there is a regime change in the nature of competition at the transition from 
two to three (or more) competitors. Intuitively, in a duopoly, firm 1 (the low-quality provider) 
has an incentive to differentiate towards lower quality levels in order to soften firm 2’s pricing 
behavior, and vice versa. When consumers are fully informed, the incentives are so strong that 
firms locate even outside the range of consumers’ preferred quality levels109. In a triopoly, 
firm 1 has two competitors. Whereas firm 1 only competes for consumers at the margin with 
its direct neighbor (firm 2), firm 2 is also engaged in a price competition with firm 3. 
Therefore, when firm 1 lowers its quality choice in order to soften price competition, this will 
have a weaker effect than in the duopoly case (firm 2’s responsiveness to a quality reduction 
by firm 1 is lower). As a result, the degree of over-differentiation (as compared to the social 
planner’s case) is much smaller in markets with three or more competitors than in duopolistic 
markets. A direct consequence of this is that policies that improve the overall provision of 
quality (and hence welfare) in a duopoly, may not be effective or even harmful in markets 
with three or more competitors. The adequacy of policy prescriptions, thus, depends crucially 
 
109 A consumer’s preferred quality level is defined as the consumer’s product choice when all feasible quality 
levels are offered to the consumer, each of them at its respective marginal cost. 
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on the number of competitors, which implies that some of the previous results are applicable 
only to strictly duopolistic markets. 
The modeling framework I use resembles the one in Cremer and Thisse (1994) but is slightly 
more general. The authors analyze the effects of an ad valorem tax upon the provision of 
quality and prices in a vertically differentiated duopoly. They show that a uniform ad valorem 
tax is similar to a shift in the firms’ marginal cost function and leads to lower quality levels 
and lower prices. The high quality level, thus, moves closer towards the average consumer’s 
preferred quality, and in conjunction with lower prices, welfare unambiguously increases 
when a moderate ad valorem tax is introduced. 
Constantatos and Sartzetakis (1999) extend Cremer and Thisse’s (1994) work to allow for 
entry into a vertically differentiated market. They use a modeling framework that is similar to 
the one by Shaked and Sutton (1982 and 1983), and consider situations where the market is a 
natural oligopoly (in the sense of Shaked and Sutton) before the ad valorem tax is 
introduced.110 The tax effectively shifts the marginal cost curve upwards, which implies that 
the range of preferred quality levels shifts downwards. If the tax rate is sufficiently high, the 
market may switch from natural monopoly / oligopoly to a market that can support an infinite 
number of competitors. The authors show that, although for a given number of firms, the tax 
leads to a reduction in quality levels, quality jumps upwards can occur whenever the tax rate 
reaches a level that induces a change in the endogenous market structure. 
Ronnen (1991) analyzes the effects of a minimum quality standard upon the provision of 
quality and prices in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms have to pay a quality 
dependent fixed cost before competing in prices. The author shows that, when the standard is 
binding for the low-quality provider, also the high-quality provider increases its quality in an 
attempt to cushion the adverse effects on price competition. Nevertheless, prices fall, and the 
consumers’ participation in the market increases. As a result, a moderate minimum quality 
standard increases welfare. 
Crampes and Hollander (1995) analyze the effects of a minimum quality standard in a 
duopoly without quality dependent fixed costs, but where the marginal cost of production 
 
110 For a vertically differentiated market to be a natural oligopoly (which means that only a limited number of 
firms enter even when entry costs are zero), one must assume that there exists an upper bound to the set of 
quality levels that can be produced, and that this bound lies strictly below the preferred quality level of the 
consumer with the lowest valuation for quality / the lowest income. The assumption of an exogenous upper 
bound to quality appears to be quite restrictive and is relaxed in this chapter. The “natural oligopoly” case 
defined in Shaked and Sutton (1983) does, thus, not apply, so the market can support an infinite number of firms. 
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increases in quality. Similarly as Ronnen, the authors find that an appropriately chosen 
standard can improve welfare if the high-quality provider does not raise quality too sharply in 
response to the increased low-quality level. 
In this chapter, I do not explicitly analyze the welfare effects of minimum quality standards or 
commodity taxation. Instead, I perform the welfare analysis on a more general level. I 
investigate what the maximum scope for welfare improvements is within a given market 
structure, independently of the specific type of regulation chosen. To this end, I use extreme 
parameter values that allow me to compute an upper bound to the percentage welfare increase 
that can be achieved by regulation, using the social planner’s solution as reference point. 
While in a duopolistic market, the scope for welfare improvements is potentially large, it turns 
out that there is little scope for welfare improvements in unregulated markets with three or 
more competitors. Therefore, any type of regulation (although perhaps effective in a duopoly) 
is likely to be harmful in markets with more than two competitors. This includes policy 
measures such as minimum quality standards or ad valorem taxes.111 A laissez-faire policy, 
thus, seems generally appropriate for vertically differentiated markets with well-informed 
consumers where three or more firms are already in the market. 
Given the above results, the question arises where to look for an optimal policy when the 
market is a duopoly. Should the regulator try to force qualities closer to the optimum within 
the given market structure, or is it more efficient to offer a subsidy to entry and let 
competition do the rest? To give an answer to this question, I first analyze whether a subsidy 
to entry can be welfare improving. The answer is “yes, if entry costs are not too high”. I, then, 
compare welfare in a triopoly (with the subsidy) to a hypothetical policy that establishes the 
optimal quality levels in a duopoly without triggering entry. It turns out that a well-designed 
policy that does not trigger entry is superior to the entry subsidy. Nevertheless, the entry 
subsidy may be useful in practice because it requires less information. 
The fact that minimum quality standards are widely used in practice, and that their use is not 
restricted to duopolistic industries, appears to be at odds with the results of this chapter. 
Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that other sources of inefficiency, that are not related 
 
111 Scarpa (1998) shows that a minimum quality standard is harmful in a vertically differentiated market with 
three firms. However, the author does not derive a closed-form solution and resorts to a numerical analysis. 
Therefore, he fails to see the generality of his result (in particular, the fact that it applies not just to minimum 
quality standards but to any type of regulation). He does also not identify the basic reason behind the result, 
namely the fact that equilibrium qualities in an unregulated market with three (or more) competitors are almost 
optimal. 
to firms’ strategic interaction in oligopoly, play an important role as well. Leland (1979) 
points out that “Markets which have minimum quality standards tend to be characterized by 
informational asymmetry, in which the seller knows the quality of his service or product, but 
the buyer does not.”. The present chapter gives some theoretical support to this view for 
markets with three or more competitors. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, the model is introduced and 
solved for a varying number of firms. Section 4.3 performs the welfare analysis for a given 
market structure. In Section 4.4, the analysis is extended to allow for free entry. Section 4.5 
concludes. 
4.2. THE MODEL 
Consider a market where products differ in only one dimension, called quality.112 Suppose  
firms interact in two stages.
n
113 In stage 1, firms simultaneously choose the quality level of 
their products, and in stage 2, they announce prices. On the demand side, there is a continuum 
of consumers with mass 1. A marginal consumer is characterized by the taste parameter , 
drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0 . Products are sold in units, and each 
consumer purchases at most one unit in the market (unit demand).  
t
,1]
Let the set of feasible quality levels be [0, )∞ . If the marginal consumer of type t  buys a 
product of quality  at the price q p , her surplus equals:114
 ( , , ) ( )u t q p V g q tq p= + + −  (1)
, where  is a non-decreasing function, and  is a constant. (.)g 0V ≥
                                                 
u m p t q m p t q
112 In contrast to horizontal differentiation, vertical (quality-) differentiation is defined by the condition that all 
consumers agree upon a preference ordering of all feasible product versions. Different consumer types purchase 
different versions only if lower quality products are offered at a lower price. 
113 Strictly speaking, a model of this structure applies to situations in which firms choose quality only once. In a 
dynamic context, the two stages might be interpreted as representing one product cycle. See also Hoppe and 
Lehmann-Grube (2001) for an explicit analysis of the timing decision in a vertically differentiated market, and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) for a dynamic game of quality growth. 
114 This is additional utility compared to the case where the consumer spends all income on other goods available 
in the economy. To derive (1) from a proper utility function, suppose utility is quasi-linear: 
( , , ) ( ) ( , )ϕ− ≡ − +? ??  ( m : income). Let ( , ) ( ) ( )t q V t h q g qϕ ≡ + ⋅ +? ? ? ? . Take ( )q h q≡ ?  as a new measure 
of quality, let 1( ) ( ( ))g q g h q−≡ ? , and subtract  from the utility function (this does not affect preferences over m
p q− ? - combinations) to get (1). 
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According to (1), the impact of quality upon utility can be decomposed into a type-dependent 
part, , and a type-independent part, tq ( )V g q+ .115 The constant V  reflects utility of 
consuming any feasible product version, irrespective of quality. Throughout this chapter, I 
will assume that V  is sufficiently large so that uncovered market outcomes, where some of 
the consumers with the lowest valuation for quality do not make a purchase, do not occur.116 
Aggregate demand, thus, always equals 1. The assumption of full market coverage simplifies 
the exposition considerably, but the main results would not change if the assumption is 
relaxed. 
The marginal cost of production is assumed to be independent of quantity but increasing in 
quality. It is denoted by .( )c q 117 Profit maximizing firms serve the entire demand they face, 
so firm ’s total production cost equals , where  is demand for firm ’s product. 
Profits are given by: 
i ( ) ic q D iD i
( )( )i i i ip c q Dπ = − 1, 2,...,i n  ( = ). 
The above model is more general than Tirole’s (1988) well-known model, and contains the 
latter as a special case. The relation between the two is discussed in the Appendix. The 
present model appears to be more realistic, and seems more suitable as a “benchmark model” 
for vertically differentiated markets. 
Suppose, products are ordered from lowest to highest quality: 1 2 ... nq q q< < < .118 Since 
consumers agree upon the ordering of products, it must hold that 1 2 ... np p p< < <  if each firm 
is to sell a positive quantity. As is well-known from vertical differentiation models of this 
type, firm i ’s demand can be derived from conditions of indifference. Let  be the type who 
is indifferent between buying firm i ’s and firm 
it
1i + ’s product ( 1,..., 1i n= − ). The conditions 
of indifference read: 
 1 1( , , ) ( , , ) ,  1,..., 1i i i i i iu t q p u t q p i n+ += = − (2)
Using (1), this yields: 
                                                 
115 Type-dependent utility may also be non-linear in quality (e.g. ). However, the measure of quality can be 
rescaled to yield  
( )th q
( )h q q= q∀ . 
116 Note, that for any set of prices and quality choices, there is a V that is sufficiently large so that even the 
lowest consumer type makes a purchase in the market. 0V =  is often sufficient for this. For a detailed 
discussion of covered vs. uncovered outcomes, see also Wauthy (1996), and Choi and Shin (1992). 
117 Ronnen (1991), Lehmann-Grube (1997), and Aoki (2003) assume a quality dependent fixed cost. This seems 
plausible when firms enter a new market. 
118 The inequalities are strict because i jq q i≠=  leads to marginal cost pricing and does not occur in equilibrium. 
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 1 1
1
( ) (i i i
i
i i
p p g q g qt
q q
+ +
+
)i− − += −  
(3)
Let  and . Firm i ’s demand is, then, given by: 0 0t ≡ 1nt ≡
 1 ,  1,...,i i iD t t i n−= − =  (4)
The profit maximization problems at the pricing stage read: 
 ( )( )1max ( )  ,  1,...,
i
i i i i ip
p c q t t i nπ −= − − = (5)
To simplify the exposition, I will use ( )ic c qi≡  as a short-hand for the value of the function 
 at . The short-hand is also used for other functions of  (e.g. ).  (.)c iq q= q ( )i ig g q≡
Furthermore, the following variable transformation turns out to be useful: 
 i ir p ci≡ −  (6)
ir  is firm i ’s mark-up price (price minus marginal cost). For a given value of , this variable 
can be used instead of 
iq
ip  in all computations.  
It is further useful to melt the functions  and  into a single function as follows: (.)g (.)c
 ( ) ( ) ( )f q g q c q≡ −   q∀  (7)
The function  reflects the type-independent preference for quality net of marginal cost. 
To obtain an interior solution,  must be a concave function, and to fulfill the second-order 
conditions at the quality stage,  must be sufficiently concave. Below, a linear-quadratic 
form is assumed that fulfills the requirements. Note, that to assure that  is concave,  
must be concave or  must be convex, or both. Both are plausible assumptions. 
(.)f
(.)f
(.)f
(.)f (.)g
(.)c
 
Lemma 1: The equilibrium mark-up prices  and quality choices  ( ) are 
independent of the exact specification of  and . They only depend on  and  
via . 
*
ir
*
iq 1,...,i = n
                                                
(.)g (.)c (.)g (.)c
(.)f
 
Proof: 
Using (3), (6), and (7), the profit maximization problems at the pricing stage, (5), can be 
written as follows:119
 
i
119 Remember, that  stands for , and if ( ) ( ) ( )i if q g q c q= − ( )i i ir p c q= − . 
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 ( ) ( )
1
2 1 2 1
1
2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
                                            max
( ) ( )
   max  ,  2,..., 1
( )( )
                             
i
r
i i i i i i i i i i i i
ir
i i i i
r r f fr
q q
q q r r f f q q r r f f
r i
q q q q
− + + + − −
+ −
⎡ ⎤− − +⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
− − − + − − − − +⎡ ⎤ = −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
n
1 1 1
1
   max
n
n n n n n n
nr
n n
q q r r f fr
q q
− − −
−
⎡ ⎤− − + + −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
(8)
The claim follows from the fact that equations (8) contain  and  only via . □ (.)g (.)c (.)f
 
According to Lemma 1, different specifications of  and  yield the same market 
outcome, as long as the function  stays the same. This implies that market outcomes do 
not depend on the absolute value of marginal production costs, but only on marginal costs 
relative to consumers’ (type-independent) willingness-to-pay for quality. 
(.)g (.)c
(.)f
Lemma 1 has an important implication for the welfare analysis in Section 4.3. Although the 
equilibrium prices ip  may depend upon the exact specification of  and , welfare does 
not, because prices are simply transfers from consumers to firm owners and do not directly 
affect welfare. Similarly as the mark-up prices and quality choices, welfare will depend on 
 and  only via . 
(.)g (.)c
(.)g (.)c (.)f
The solution to the profit maximization problems (8) is computed via the following first-
order-conditions (FOC) that form a system of  linear equations in the mark-up prices:n 120
 
( )
1 2 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
                                                   2
( ) 2 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
                                         2
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
n n n n
r r f f
q q r q q r q q r q q f f q q f f
r r q q
+ − + − − + − + +
− −
− + = −
− − − + − = − − − − −
− = − + 1n nf f −− +
1−
(9)
The FOC (9) can be substituted back into the profit maximization problems (8) to yield the 
following simplified expressions for profits: 
 2
1
1
2 1
2
1 1
1 1
2
1
              
( )    ,  2,..., 1
( )( )
             
i i i
i
i i i i
n
n
n n
r
q q
r q q i n
q q q q
r
q q
π
π
π
+ −
+ −
−
= −
−= =− −
= −
−
                                                
(10)
Now consider profit maximization at the quality stage. Using (10), and: 
 
120 It is straight-forward to check that the second order conditions are always fulfilled. 
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 ,  1,...,i i i i
i i i i
d dr i n
dq r dq q
π π π∂ ∂= + =∂ ∂
(11)
, the FOC on the quality stage can be written in the following simplified form: 
 1
1 2 1
1
1 1 1 1
1
                           2( ) 0
   ( 2 ) 2( )( ) 0 ,  2,..., 1
                          2( ) 0
i
i i i i i i i i
i
n
n n n
n
drr q q
dq
drq q q r q q q q i n
dq
drr q q
dq
+ − + −
−
+ − =
− + − − − = = −
− − =
 
(12)
Due to backwards induction, (12) can only be solved for  after the FOC on the 
pricing stage, (9), have been solved for . Equations (10), then, yield the 
equilibrium profits ( )
1 2( , ,..., )nq q q
1 2( , ,..., )nr r r
* * *
1 2, ,..., nπ π π .  
To obtain tractable results, from now on, a linear-quadratic form will be assumed for :(.)f 121
 2( )f q q qβ α= −  (13)
, where 0α >  and 0β >  by assumption.  
In the duopoly case122, the equilibrium can easily be computed. One obtains:123 
 * *
1 2
* *
1 2
* *
1 2
1/ 4 5 / 4  ,  
2 2
3            
8
3         
16
q q
r r
β β
α α
α
π π α
− += =
= =
= =
(14)
For  firms, one obtains the following solution: 3n =
                                                 
121 Although the results in this chapter are based on this specific functional form, the main results hold more 
generally for a set of concave functions. Note also that, since  is a combination of (.)f (.)g  and , (.)c (.)g  and 
 are not required to be linear-quadratic, which adds some generality. (.)c
122 For completeness, the monopoly case ( 1n = ) is briefly discussed in the Appendix. 
123 It can be shown that the necessary second order conditions are fulfilled, and that the equilibrium qualities are 
also global maxima. To assure market coverage, the following condition must be fulfilled (follows from (1), (6), 
and (7) for ): 0t = 21 1V r q q1β α≥ − + . For 2n = , this yields (using (14)): 
225 16
64
V βα
−≥ . To assure market 
coverage, on can either assume that β  is sufficiently large, or that . 0V >
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 * * *
1 2 3
* * *
1 3 2
* * *
1 3 2
1/ 8 1/ 2 7 / 8  ,    ,  
2 2
13 11              ,  
256 256
169 121        ,  
12288 12288
q q q
r r r
β β β
2α α α
α α
π π πα α
+ += = =
= = =
= = =
+ (15)
For , computations become so complicated even with the help of a computer that the 
problem must be simplified. This can be achieved by assuming that the solution has certain 
properties, which allows to reduce the number of variables in the computation. The inspection 
of the above results for  and 
4n ≥
2n = 3n =  reveals that equilibrium qualities are located 
symmetrically around 1/ 2
2
β
α
+ , and are of the form 
2
i
i
xq β α
+= , where the  depend 
only on the number of firms, n , and are independent of all other parameters of the model. The 
values 
ix ∈?
ix  may be referred to as reduced quality levels: 
 2i ix qα β≡ −  (16)
Assuming that the above assumptions hold for , candidate equilibria can be computed 
for any given number of firms. It must, then, be verified that each of them fulfills the 
necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions. Using this approach, I have solved the 
problem for up to  firms. The equilibrium reduced quality levels are shown in Figure 1. 
3n >
7n =
 
 
Figure 1: Equilibrium reduced quality levels xi for a varying number of firms n 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that a “regime change” occurs at the transition from  to , as the 
range of quality levels is narrowed remarkably at this transition (and gradually increases again 
for larger values of ). This is accompanied by a dramatic decline in profits (industry profit 
decreases by roughly factor 10 at the transition from 
2n = 3n ≥
n
2n =  to 3n = ). The presence of a 
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regime change suggests that results or policy prescriptions that are derived for duopolistic 
markets may not hold for markets with more than two competitors. 
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Range of preferred quality levels:  It is instructive to compare the range of equilibrium quality 
levels ( ) with the range of quality levels preferred by consumers. Let  be the 
preferred quality level of the marginal consumer of type t  when all feasible quality levels are 
available to the consumer at marginal cost. Use 
*
1nq q− ( )q t?
( )p c q=  in (1), and maximize over  to 
obtain the following optimality condition: 
q
 ( ) 0df qt
dq
+ =?  (17)
(17) is easy to interpret. t  is the type-specific marginal utility with respect to an increase in 
quality, and ( )df q
dq
?
 is type-independent marginal utility net of marginal cost. Optimality 
requires the overall benefit of a marginal increase in quality to be zero.  
Using (13), (17) yields:  
 ( )
2
tq t β α
+=?  (18)
Plugging in  for the lowest, and 0t = 1t =  for the highest consumer type, we, thus, obtain for 
the range of preferred quality levels: 1,
2 2
β β
α α
+⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . Note, that 
1/ 2
2
β
α
+ , the mid-point of 
equilibrium qualities for , is also the center of the interval of preferred qualities. 2n ≥
Comparing the range of equilibrium quality choices in a market equilibrium (see Figure 1) 
with the range of preferred quality levels, we find that for , equilibrium qualities are 
located at the interior of the range of preferred quality levels, whereas in the duopoly case, 
they are located outside. This illustrates that, in an attempt to soften price competition, 
duopolistic firms differentiate so much in the quality dimension that equilibrium qualities are 
not optimal qualities for any consumer type. There is, thus, a high degree of over-
differentiation in the duopoly case that can cause a substantial welfare loss.  
3n ≥
The reason why equilibrium qualities are less dispersed as soon as more than two competitors 
are in the market is the following. If, say, firm 1 in the duopoly case lowers its quality choice 
in stage 1, this will soften firm 2’s pricing behavior in the following stage.124 This gives firm 
1 an incentive to choose an artificially low quality level. When there are three firms in the 
                                                 
124 Reaction functions shift towards higher prices. 
market, firm 1 has two competitors who are also engaged in a price competition among each 
other. This implies that firm 2 is now less responsive to a quality reduction by firm 1. 
Therefore, firm 1 has a weaker incentive to differentiate away from its neighboring 
competitor. The same reasoning applies to firm 3, so overall, equilibrium qualities are less 
dispersed than in a duopoly. Although the quantitative results (in particular the welfare 
analysis conducted in Sections 4.3 and 4.4) rely on the specific modeling framework chosen 
in this chapter, the basic finding of a regime change in the nature of competition at the 
transition from  to  or more firms is of a much more general nature, so the 
prediction that qualities are less dispersed than in a duopoly, and the consequences that are 
derived from this, are robust. 
2n = 3n =
The over-differentiation result obtained in the duopoly case, and the welfare loss it causes has 
inspired authors to analyze the effects of different policy measures on welfare in vertically 
differentiated markets. As pointed out above, the presence of a regime change at the transition 
from duopoly to triopoly raises concerns about the generality of the results. Since the nature 
of competition in vertically differentiated markets with more than two firms differs from the 
one in the duopoly case, we can not expect conclusions that were obtained for the duopoly 
case to be applicable to markets with than two competitors. The following two Sections 
analyze the scope for welfare improvements by regulation for a varying number of firms. It is 
shown that, as soon a more than two competitors are in the market, outcomes are almost 
optimal, which leaves little room for welfare improving policies. 
4.3. WELFARE ANALYSIS 
To compare welfare in a market equilibrium with the optimum (the social planner’s case) for 
a varying number of firms, I will first derive an expression that allows to compute welfare for 
a given set of quality levels and mark-up prices.  
I assume consumer surplus ( ) and industry profit (S Π ) enter welfare in an identical way: 
 W S= +Π  (19)
Consumer surplus is computed by summing over the different products and integrating over 
consumer types, taking into account consumers’ product choices: 
 
1
1
( , , )
i
i
tn
n i
i t
S u t q p
−=
i dt
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∫  
(20)
Using (1), (6), and (7), and evaluating the integral, this can be written as: 
 (1 1
1
1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( )
2
n
n i i i i i i
i
S V t t f q r q t t− −
=
= + − − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ )i (21)
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Industry profit is simply the sum over the  firms’ profits. Using (4) and (6), we obtain: n
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1 1
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n i i i i
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= =
Π = = −∑ ∑  (22)
Using (21) and (22) in (19), we obtain the following expression for welfare:  
 ( )1 1
1
1 ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
2
n
n i i i i i
i
W V t t f q q t t− −
=
= + − + + i⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ (23)
The values for  are computed as (follows from (3) and (6)): it
 1 1
1
( ) (i i i i
i
i i
r r f q f qt
q q
+ +
+
)− − += −  
(24)
Note, that prices affect welfare only via market shares (that are determined by the ’s). This 
is because prices are simply transfers from consumers to firm owners and, thus, have no direct 
effect upon welfare. Market shares and quality levels, however, affect welfare directly. 
Inefficiencies in vertically differentiated markets can, thus, arise due to distorted quality 
levels, or due to distortions in market shares, which implies that some consumers do not 
purchase from the same firm where they would buy in the planner’s case (or both).
it
125  
 
The Social Planner’s case: 
The planner’s problem is to maximize welfare by choosing prices and qualities optimally. 
Since welfare depends upon prices only via the ’s, the problem can be decomposed into two 
steps: 1. determine the vector 
it
1 1( ,..., , ,..., )n nq q t t 1−  that maximizes (23) for a given n , and 2. 
choose mark-up prices  such that (24) is fulfilled ir {1,..., 1}i n∀ ∈ − . Note, that in step 2, the 
regulator has one variable more than necessary to fulfill the 1n−  conditions, because there 
are  mark-up prices to choose. Intuitively, suppose the planner chooses for product 1 some 
price greater than marginal cost ( ). This does not cause an inefficiency if the planner 
chooses the remaining prices and all quality levels such that the optimal allocation is reached. 
Now all mark-up prices are greater than zero. Therefore, if the planner values consumer 
surplus only marginally more than profits, the optimal choice will always be , and, not 
surprisingly, all other mark-up prices will optimally be zero as well. However, rather than 
imposing this, this should be the result of the planner’s optimization problem, because the 
n
1 0r >
1 0r =
                                                 
125 Another potential source of inefficiency arises in uncovered market situations when too many consumers (as 
compared to the planner’s case) do not make a purchase. As pointed out in Section 4.2, this chapter focuses on 
covered market outcomes, so this possibility does not arise. 
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planner may set prices different from marginal costs to correct for other inefficiencies. 
Therefore, we are only free to choose one mark-up price.126 I, thus, assume .  1 0r =
Using (13) in (23), the first step of the planner’s problem reads: 
 ( )
1 1 1
2
1 1,..., , ,..., 1
max ( ) 2 2 ( )
n n
n
i i i i i i iq q t t i
t t q q q t tβ α
−
− −
=
⎡ ⎤− − + +⎣ ⎦∑ (25)
The FOC can be written as follows: 
 1      ( )   ,   1,..., 1i i it q q i nα β+= + − = −  (26)
 1  0 2 4   ,   1,...,i i iq t t i nβ α −= − + + = (27)
Plugging the ’s from (26) into (27), we obtain the following relation: it
 1 1      ,   2,..., 1
2
i i
i
q qq i+ − n+= = − (28)
(28) illustrates that, in the optimum, there are equal distances between all quality levels. 
To solve the system of linear equations (26) and (27) for an arbitrary number of firms , the 
easiest approach is to guess (part of) the solution, and then to verify that the candidate 
solution fulfills the equations. Since quality levels are equally spaced, an obvious guess is that 
all market shares are identical in the planner’s solution. I, thus, assume: 
n
  ,   1,..., 1i
it i n
n
= = −  (29)
 Plugging this into (27), we obtain for the planner’s quality choices: 
 1/ 2
 ,   1,...,
2
i
n
iq i
β
α
−+= = n  (30)
All that remains to be done is to use (29) and (30) in (26) to show that the candidate solution 
is the correct solution to step 1 of the planner’s problem (this is straight-forward). 
Step 2 of the planner’s problem is to choose mark-up prices that fulfill (24). Solving (24) for 
, we obtain (using (29) and (30)): 1ir+
 1  ,    1,..., 1i ir r n+ = −  (31)
All mark-up prices are, thus, identical, which, combined with the assumption , yields 
, . The planner, thus, sells all product versions at marginal cost. 
1 0r =
0ir = 1,...,i = n
                                                
 
Using the above results, welfare in a market equilibrium can be compared with the respective 
 
126 Furthermore, this mark-up price must be sufficiently low to yield market coverage. 
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planner’s outcome for an arbitrary number of firms. For the purpose of this chapter, it suffices 
to show the results for  and  firms: 2n = 3n =
 2
2
5 /16
4
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α=
+ += +    ,   
2
*
2
1/16
4n
W V β βα=
+ += +  (32)
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35 /108
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989 / 3072
4n
W V β β α=
+ += +  (33)
Note, that the welfare reductions in the market equilibrium relative to the planner’s case result 
for different reasons. For , both firms’ market shares are equal to 1/2 in the planner’s 
case and in the market equilibrium. The lower welfare in the market equilibrium is, thus, due 
to the fact that qualities are too dispersed (over-differentiation). For , qualities in the 
market equilibrium are (slightly) too dispersed, and in addition, market shares are skewed
2n =
3n =
127, 
which implies that there is a misallocation of consumers over the firms (some consumers 
purchase from a different supplier than in the planner’s case). 
Note, that all expressions for welfare in (32) and (33) are of the same form: 
2
4
constW V β βα
+ += + . This permits quantitative predictions about potential welfare 
improvements by regulation. Consider the following measure for the maximum percentage 
welfare increase that a regulator can achieve by setting prices and qualities optimally (for a 
given number of firms ): n
 *
*, ,
max
sp
n n
n V
n
W WR
Wα β
⎡ ⎤−≡ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
(34)
nR  is, thus, an upper bound to the percentage welfare increase a regulator can achieve, which 
means that we can not find parameter values that yield a higher relative welfare increase. It is 
a measure of the scope for welfare improvements that can be achieved by regulation. 
Computing the ratio 
*
*
sp
n
n
W W
W
− n  for a given value of , we find that the parameters V  and n β  
drop out in the numerator, and in the denominator, they appear with positive signs. This 
implies that the ratio strictly decreases in V  and β . Therefore, to compute an upper bound to 
the percentage welfare increase, simply set 0V .128 The parameter α , then, drops out. β= =
                                                 
127 The high- and the low-quality provider have a market share of about 27%, and the medium firm of 46%. 
Mark-up prices are also not identical (see (15)). 
128 A parameter restriction of the form 0β β≥ >  or 0V V≥ >  is sometimes necessary to assure non-negativity 
of the lowest equilibrium quality and/or market coverage. These restrictions are for simplicity neglected in the 
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Evaluating (34) for the duopoly case, we obtain an upper bound to the percentage welfare 
increase of 200 percent. This implies that, depending on the actual parameter values, there can 
be a substantial scope for welfare improving policy interventions in the duopoly case. Results 
are, however, markedly different when the number of competitors is larger. The main result of 
this Section is summarized by the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: When three firms are in the market, there is an upper bound to the percentage 
welfare increase by regulation of only 0.66 percent. 
 
Proof: 
Using (33) and (34), we obtain for 0V β= = : 3 35 /108 989 / 3072 0.0066989 / 3072R
−= ≅ . 
 
According to Proposition 1, when there are three firms in the market, the scope for welfare 
improving policies is small.129 It should be pointed out that for any plausible parameterization 
of the model ( 0β > ), the actual scope for welfare improvements is even smaller, as the upper 
bound has been computed for extreme parameter values. 
The reason for behind the result is that the equilibrium qualities when three (or more) firms 
are in the market are close to the optimum, as can easily be confirmed by comparing (15) and 
(30) (for ). The over-differentiation result that drives the inefficiencies in the duopoly 
case, thus, almost disappears at the transition from 
3n =
2n =  to 3n =  or more firms. Furthermore, 
even if the specific value for the upper bound to potential welfare improvements that was 
computed above relies on the specific modeling choices made, the main result, namely that 
the scope for welfare improvements decreases dramatically at the transition from 2n =  to 
 firms, holds more generally and does not depend on the specific modeling choices made 
(such as the linear-quadratic specification of the function ). 
3n =
(.)f
As a consequence, we can conclude that a laissez-faire policy seems appropriate whenever 3 
or more firms are in the market. This is especially true if the regulator faces some uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                                        
0computation of the upper bound to potential welfare increases. However, in both cases, ( β > 0> or V ), 
incorporating the restriction into the computation would only lead to a reduction in the upper bound, thus 
strengthening the main results of the analysis further. 
129 This holds a fortifiori for an even larger number of firms since prices and quality choices are even closer to 
the planner’s solution. 
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about the true parameter values of the model (as is always the case in reality). A policy that is 
intended to increase welfare may, then, even turn out to be harmful. 
4.4. WELFARE UNDER FREE ENTRY CONDITIONS 
In this section, the analysis is extended to allow for free entry. Let  be the fixed entry 
cost per firm. The main questions that shall be answered are whether the result of Proposition 
1 continues to hold under free entry conditions, and whether a regulator can use a subsidy to 
entry to improve welfare. 
0F ≥
As a benchmark, consider first a situation with zero entry costs. To maximize welfare, the 
social planner offers a continuum of product qualities (the interval between the lowest and the 
highest preferred quality) at marginal cost, and each consumer type chooses her preferred 
quality level . Using (1), (7), (13), and (18), we obtain for the utility of type t : ( )q t?
 2( )( )
4
tu t V β α
∞ += +  (35)
Welfare, thus, equals:  
 1 2
0
1/ 3( )
4
W u t dt V β βα
∞ ∞ + += = +∫ (36)
This is the maximum welfare that can be achieved in this market in the absence of entry costs. 
This formula can be used to compute a simple estimate for an upper bound to welfare 
improvements by any type of regulation. Note, that, under free entry conditions, the market 
equilibrium with zero entry costs coincides with the planner’s solution: an infinite number of 
firms enter, and welfare is as in (36).  
In the presence of entry costs, the optimal number of firms is finite. (36), then, always 
overestimates the scope for welfare improvements by regulation. When 3 firms are in the 
market, using (33) and (36), we obtain as an estimate of the scope for welfare improvements: 
*
3
*
3
3.5W W
W
∞ − =  percent. This illustrates that the market solution with 3 firms leaves rather 
little scope for welfare improvements even when compared to the first best solution with an 
infinite number of product versions where entry costs are neglected.  
When entry costs are taken into account, the scope for welfare improvements is smaller. The 
following Proposition extends the result of Proposition 1, taking into account entry costs: 
 
Proposition 2: When three firms are in the market, the upper bound to the percentage welfare 
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increase by any regulation that leaves the number of competitors unchanged equals 1.6 
percent. 
 
Proof: 
When entry costs are taken into account, the formula for welfare (19) becomes: 
 W S nF= +Π−  (37)
, where Π  is industry profit before entry costs. 
Suppose, entry occurs in stage 0, before firms coordinate on their positions in the quality 
dimension. Therefore, entry occurs as long as the following condition holds: 
 ( ) 0n nFΠ − ≥  (38)
To obtain an upper limit to potential welfare improvements, we want to compute nR  as in 
(34), but now the maximization is also over , and we have to subtract the total entry cost 
 from all expressions for W . In the numerator, entry costs drop out, while the denominator 
decreases in . 
F
nF
F nR  is, thus, maximized when  is maximized. Since 3 firms are in the 
market, we know that 
F
(3
n
Π )F ≤  holds. Therefore, to maximize nR , let (3)F n
Π≡ . Industry 
profit, then, equals zero, so welfare equals consumer surplus. For 3n = , this is given by: 
 2*
3
409 / 3072
4n
S V β β α=
+ += + (39)
Using (33) and (39), we obtain for 0V β= = : 3 35 /108 989 / 3072 0.016409 / 3072R
−= ≅ . 
 
The difference between the results of Propositions 1 and 2 can be interpreted as follows. 
When fixed entry costs are taken into account, profits are partially or fully dissipated, so total 
welfare is reduced, while the difference in welfare with / without regulation stays the same. 
This yields a slightly higher estimate of the scope for welfare improvements measured in 
relative terms. However, the basic result, that the scope for welfare improvements is small 
when 3 firms are in the market, remains valid. 
It has been shown that, when 3 or more firms are in the market, there is little scope for welfare 
improvements, so a laissez-faire policy seems generally appropriate. The following results, 
thus, focus on the duopoly case where (depending on the parameter values) substantial 
welfare improvements may be possible. In particular, I will analyze whether a subsidy to 
entry may be welfare improving, which seems plausible as welfare is almost maximized for 
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3n = . Note, that a subsidy to entry has (compared to other policies) the advantage that the 
regulator does not need to influence the firms’ choices of qualities and prices directly. 
 
Proposition 3: When two firms are in the market, there is an interval of fixed entry costs  
where entry is welfare improving but does not occur under market conditions. A subsidy to 
entry is, thus, welfare improving. 
F
 
Proof: 
Under free entry conditions, at most two firms enter the market if (3) 3 0FΠ − < . Using (15), 
this yields the condition: 
 51
4096
F α>  
(40)
Starting from a situation with two firms, entry by a third firm leads to the following change in 
welfare (using (32) and (33)): 
 * *
3 2
797
12288
W W F Fα− − = −  
(41)
Therefore, for 51 797
4096 12288
Fα α< < , the entrant stays out, although entry would be desirable 
from a welfare perspective. 
 
The result of Proposition 3 stems from the fact that there is insufficient entry under market 
conditions. This result is in contrast to standard oligopoly theory (e.g. Cournot competition), 
where prices in excess of competitive prices usually induce more entry than optimal, due to an 
inefficient replication of entry costs. In the present model, there is a substantial increase in 
consumer surplus at the transition from 2n =  to 3n =  because over-differentiation almost 
vanishes, while profits decrease sharply.130 This leads to insufficient entry.  
Note, that, if a subsidy is used to trigger entry, it must be at least as high as 51
4096
F α−  to 
make the entrant’s profit non-negative. A subsidy should not be granted if 797
12288
F α> . If the 
actual level of the fixed entry cost  is unknown to the regulator, the optimal policy is to F
                                                 
130 Note, that, unlike in the present model where a regime change occurs at the transition from  to 2n = 3n = , in 
Cournot markets, the transition to competitive pricing as the number of firms increases is a gradual one. 
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offer a subsidy of 797 51 161
12288 4096 3072α α α− =  to a potential entrant, since entry will, then, 
occur if and only if it is socially desirable. 
The result of Proposition 3 raises the question where to look for an optimal policy. In the 
following, I want to answer the question whether a subsidy to entry is superior to a 
hypothetical optimal policy that leaves the number of competitors unchanged (starting from a 
situation with two firms in the market). The result is summarized in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4: If two firms are in the market, a subsidy to entry is inferior to an optimal 
policy that leaves the number of competitors unchanged.  
 
Proof: 
A subsidy to entry is superior to an optimal policy that leaves the number of firms unchanged 
if *3 2
spW F W− > , where 2spW  is welfare in the planner’s case for 2n = . Using (32) and (33), 
this yields the condition: 
 29
12288
F α<  
(42)
However, by (40), when there are two competitors in a market, we must infer that entry costs 
are at least as high as 51
4096α . Therefore, condition (42) is violated. 
 
Proposition 4 implies that a policy that installs optimal prices and qualities in the duopoly 
case, without triggering entry, is always superior to a subsidy to entry. Nevertheless, there are 
arguments in favor of an entry subsidy. If welfare is to be increased by means of taxation, 
minimum quality standards, or other policies that aim at establishing quality choices that are 
close to the optimum, then the regulator must have sufficient knowledge about the demand 
and cost structure in the market, which enables him to compute the optimum. A subsidy to 
entry, on the other hand, does not require as much information. The welfare enhancing effect 
of this policy relies strictly on competitive forces, and as long as the subsidy is not too high, it 
will always be welfare improving. 
4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A well-established result for duopoly models with vertically differentiated products and fully 
informed consumers is that firms differentiate too much in the quality dimension in order to 
soften price competition (over-differentiation). This should not be confused with the 
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“principle of differentiation” (Tirole, 1988), according to which firms do not choose identical 
positions in the quality space in order to avoid marginal cost pricing. While the principle of 
differentiation seems fairly robust, the over-differentiation result turns out to be very sensitive 
to the specific modeling choices. In particular, the present chapter showed that over-
differentiation almost disappears when three or more competitors (instead of two, as assumed 
in previous works) are in the market. Since qualities are close to the optimum, there is little 
scope for welfare improving policies. Policies that can improve welfare in a duopoly (such as 
minimum quality standards) may, thus, not be suitable for markets with three or more 
competitors.  
Since in practice, minimum quality standards are widely used, and their use is not restricted to 
duopolies, this indicates that there may be other sources of inefficiencies that are not related 
to strategic over-differentiation in vertically differentiated duopolies. An obvious candidate is 
incomplete consumer information, e.g. related to unobservable quality features of products 
before or even after purchase. To name only two examples, consider the safety features of a 
car that are unobservable at the time of purchase, or potentially harmful ingredients in food. 
For vertically differentiated markets with well-informed consumers, the welfare analysis 
conducted in the present chapter allows the following policy prescriptions: 
1. When two competitors are in the market, a subsidy to entry is welfare enhancing if entry 
costs are not too high. 
2. When three or more competitors are in the market, a laissez-faire policy should be adopted. 
4.6. APPENDIX 
The relation to Tirole’s (1988) model of vertical differentiation: 
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p
Tirole’s (1988) well-known vertical differentiation model is a special case of the model 
introduced in this chapter. Tirole assumes: u qϑ= − , where the preference parameter ϑ  is 
distributed uniformly on the interval [ , ]ϑ ϑ . This expression for  is obtained when  is 
linear: 
u (.)g
( )g q qβ≡ , and . (1), then, reads: 0V = ( )u t qβ p= + − . Define tϑ β≡ + . Since t  is 
uniform on [0 , ,1] ϑ  is uniform on [ ,ϑ β ϑ β 1]≡ ≡ + . Arbitrary values for ϑ  and ϑ  are 
reached by adjusting β  and by appropriately rescaling the measure for quality by a constant 
factor. Note, that a larger value of β  corresponds to less dispersed preferences in Tirole’s 
formalization. Tirole further assumes that costs are independent of quality, which seems 
restrictive. 
Tirole points out that the “types” can be re-interpreted as consumers with different levels of 
income. If p m<< , a first-order Taylor expansion of utility yields: 
( , ) ( , ) ( / )U m p q U m q U m p− ≅ − ∂ ∂? ?? ? ? . Let ( , )U m q??  be given by ( )m h qα + ?  (the surplus derived 
from consuming one unit of a product of quality q?  is the same for all consumers). Subtract 
mα  from the utility function and divide by  to get 1/U m mαα −∂ ∂ =?
1ˆ ( , , ) ( ) /U m p q m h q pα α−= ⋅ −? ? . If  has the distribution function m 1( )F m m α β−= −  over the 
interval , we get 1/(1 ) 1/(1 )[ , (1 )αβ β− + ]α− ( , , ) ( ) ( ) /U t p q t h q pβ α= + −? ? , where 1t m α β−≡ −  is 
distributed uniformly over [0 . Now take ,1] ( ) /q h q α≡ ?  as a new measure of quality. Since 
 should normally be a concave function,  automatically becomes (more) convex (if 
 is linear: 
(.)h (.)c
(.)c ( )c q qχ=? ? , then 1( ) ( )c q h qχ α−= ). This important fact has been ignored by 
Tirole, who suggests to linearise the quality-dependent part of utility, but assumes that c  is 
independent of , which seems restrictive. The non-linear model presented in this chapter 
seems more realistic, and it produces interior covered market solutions. 
q
 
A brief discussion of the monopoly case: 
Under market coverage, demand equals 1, so the monopoly profit is simply equal to the mark-
up price of the monopolist: . Profit is, thus, increasing in , so the monopolist either 
chooses  such that the lowest consumer type is indifferent between buying and not buying 
(corner solution), or an uncovered market outcome is obtained. The corner solution is 
characterized by: 
m rπ = r
r
 ( 0, , ) ( )u t q p V g q p= = + − 0= (43)
Using (6), this yields: 
 ( )r V f q= +  (44)
Maximizing this over q , we obtain the following monopoly outcome: 
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2
4
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m m
q
r V
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α
βπ α
=
= = +
 
(45)
To assure that a covered market equilibrium is obtained, it suffices to assume that the value V  
is sufficiently large.131
                                                 
131 To see this, write down the profit for an uncovered market for a given q , and take the derivative w.r.t. . 
Evaluate this at , the price where the lowest type is indifferent between buying and not buying. If 
r
( )r V f q= +
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Welfare in the monopoly case and in the respective planner’s case is given by: 
 2
1
1/ 4
4
sp
nW V
β β
α=
+ += +    ,   
2
*
1 4n
W V β βα=
+= +  (46)
The welfare loss in a monopoly, as compared to the planner’s case, results from the under-
provision of quality (the monopolist chooses the quality level that is preferred by the 
consumer with the lowest preference for quality, whereas the planner chooses the average 
consumer’s preferred quality.) A minimum quality standard seems an appropriate measure to 
improve the market outcome. 
                                                                                                                                                        
( )f q≥ −the derivative is non-positive (the condition for this is V q ), the monopolist does not benefit from 
increasing his price, so the market remains covered. This holds for any given q  if V  is sufficiently large. 
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Chapter 5. ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE HIGH-QUALITY 
ADVANTAGE UNDER VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
A vertically differentiated market is a market where consumers agree on the ranking of all 
feasible product types when they are sold at the same price.132 In a duopolistic market with 
fully informed consumers, where each firm sells one product of a certain quality133, firms 
never choose the same quality level because price competition then drives profits to zero. In 
order to characterize the nature of competition in vertically differentiated markets, one must, 
thus, understand how firms choose the quality of their products in equilibrium, given that they 
compete also in prices, and what this implies for the resulting profits. It appears to be an 
established fact that the high-quality provider earns the higher profit. This chapter questions 
this result and shows that it relies on the specific modeling choices made by various authors. 
Tirole (1988), e.g., introduces a model where utility is linear in quality, and unit cost is 
independent of quality.134 He shows that the high-quality provider always earns the higher 
profit. Lehmann-Grube (1997) shows that the high-quality-advantage is still obtained when 
there are (convex) fixed costs of implementing a desired quality level. The high-quality 
advantage, thus, seems to be a robust prediction. Unfortunately, the author does not offer an 
explanation of what actually drives the high-quality advantage, which makes it difficult to 
question the robustness of his prediction even on a qualitative level. The mere fact that the 
high-quality provider sells to the higher-willingness-to-pay consumers is not a convincing 
argument for the generality of the prediction when costs are increasing in quality. 
Crampes and Hollander (1995) introduce a model where firms earn equal profits in 
equilibrium when the unit cost of production is quadratic in quality. This already implies that 
the strict high-quality advantage can not be a general prediction, but it leaves open the 
question under what conditions and why a high- or a low-quality advantage is obtained.  
This chapter fills the gap between Tirole’s (1988) linear and the quadratic version of Crampes 
and Hollander’s (1995) model. Based on the assumption that either utility is concave or unit 
 
132 When products are sold at unit cost, different consumer types may prefer different quality levels. Otherwise, 
there is an upper bound to the number of active firms in the market (see Shaked and Sutton, 1982 and 1983). 
133 Champsaur and Rochet (1989) analyze a duopolistic market where firms offer an interval of qualities. 
134 Tirole’s model has become popular in the literature and has been used or modified by several authors, e.g. 
Wauthy (1996), Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001), Choi and Chin (1992). 
cost is convex in quality, or both, interior covered market equilibria are obtained. It is shown 
that, for a low degree of non-linearity, the low-quality provider earns the larger profit, while 
for higher degrees of non-linearity, the high-quality advantage is restored. The intuition 
behind this result is as follows. For a high degree of non-linearity, the high-quality provider is 
effectively committed not to choose very high quality levels as the difference between 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay and unit cost decreases rapidly in quality at high quality levels. 
Anticipating the competitor’s reluctance to choose high quality levels, the low firm has a 
larger incentive to choose a lower quality level, which benefits the high firm. The resulting 
high-quality advantage is, thus, a consequence of the firms’ strategic interaction. For a low 
degree of non-linearity, the situation is reversed, and a low-quality advantage is obtained. 
Tirole (1988) imposes exogenous bounds to the set of feasible quality choices. The upper 
bound is necessary because the high firm always has an incentive to increase quality, while 
the lower bound assures the existence of a covered market equilibrium135. However, 
exogenous bounds to quality affect the firms’ strategic interaction. An upper bound has a 
similar effect as a (sufficiently) concave utility – quality, or a convex unit cost - quality 
relation. The high-quality provider is, then, committed not to choose very high quality levels.  
In the model presented in this chapter, the assumption of an upper or a lower bound to quality 
is not necessary. If an exogenous upper bound is nevertheless introduced, it can induce an 
artificial high-quality advantage that might otherwise not be observed, while a lower bound to 
quality can induce a low-quality advantage. The chapter is meant to contribute to our 
understanding of where a high-quality advantage comes from, in case it is observed, and to 
clarify that its existence is not a general prediction for vertically differentiated markets. 
5.2. THE MODEL 
The model analyzed in this chapter differs from the one introduced in chapter 4 in two 
respects. Firstly, the analysis in this chapter is restricted to the duopoly case ( ). And 
secondly, a more general non-linear dependency between willingness-to-pay minus cost and 
quality is introduced (see below). In chapter 4, the focus was on the special case of a quadratic 
dependency. Since the basic model is the same, the main assumptions and results that are 
relevant for this chapter are, in the following, only briefly summarized. 
2n =
Two firms (a high- and a low-quality provider) interact in two stages. In stage 1, they choose 
the quality level of their products (  and ), and in stage 2, they announce prices (1q 2q 1p  and 
                                                 
135 “covered” means that all consumer types buy a product in this market 
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2p ). There is a continuum of consumers with mass one. A marginal consumer is characterized 
by the taste parameter , that is uniformly distributed on [0 . A consumer buys either zero 
or one unit in the market. If type  buys a product of quality  at price 
t ,1]
t q p , her utility equals: 
 ( , , ) ( )u t q p V g q tq p= + + −  (1)
, where  is a non-decreasing concave function, and  is a constant. (.)g 0V ≥
The unit cost of production is independent of the produced quantity, but increasing and 
convex in quality. It is denoted by . ( )c q
To simplify notation,  and  are used as a short-hand for  and . It is further 
useful to define: 
ic ig ( )ic q ( )ig q
 ( ) ( ) ( )f q g q c q≡ −  (2)
( )f q  is type-independent surplus net of cost from consuming a good of quality . q
The derivation of the equilibrium profits on the pricing stage (for fixed quality levels) is as in 
chapter 4. The equilibrium profits in the duopoly case are: 
 ( )22 1 2 1
1
2 19( )
q q f f
q q
π − − += −   and  
( )22 1 2 1
2
2 1
2( )
9( )
q q f f
q q
π − + −= −  
(3)
There are two conditions that assure non-negative profits that follow from (3): 
 2 1 2 1 0q q f f− − + ≥   and  2 1 2 12( ) 0q q f f− + − ≥  (4)
While in Tirole’s linear model, 2π  is unambiguously larger than 1π  when both firms are 
active – this is the so-called high-quality advantage (see Wauthy, 1996) – this must not be the 
case here. It holds that 1 2π π>  if:  
 2 1 2 12( ) 0f f q q− + − <  (5)
Note, that (5) can not be fulfilled if 1c c2= . Therefore, a low-quality advantage can only be 
generated in a covered market situation if the unit cost is increasing in quality.136
The first-order-conditions at the quality stage read: 
 2 1 2
1
2 1
2 '( ) q q f ff q
q q
1− + −= −   and  
2 1 2
2
2 1
2( )2 '( ) q q f ff q
q q
1− − + −= −  
(6)
According to (6),  must be a concave function if it is to produce an interior covered 
market solution. This is fulfilled since, by assumption,  is convex and  is concave. 
(.)f
(.)c (.)g
                                                 
136 It can be shown that the firm that earns the higher profit in equilibrium (firm {1,2}i∈ ) always serves more 
than half of the market ( ) and has a higher mark-up price (1/ 2iD > i i ip c p c i− −− > − ). 
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Computing the second derivatives of the profits from (3), and using (6), one obtains the 
following (necessary) second-order-conditions: 
 2 1 2
1 2
2 1
''( )
4( )
q q f ff q
q q
− − +− ≥ −
1
and
2 1 2
2 2
2 1
2( )''( )
4( )
q q f ff q
q q
1− + −− ≥ −  
(7)
By (4), the right-hand sides are non-negative.  must, thus, be sufficiently concave in the 
relevant range to produce an interior covered market solution. 
(.)f
5.3. HIGH-QUALITY ADVANTAGE VS. LOW-QUALITY ADVANTAGE 
To analyze the impact of the “degree of non-linearity” of  upon the relation between the 
two firms’ profits, the following specification of  is used: 
(.)f
(.)f
 ( )f q q qδβ α= −  (8)
, where α  and β  are non-negative constants, and 1δ > .137
Before analyzing the equilibrium under market conditions, it is instructive to characterize the 
preferred quality level  of consumer type t , given that price equals unit cost. As shown in 
chapter 4,  is defined by the condition: 
( )q t?
( )q t?
 ( ) 0df qt
dq
+ =?  (9)
For 2δ = , (9) yields: ( )
2
tq t β α
+=? . The range of preferred qualities is, thus 1,
2 2
β β
α α
+⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .
138
Under market conditions, the equilibrium quality levels in the quadratic case are:  
 * *
1 2
1/ 4 5 / 4  ,  
2 2
q qβ βα α
− += = (10)
According to the “principle of differentiation” (Tirole, 1988), firms in a vertically 
differentiated industry do not occupy identical positions to avoid marginal cost pricing. The 
above results show that, in the quadratic duopoly case, the strategic effect139 of reducing / 
increasing quality in order to soften the competitor’s pricing behavior is so strong that the 
equilibrium qualities lie even outside the range of preferred qualities. 
                                                 
137 β  is assumed to be sufficiently large so that the low quality is greater or equal to zero. See the Appendix. 
138 In Tirole’s (1988) model, all consumers would choose a product of infinite quality when sold at unit cost. 
139 in the terminology of Tirole (1988); the effect of a change in  on firm 2’s profit can be decomposed as 
follows: 
2q
* * *
2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2
2 2 1
( , , ( , ), , ( , )) ( , )d q q p q q p q q p q q
dq q p q
π π∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ 2
π ; the first term is called the direct effect, the 
latter one is the strategic effect 
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Now consider the more general non-linear case, where δ  may be different from 2. The main 
result of the analysis in this chapter is summarized by the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: In an interior covered market equilibrium, for 2δ > , the profit of the high-
quality provider is larger than the one of the low firm, while for 2δ < , the low firm earns the 
larger profit. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
The idea that under non-linear preferences and costs, the high-quality advantage can be 
reversed may not be very surprising: suppose the quality levels of the two firms were 
exogenously fixed; if the unit cost of production increases fast enough in quality (that is, 
faster than the consumers’ willingness to pay), why should we expect the high-quality 
provider to earn the higher profit? What is surprising about the above result, however, is that 
for a high degree of non-linearity, the high-quality advantage is actually restored!  
To understand the intuition behind this result, we have to take into consideration the strategic 
effects of a change in the degree of non-linearity. If δ  is increased (say, starting from 2δ = ), 
the difference between the unit cost and the consumers’ willingness to pay is reduced at 
higher quality levels. The negative effect upon firm 2’s profit can partially be cushioned by 
lowering . The negative side-effect of this is that firm 1’s pricing behavior becomes more 
aggressive. Since firm 1 anticipates firm 2’s choice of a lower quality level, firm 1 has an 
additional incentive to choose a lower quality level itself. This, however, positively affects 
firm 2’s profit, while firm 1 suffers from the reduced level of . This leads to the high-
quality advantage. In sum: there are two effects of an increased degree of non-linearity of 
: Firstly, a reduced margin between the consumers’ willingness-to-pay and unit cost as a 
direct effect, and secondly, a commitment effect: when the exponent in  is sufficiently 
high, firm 2 is effectively committed not to choose very high quality levels, and firm 1, 
anticipating this, will choose an even smaller level of . 
2q
2q
(.)f
(.)f
1q
Figure 1 shows that both firms suffer from an increased degree of non-linearity, but – as a 
result of the strategic interaction of the two firms – the low-quality provider suffers even more 
than the high firm. This is what drives the above result. 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium profits π1 and π2 for different exponents δ (α = β = 1; π1: dashed) 
 
For lower values of δ , the situation is reversed, and a low-quality-advantage is obtained.140 
For 1δ → , Tirole’s linear model is obtained. For this model, however, a high-quality-
advantage is always obtained. To understand the difference between the model presented 
above, for δ  near 1, and Tirole’s linear model, note, that Tirole assumes an exogenous upper 
bound to the set of feasible quality choices (otherwise, the high-quality provider would 
choose ), and a lower bound to assure market coverage. Now it should be clear from 
the discussion above that an exogenous upper bound to quality serves as a commitment device 
for the high firm not to choose very high quality levels, and this can induce a high-quality-
advantage, while a lower bound to quality can lead to a low-quality-advantage. The fact that 
Tirole (1988) predicts an unambiguous high-quality-advantage (despite the lower bound to 
quality) relies on the restrictive assumptions made by the author.
2q →∞
141
To see that an exogenous bound to quality can induce an artificial high- / low-quality 
advantage, consider the following example. Let 2δ = , 3 / 8α = , and 1β = . One obtains in 
equilibrium: , , and 1 1q = 2 3q = 1 2 1/ 2π π= = . Now suppose there is a lower bound to 
                                                 
140 For an intuitive explanation of the low-quality-advantage, consider the plot (over ) of the willingness-to-
pay (wtp) minus unit cost for the average consumer (
q
1/ 2t = ), for 2δ < . It increases steeply at low levels of  
and then declines slowly.  is located in the increasing range,  in the decreasing one. What matters for the 
strategic determination of qualities the slope (the rate of change in  of wtp minus unit cost), while the level at 
 and matters for profit. Since the curve is steep at the low end, a high slope is reached already at high levels 
of the curve, while a comparable slope (in absolute value) in the decreasing range is reached at a lower level. 
q
1q 2q
q
1q 2q
141 in particular, that the unit cost is independent of quality, and that utility is linear in quality; under these 
assumptions, the difference between the willingness-to-pay and unit cost always increases in quality 
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quality142 at . One obtains in equilibrium: 1.5q = 1 1.5q = , 2 3.166q = , 1 0.567π = , 
2 0.289π = , so 1 2/ 1.96π π = . The lower bound to quality induces a pronounced low-quality 
advantage. Firm 1’s profit even increases in absolute terms (not just relative to 2π ) when the 
lower bound is introduced. The firm benefits from the bound to quality as a commitment 
device. 
5.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In linear models of vertically differentiated markets, an exogenous upper bound to quality 
must be imposed to avoid the problem of an infinitely high quality choice. Furthermore, a 
lower bound is assumed if the focus is on covered market equilibria. An exogenous bound to 
quality confers commitment power to the firms not to choose a very high / very low quality 
level. This can induce an (artificial) high- or low-quality advantage. The fact that Tirole 
(1988) always obtains a high-quality-advantage relies on the specific assumptions of the 
model, in particular the quality - independent unit cost and the linear utility - quality relation. 
It seems more natural to assume that utility is concave and / or that the unit cost of production 
is convex in quality. As a result, one can either obtain a high- or a low-quality advantage, 
depending on the degree of non-linearity assumed in the model. For a low degree of non-
linearity, the model presented in this chapter predicts a low-quality-advantage, while the high-
quality-advantage is restored for higher degrees of non-linearity (a quadratic relation marks 
the turning point between these two cases). A high degree of non-linearity is similar to an 
exogenous upper bound to quality, as it confers commitment power to the high firm not to 
choose very high quality levels. The existence of a high- or a low-quality advantage, thus, 
depends on the nature of strategic interaction, which is related to the degree of non-linearity. 
5.5. APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
First, it will be shown that the parameterization of the model can be simplified without 
affecting the value of the profit ratio. It turns out that this ratio is independent of one of the 
remaining parameters. This simplifies the proof considerably. 
For an ease of notation, “∆ ” is used for differences between qualities or functional values of 
qualities. E.g.,  stands for f∆ 2 1 2 1( ) ( )f f f q f q− = − . 
                                                 
142 A lower bound to quality can be interpreted as a minimum quality standard. See Ronnen (1991) or Crampes 
and Hollander (1995). 
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)From (8), one obtains: 2 1(f q q q
δ δβ α∆ = ∆ − − . Using this and (8), the FOCs (6) become: 
 
1 2 1
1
( )1 1
2 2 2
q qq
q
δ δ
δαδ β α− −= − + ∆   and  
1 2 1
2
( )1 1
2 2
q qq
q
δ δ
δαδ β α− −= + + ∆  
(11)
Using (3) and the expression for , one obtains for (the square root of) the profit ratio: f∆
 ( )
( ) 2 112 2
1 (
2 (
q q q
q q q
δ δ
1
)
)δ δ
β απ
π β α
− ∆ + −= + ∆ − −
(12)
In the following, it is shown that the profit ratio is independent of α . 
First, consider the expression 2 1(q q )
δ δα −  that appears in (12). This can be rewritten in a 
more convenient way. Multiply equations (11) by, respectively,  and  to obtain: 1q 2q
2 1
1 1
(1
2 2 2
q qq q
q
δ δ
δ αβαδ −⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟ ∆⎝ ⎠ 1
) q  and 2 12 2
(1
2 2
q qq q
q
δ δ
δ αβαδ −⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟ ∆⎝ ⎠ 2
) q . Subtracting 
these two equations and rearranging yields: 
 ( )2 1 2 11( ) 22 1q q q q qδ δα βδ− = ∆ + +−
(13)
Using (13) in (12), both numerator and denominator of the profit ratio become linear in  
and , and do not explicitly contain the parameter 
1q
2q α . However, the equilibrium quality 
levels  and  are functions of the parameters: 1q 2q 1 1( , , )q q α β δ= , 2 2 ( , , )q q α β δ= .  
Now define: 1 1( , , ) ( , , )
kq qα β δ α α β δ≡? , and 2 2( , , ) ( , , )kq qα β δ α α β δ≡? , where k  is a 
constant. Using these definitions, the FOCs (11) can be rewritten as: 
(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) 1 2 1
1
( )1 1
2 2 2
k k q qq
q
δ δ
δ δ δα δ β α− + − − + −= − + ∆
? ?? ?  and 
(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) 1 2 1
2
( )1 1
2 2
qk k qq
q
δ δ
δ δ δα δ β α− + − − += + + ? ?? ?
−
∆  
. The idea is to choose k  such that α  disappears in the FOCs. This is the case for 1
1
k δ≡ − . 
 and  are, then, only functions of 1q? 2q? β  and δ . From the definition of  and , it, thus, 
follows that: 
1q? 2q?
 1
1
1 1( , , ) ( , )q qδα β δ α β δ− −= ?  and 
1
1
2 2( , , ) ( , )q qδα β δ α β δ− −= ?  
(14)
Using (13) and (14) in (12) shows that α  cancels out. The profit ratio has, thus, been shown 
to be independent from α . 
There is a minimum value for β , denoted by minβ , that assures that the FOCs have at least 
one solution for which  holds. Set 1 0q ≥ 1 0q ≡ . (11) simplifies to: 121 12 2q
δ βα δ −⎛ ⎞− = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and 
1
2
1q δ βα
− −=  . Combining these two equations yields (note, that α  cancels out): 
 
min
3( ) 1
2
β δ δ= −  
(15)
For example: 1.5δ =  yields min 0β = , 2δ =  yields min 14β = , and min 12β =  for 3δ = . 
It remains to be shown that, for 2δ <  ( 2δ > ), 1
2
1ππ >  (
1
2
1ππ < ) holds for all β . (5) is a 
condition for 1
2
1ππ > . Using (8) and (13), this condition can be written as: 
 
r z> , with 2qr q≡ 1  and 
12( 1) 2
52( 1) 2
z
δ β δ
δ β δ
− + +≡ − + −
 
(16)
That is, the condition for 1
2
1ππ >  has been re-written as a condition on the ratio of equilibrium 
quality levels. 
The FOCs (11) can be combined into a single non-linear equation that determines the 
equilibrium value for . Dividing the equations by each other, and using (13), one obtains: r
 1 2 ( 2)( 1) 3
2 ( 1)( 1) 3
rr
r r
δ δ β
δ β
− + − += − − +  
(17)
It must be shown that  holds for 1 2r z> δ< < , r z=  for 2δ = , and  for r z< 2δ > . The 
second claim ( r  for z= 2δ = ) is easily confirmed. For 2δ = ,  simply equals the critical 
value for r :  for all 
r
z β . To show that the other two claims hold, one may insert  into the 
equation that determines . It, then, suffices to show that the resulting equation in 
z
r β  and δ  
has no solution for 2δ ≠ , because by continuity, then,  is larger (smaller) than  for all r z β  
and all (1,2)δ ∈  ( (2, )δ ∈ ∞ ). Replacing  by , one obtains: r z
 1 512( 1) 2 4
5 12( 1) 42
δδ β δ β
βδ β δ
−⎛ ⎞− + + +⎜ ⎟ =⎜ ⎟ −− + −⎝ ⎠
(18)
For a given δ , the left- and the right-hand-side (LHS, RHS) of this equation can be seen as 
two curves that intersect at a solution of the equation. For 2δ = , both curves are identical. 
Note, that the RHS of (18) is independent of δ . To show that for 2δ ≠ , the equation has no 
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solution, it, thus, suffices to show that the set of curves defined by the LHS do not intersect 
each other. That is, starting from 2δ =  where both curves are identical, if δ  is increased (or 
decreased), the curve of the LHS is shifted away from the one of the RHS for all β . Here, 
this is shown indirectly by analyzing the slope of the LHS at a fixed β  for different values of 
δ . Define the function ( , )h β δ  as the natural logarithm of the LHS: 
 
2
1
( , ) ( 1) lnh β δβ δ δ β δ
⎛ ⎞+= − ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ , where 2
1
2δδ +≡  and 1
5
2
2( 1)
δδ δ
−≡ −  
(19)
2( 1)δ −
Since the logarithm is a strict monotone increasing transformation, it suffices to analyze the 
slope of h . Taking the derivative w.r.t. β , one obtains: 2 1
2 1
( 1)( )'( , )
( )(
h
)
δ δ δδ β β δ β δ
− −= − + + . It must 
be shown that the absolute value of this slope decreases as δ  increases. That is, for any 
, it must hold that: 1δ δ> >? '( , ) '( , )h hβ δ β> ?δ . Using the condition that 1 0β δ+ >  
(otherwise, the denominator in LHS, and, thus, r  is negative, which implies ), after 
some re-arrangements, the condition 
1 0q <
'( , ) '( , )h hβ δ β δ> ?  simplifies to δ δ>? , which is true 
by assumption. Therefore, the slope of the curve defined by the LHS is decreasing in δ . 
Noting that lim ( ) lim ( ) 1r zβ ββ β→∞ →∞= =  (which is easy to verify), the equation to be analyzed has, 
thus, been shown to have no solution for 2δ ≠ . (Rigorously, one must also show that LHS 
does not intersect with the lower branch of RHS, since RHS has a polar point. It can be shown 
that the limiting curve for δ →∞  of LHS is given by: 3 /(2 1)e β + , which lies strictly above the 
lower branch of RHS.) 
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Outlook 
The reader may wonder, why in this work, there are chapters on markets with demand 
rigidity, and chapters on vertical differentiation with apparently few conceptual intersection 
points. The choice of these topics was motivated by a broader vision of markets with demand 
rigidity, where firms choose quality endogenously and invest in R&D to develop higher-
quality products. This vision combines ideas from all chapters of this work. The main idea is 
briefly sketched in the following. 
Suppose, a firm moves up on the quality ladder143, and reaches the quality level of its 
competitor that dominated the market in the past. In existing models with endogenous quality 
growth, authors generally neglect the possibility of demand rigidity, e.g. caused by 
incomplete consumer information. Therefore, market shares immediately adjust to the new 
conditions after the innovation, and the previous follower reaches an equal market share as the 
competitor. However, under demand rigidity, market shares are sticky and do not immediately 
adjust. Therefore, the previous leader may still serve a large fraction of market demand after 
the innovation. This reduces the follower’s incentives to innovate, and puts the leader in a 
fairly “secure” position. 
One of the questions that one could ask in this context is whether there exist dynamically 
stable constellations with leaders and followers with different market shares. E.g., there may 
be a large technological leader chased by several smaller followers, or a high-priced leader at 
the technological frontier and a large follower that serves most of the market. Pioneering work 
in this field has been done by Fishman and Rob (2003). The authors show that, in a market 
where consumers are locked-in at their previous supplier due to search costs, firms with a 
large customer base earn higher profits and invest more in R&D than smaller firms. However, 
the authors assume that firms only compete for new consumers who arrive in the market, 
while older consumers are fully locked-in. In a similar model, Rob and Fishman (2005) 
introduce word-of-mouth. Information about the past performance of firms, thus, spreads only 
gradually in the economy. However, also in this work, the authors abstract largely from price 
competition by assuming that consumers are locked-in at their previous supplier. This could 
be a good starting point for future research. 
Apart from this, there is a weakness of the models introduced in this work that shall briefly be 
discussed here. But it is important to note that this is not a weakness that is specific to these 
models. It equally concerns a large number of other models, e.g. from the search literature. 
 
143 See Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
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Confronting this weakness, and trying to resolve it, could be another interesting starting point 
for future research. 
This weakness is, that these models neglect the importance that retailers have in the 
determination of market outcomes. E.g., if consumers are not fully informed about the 
existence or the offers of the different firms in a market – as was assumed in chapter 2 and 3 
of this work – then shops play an important role because they make a pre-selection of the 
products with respect to quality and price. This may, indeed, be one of the main functions of 
shops in general, possibly eliminating much of the quality uncertainty that might otherwise 
prevail in a market economy.144 A “complete” model of a market should, thus, account for the 
role that retailers play as information intermediaries and price setters. The explicit inclusion 
of firms and retailers in oligopoly models with incomplete consumer information is a real 
challenge for future research. 
Authors from the search literature often refer to shops rather than firms at the supply side of 
their models. In this work, I have chosen not to adopt this notion. The reason for this is that 
shops usually offer a variety of products. Therefore, they do not set a single price, as was 
assumed for the “firms” in chapter 2 and 3. They set a large number of prices, and usually 
offer a low price from time to time for certain products but not for others. Therefore, the 
average price of a basket of goods may be roughly constant over time. 
Another complication arises when firms do not offer a single product, but a set of different 
product versions. This complicates the picture, because the demands that a firm faces for the 
different product versions are not independent. Multi-product firms that are active in several 
markets may also find it easier to establish a reputation for offering goods of a certain quality 
level than single-product firms, because consumers purchase from them more frequently. 
 
144 Stiglitz (1989) writes: “The existence of imperfect information gives rise to a demand for information… (this) 
may give rise to firms which specialize in the production and dissemination of information… Indeed, on can 
view wholesalers, or even retailers as being largely information intermediaries.“ 
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